Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State⁰

Karachi, August 8, 1963, 7 p.m.

307. Embtel 274.¹

1. I met with President Ayub at Quetta on August 7 as scheduled to discuss trend of US-Pak relations and to put forward our proposals for Under Secretary Ball’s visit to Pakistan and for Kashmir mediation. (Latter reported separately.) MEA Director General Shahi and Sneider also present. Ayub confined to bed due fever which had forced him cancel all his public engagements for past 24 hours. Despite illness he was most cordial and prolonged interview for 45 minutes to amplify his own concern over current drift in relations. We had fuller and more useful exchange than I had anticipated under circumstances. His warm response to President’s proposal for visit by Mr. Ball likewise reflected this deep concern with recent developments.

2. I opened meeting by setting forth as instructed Deptel 219² the President’s serious concern with deterioration in our relations and his decision send Mr. Ball along with senior military official to Pakistan to examine full range of US-Pakistan problems in extended conversations with Ayub in effort place our alliance on more solid basis. As reported Embtel 295,³ Ayub quickly warmed to proposed visit and after reviewing his schedule suggested dates August 19-22 or from August 26 since he committed to Lahore visit August 23-25. He particularly asked that I convey his personal gratitude to the President for initiative.

3. In underscoring our concern with current drift in US-Pak relations, I made point as instructed that while we welcomed assurances given us by Bhutto on non-existence of special Sino-Pak ties or understandings, we wanted to make clear earnest US desire to avoid being forced to take unpalatable choice between our wish to continue support Pakistan and our obligation to discharge global responsibilities. I told the President he knew that nothing could be allowed to prevent us from meeting our obligations to the Free World as we saw them. The meeting of this commitment was in the ultimate essential interest of Pakistan. During conversation I took other opportunities to highlight our concern pointing out Pakistan’s immediate national interests should be in line with our broad policy. I pointed out inevitable adverse reaction in US as was already happening to some extent if it appeared Pakistan working with enemy of US and serious view we must take of any actions Pakistan might be tempted to take which would seek to limit our freedom to take action necessary for global security. I also stressed our intention back up Indian resolve to keep Chicoms and their influence out of Indian territory, regardless of Pak views. This did not mean we necessarily endorsed Indian policies, but that extension of Chinese influence over India would be an unacceptable threat to all free interests including those of Pakistan.

4. Gist of Ayub’s response was contained in message he asked me to convey to President that he too was greatly concerned about current developments but he continued to be convinced Pakistan needed US and that US needs and will need Pakistan more and more as time goes on. He felt it would be a great misfortune if we drifted apart through “force of circumstances.” He reaffirmed that last thing Pakistan wanted was to get militarily or politically involved with Communist China, “unless Pakistan is forced to the wall.” Nevertheless, he elaborated and reiterated this thesis; Ayub made clear there is risk of this eventuality coming as result of so far unallayed Pakistani fears that its security will be irretrievably undermined by continuing Indian military build-up. Ayub urged we do not allow situation to develop where Pakistan driven involuntarily to “do something not acceptable” to US.

5. Ayub reiterated and expanded on this thesis throughout our conversation, making following points:

A. Not only does Pakistan need US but US will need Pakistan as ally on subcontinent in future, since Ayub is convinced of prospect of increasing close ties with India and USSR and gradual elimination of present favorable US position in India. He foresees Indian-Soviet ties growing as result psychological—not ideological—factors, particularly many years of anti-Western indoctrination of Indian public which makes ties with US difficult to justify, and as a result greater sense of security gained by India against Chicoms if USSR underwrites its security. Ayub sees US links with India hindered by latter’s non-alignment policy which associated with anti-West spirit and mutual Indian and Soviet adherence to “liberation” theme—which essentially liberation from Western influence. Thus aid and influence of USSR, which is in part an Asiatic power, are easier for Indians. Ayub pointed to recent Indian repudiation of VOA transmitter agreement as substantiation his point about Indian non-receptivity to new role for US. (In this context, Ayub incidentially castigated neutralism as “threadbare” policy with nothing to it.)

B. Ayub indicated he was under no illusions about Chicom motives in cultivating Paks. He not only reaffirmed Bhutto’s assurances that there is no Sino-Pak mutual defense arrangement but questioned Bhutto’s statement to Assembly on grounds that, if India-Pakistan engaged in war, China would act only in its own, not Pak, interests since India and China vying for dominance of Asia. Paks could not control Chicom reaction and Chicoms do not need Pak encouragement to resist anything which involves expansion of Indian influence. (I challenged Ayub on Indian ambitions for all Asian dominance but this is unshakable element of Ayub credo.) When I pointed to magnitude Sino-Soviet rift and possible implications of extension of their contest to subcontinent, Ayub acknowledged seriousness of rift more explicitly than in past, or in earlier part of this conversation but interestingly commented Chinese not cultivating Pakistan much and not making any gestures of serious type. He still believes two great communist partners could and probably would close ranks when all chips down.

C. Ayub throughout stressed reality and justness of Pakistan fear of threat to own security as result buildup of Indian forces. Ayub cited in this connection arms and assistance to ordnance factories being supplied not only by US but by UK, Germany, USSR and others. He reiterated his well-known lack of trust in India, which views Pakistan as enemy and he cited, as symptom of inner Indian animosity, its position on Kashmir which has no overriding economic, political or symbolic importance to India. Pak public much alarmed by Indian military buildup and in this inflamed condition vulnerable to irrational impulse to do all sorts of things which not reasonable.

D. Ayub urged that situation not be allowed to develop where Pakistan driven to this point, since it has great warmth for US. I pointed out US had given assurances to Pakistan against Indian threat, which stood as a protection. Ayub felt these were not sufficient and Pakistan needed confidence it could with its own forces “hold off” Indians. He broached then US support for a Pak “containing force” sufficient to hold off communist or Indian threat. Strength of such force would be worked out by military. Ayub stressed increased Pak forces would not only reassure Pak public and stem current adverse drift in US-Pak relations but serve as “stand-by” force for our common use in other areas.

6. Main theme on each side came out again at end of meeting when Ayub solemnly enjoined me on his behalf to urge President “not to drive us to the wall” and I adjured him not to take any action which would have the unnatural effect of putting Pakistan’s immediate interests out of line with US discharge of its regional obligations. Ayub manifestly understood and did not challenge our right or need to act on this basis if this painful point were ever reached. Clearly he hopes we will never have to make such a choice. He also hopes that US recognizes full scope of his deep concern about Pak security and the inevitable primacy of this factor in ultimate Pak foreign policy decisions.

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/BALL. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and New Delhi.
1. In telegram 274 from Karachi, August 3, McConaughy reported that he had an appointment to see Ayub in Quetta on August 7. (Ibid., POLPAK-US)
2. Telegram 219 to Karachi, August 5, also sent to New Delhi as telegram 300, informed McConaughy and Bowles of President Kennedy’s decision to send Ball to the subcontinent for a series of in-depth discussions with Ayub and Nehru. The two Ambassadors were instructed to discuss Ball’s proposed visit with Ayub and Nehru, and consult about the timing for the visit. (Ibid., POL 7 US/BALL) According to an August 6 telephone conversation between Ball and McGeorge Bundy, Bowles objected, via a “private wire,” to Ball’s visit to India. He felt that it would hurt his prestige in India if his successor as Under Secretary turned up in New Delhi shortly after his arrival. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Subjects, Pakistan, 1961-1963) Accordingly, the Indian portion of the Ball trip was cancelled.
3. Dated August 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/BALL)