Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

304. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, June 3, 1963, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Visit of President of India¹

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, President of India
• H.E. B.K. Nehru, Ambassador of India
• H.E. Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs
• Mr. S. Dutt, Secretary to the President
• Dr. S. Gopal, Director, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs
• President Kennedy
• Secretary of State Rusk
• The Hon. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• The Hon. John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador to India
• The Hon. Chester Bowles, Ambassador-Designate to India

While the two Presidents were speaking privately in President Kennedy’s office, Secretary Rusk raised with the rest of the group the question of Laos.

[Here follows discussion of the situation in Laos.]

At this point the two Presidents joined the group.

President Kennedy said that he and President Radhakrishnan had discussed the types of assistance we hope to give India, that President Radhakrishnan had commented on the needs of India, and that the two had discussed the problem of Pakistan’s relations with India and the effect of those on the United States.

In response to a question by President Kennedy, Dr. Radhakrishnan advanced the thesis that China had attacked India for both military and political reasons. Militarily, the Chinese intention was to show that India was not strong enough to stand against China, a lesson that would be observed in Southeast Asia as well. On the political side, the Chinese probably thought they could disrupt the Indian democratic way of life. If they could succeed, then other countries would give up their struggles for democracy and go China’s way. Also, the Chinese might have believed that the impact would be felt on Australia, which is sparsely populated while China is full. The thesis of empty lands and hungry mouths could tempt China to move in the general direction of Australia. He expressed the view that the democratic experiment will work only if there is a strong grouping in Asia, taking Australia, Malaysia, and India together. The stabilizing factor in Asia is the success of India’s democracy, as it was India’s weakness that tempted the Chinese to come in. A basic point is that the Himalayas have ceased to be a barrier, just as the Atlantic Ocean ceased to be a protective barrier for the United States. In the Himalayan region roads and other communications now make penetration much easier than before. The Chinese could enter India again, and are prevented only by the consciousness that India could get the strength to repulse the attack. India has wanted to raise its eleven divisions to about 21 which in numbers of troops comes to the same as Mountbatten’s 17. He was sure that India has to build up its strength, to give confidence to its own people and to its neighbors.

Turning to the subject of Pakistan, President Radhakrishnan said that the Indian leaders had made a special offer at the sixth and concluding round of ministerial talks on Kashmir and related matters. These included the offer of a no-war commitment, full disengagement of troops from the India-Pakistan border, no freezing of the present Kashmir situation, and continued effort to find a solution to the problems between India and Pakistan. The Pakistanis did not accept this. On Kashmir, it should be remembered that both the ruler and the National Front of Sheikh Abdullah had wanted accession to India, so it was not correct to say that the state had not been consulted. In addition, India has now spent crores of rupees on development in the state.

President Kennedy asked whether the same factors that moved the Chinese last fall would cause them to attack again or whether they had been largely satisfied by their successes in 1962. In response Dr. Radhakrishnan observed that the military weakness of India would continue to be a factor in the situation until overcome.

He said that the Chinese had now turned back 3,900 prisoners to India of whom ten had been brainwashed. Gurkhas were included in the returned prisoners.

Dr. Gopal, explaining the situation on the ground, said that India has sent its civil authorities right back to the McMahon Line. The Assam Rifles are back from the line and the Army farther back. Since September the Chinese have withdrawn from NEFA but elsewhere are holding 2,500 square miles more than before, mainly in Ladakh.

President Kennedy observed that we desire our aid to help India both economically and militarily and that we want a point short of causing a real crisis in Pakistan. Our aid, including the presence of our forces, radar assistance, etc., are all factors China will take into account. The program we have in mind would give the substance of alignment without the fact of it. If India and the U.S. were to move on this, the result should give India more security without heavy cost in terms of our relations with Pakistan. We are as anxious as any country could be, almost as anxious as India, that India should be prepared to defend itself, and we are prepared to move in the direction of helping it.

President Kennedy expressed the view that Pakistan has always been interested in U.S. aid as a way of balancing its power not against Russia or China, but against India. We have an interest in Pakistan and in giving it assistance for several reasons, including our ties with SEATO and CENTO and some items of sensitive importance. The Secretary added that it is possible to think that Pakistan looks on its Chinese relations primarily as a factor of its relations with India.

Mrs. Menon asked whether the U.S. had had advance knowledge of the Pakistani decision to sign a border agreement with Communist China. The Secretary responded that we had known something about it ahead of time and had told the Indians. But he could not say there was advance consultation in the usual way between allies. Mrs. Menon observed that the Indonesian Foreign Minister had said he had been told by the Chinese Communists that their only interest in Ladakh was to keep the U.S. from getting a base in the Gilgit region. Both the President and the Secretary reassured her, should there be any possible doubt in her mind, that the U.S. has no interest whatsoever in such an arrangement.

The President noted that the only check he could see against a fresh Chinese attack was the prospect that it would spark a major conflict. This was the effect of the prompt American aid given last fall and this explains the importance of working out training programs for air defense now. The greater the evidence of U.S. interest, it would seem the more restrained the Chinese Communists will be. Then, in time, India could build its own defenses.

President Kennedy asked what would be the effect on India when the Chinese exploded a nuclear bomb. Dr. Radhakrishnan said that until now India had said it does not want to produce a nuclear bomb. He does not think India’s policy would change. However, Dr. Bhabha has said that if India should want the bomb it could get it within twelve months. Of course, if China should explode the bomb the general fear of China would doubtless increase.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Subjects, Radhakrishnan Visit. Secret. Drafted by Talbot and approved in S on June 18 and by the White House on June 20. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.
1. Radhakrishnan made a State visit to the United States June 2-11. He spent June 2 in Williamsburg, Virginia, and visited Washington June 3-5. After leaving Washington, he traveled to Philadelphia, Cape Canaveral, Florida, Denver, Los Angeles, St. Louis, and New York before returning to India.