308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan0
80. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review.
Ambassador Ahmed made farewell call on President July 9. Ahmed initiated conversation by covering now familiar territory. He remarked [Page 618] that situation on subcontinent gloomy verging on tragic. GOP acknowledged US was trying hard resolve Kashmir problem and undoubtedly had given consideration to Ayub’s view that military aid to India be withheld until Kashmir and other issues settled. However, US, at time when Chicom threat receding, had now decided move beyond emergency aid and Nassau without taking into account recalcitrance of India on Kashmir. Long term aid imperils Pak security and by not tying this aid to resolution Kashmir, US had in effect written off Kashmir settlement.
Ahmed observed that he is not clear how US views future of subcontinent. US officials admitted security subcontinent depends on rapprochement India and Pakistan. On other hand same officials have said we cannot let Kashmir settlement determine our policies. In his view, he said, US policy inconsistent. There can be no security without rapprochement; yet rapprochement impossible without Kashmir settlement.
President commented that US has been taking Pak interests into account; we have very definitely not been indifferent to Pak concerns. Our aid to India was far less than India desired; we have not given India planes and have instead arranged air defense exercises which will be much easier for Pakistan. Also, we are deeply involved in trying help resolve Kashmir; this effort is in Pak interests. Ambassador Galbraith had practically worn out his welcome in New Delhi by his pressure on Indians on Kashmir. Trouble is that Pakistan and India still far apart on Kashmir and this compounds our difficulties. Withholding aid to India, in our view, is not way to get settlement; it would not work just as we realized year or more ago that this type of pressure would not have caused Pakistan settle its problems with Afghanistan. Contrary to what Ambassador said, US believes Chicom threat, existing and potential, is still great. Collapse of India is neither in US nor Pak interests. Chicoms must be contained throughout Asia. Yet, the President continued, Paks display little appreciation of this primary concern of ours and instead apparently feel impelled move towards Chicoms and away from us because Pak concern about India. In last few months Pak press has exceeded all but Chicom in its attacks against us. One would gather from Pak press, which is closer to GOP than ours to USG, that US was enemy number one.
Ahmed replied that US should not believe Paks are moving toward Chicoms. GOP, of course, wishes avoid antagonizing China, particularly with hostile USSR and India as neighbors, but this not same as drawing closer to Chicoms. GOP-Chicom border settlement was in US interest, as well; Paks had defused potentially dangerous situation. Air link with Communist China is purely commercial deal forced on Paks by UK denial of rights in Hong Kong. With respect Pak press, Ahmed remarked that it is problem for GOP as well; US should realize that attacks against US are, in fact, aimed as much at President Ayub who responsible for [Page 619] policy of close association with West. When reading Pak press US must realize Pakistan has suffered severe blows in recent months: arms aid to India, failure of bilateral talks on Kashmir, and refusal of US and others support Tarbela.
In conclusion President said he hoped that Ambassador in his new position would bear in mind that US has one basic interest—prevention of control over Europe by USSR or Asia by Chicoms. Pakistan should understand this outlook since it accepted responsibilities of alliance with us. We believe alliance has been of real benefit to Pakistan, as it has been for us. We value close alliance relationship. On our part, further military aid to India will be given with clear eye to Pak interests. We realize Paks have bone deep feeling about India. There are currently some divergencies in our immediate interests; let us work hard together in reducing abrasive effects these differences.1