Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India⁰

Washington, June 18, 1963, 6:55 p.m.

4364. After his return to New Delhi we know Ambassador plans to review his visit to US with Nehru. We assume he will wish to describe climate here regarding military assistance and the progress which has been made during the visits of Bhoothalingam team, TTK, and President Radhakrishnan, details of which already familiar to Ambassador. It would be desirable, however, to reflect theme we have developed during these visits, i.e., we are determined to assist India to build her defenses but we do have problems. In particular, manner in which India handles its relations with Pakistan will have much to do with extent, type, and pace our assistance.

We are somewhat concerned that members of Radhakrishnan party may return to India with impression most of heat from US on Kashmir is off. Lack of movement on our mediation proposal may also have created this impression within the GOI. We hope Ambassador will use occasion of describing mood of Washington to make it clear we continue attach great importance to resolution Kashmir problem and to getting mediation started; we will be in touch with Indians soon on this.

Most important word Ambassador will have for Nehru will probably concern military assistance. Ambassador authorized to convey following subject to appropriation of funds and conclusion of implementing arrangements which will permit obligation of funds in fiscal year 1964:

(1) We are working out a proposal with the British for joint training exercises with the Indian Air Force. We will be discussing this with the GOI soon.

(2) We have made decisions on several items of military aid on which we gave general undertakings to T.T. Krishnamachari. We will, therefore, be making arrangements with the GOI for the following types and amounts of assistance:

• Additional Air Transport Support—$2.7 million
• Road Construction Assistance—$5.6 million
• Training for Army and Air Force—$4.7 million
• Air Force Communications System—$8.0 million

• Radar and Associated Communications—$8.1 million

  In presenting the last two items, you should make clear that these plans for installing permanent radar include immediate training of Indians and are responsive to TTK/Desai indications that air defense arrangement should include such measures as part of package. At same time, you should stress that communications project, which will be discussed fully with IAF, goes well beyond limited purpose of air defense and provides comprehensive and lasting solution to IAF communication and command problem. USMSMI should discuss with IAF questions of timing, rehab, etc. on radars.

(3) We have also made initial decision on defense production. We will provide India with two production lines of St. Louis Ordnance Plant. The cost to the US of providing this equipment to India is $2 million although its original cost was $5.6 million and its reproduction cost would probably be $7-8 million.

(4) In addition to the above firm commitments, USMSMI will initiate discussions immediately on additional projects which we view as next priorities and on which we wish get Indian views both generally and in detail. We believe we will be able to fund these, tho possibly not till fall, but cannot commit ourselves categorically and in any event wish Indian views before making final lists. Projects are:

• Engineer Equip. for Corps Troops—$425,902
• Completing Equip. for two “Nassau” Corps and Supporting Forces—$3,721,624
• Modernizing two Mountain Divisions—$11,250,888
• Weapons Systems Support—$2,490,000
• Air Ground Control Radios—$366,030
• Ground Control Approach Radars—$1,078,999

(5) After appropriations process is completed next fall (probably October) we will be prepared to discuss additional items. FYI. Specific projects in list¹ passed Amb in Washington not now authorized for discussion. End FYI.

During course of presentation Ambassador should convey impression that items in numbered paras one through three represent major decisions and not merely minor installment on FY 1964 MAP, and that final decisions on numbered para four will mean greatest part of FY 1964 program then committed. As to force levels, you may of course note that numbered para four involves possible extension of assistance base by two mountain divisions, but you should continue to keep clear distinction between the 16-division force goal we are prepared to accept as reasonable basis for judging Indian defense production priorities, and the lesser number of divisions we are now supporting through end items. It might also be useful to describe how appropriations process makes step by step procedure in military assistance necessary.

As to dollar values, presentation should avoid dollar figures, and say that full detail of actual items will be provided through USMSMI. If Indians ask what dollar values are, you may give general orders of magnitude of actual MAP costs by project, and may also point out that many items (radar, production line) in fact worth far more than costed at. You should urge Indians not to think too much in dollar terms, and in any case not to publicize dollar figures but rather substance of items. This follows our normal practice in MAP (Nassau an exception we don’t wish to repeat), and is well justified by reason of security. You should also mention any release of figures, especially if exaggerated, would complicate Pakistan problem and certainly not help matters in Congress.²

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schneider and William Bundy; cleared with L, BNA, AID, and by Harriman and Komer; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi, London, Ottawa, and Canberra.
1. Not found.
2. Galbraith met with M.J. Desai on June 20 and conveyed the substance of the military aid program outlined in telegram 4364. In doing so, he indicated that, while not laying down conditions for the aid, the United States expected that India would recognize the sensitivity of the issue in the Congress and in Karachi. Accordingly, Galbraith requested that India pursue a conciliatory policy toward Pakistan, support the United States in opposing Chinese aggression elsewhere in Asia, and work with U.S. officials on planning and procurement to improve the Indian Army. Desai expressed understanding of the first request and agreement with the other two. (Telegram 5019 from New Delhi, June 22; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA)