Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

297. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, May 17, 1963, 1-1:35 p.m.

President’s Meeting on India, 17 May 1963

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Secretary Rusk
• Under Secretary Ball
• Under Secretary Harriman
• Assistant Secretary Talbot
• Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
• Ambassador Bowles
• Acting Administrator Coffin
• Mr. W.P. Bundy
• Mr. R.W. Komer

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by saying we must go ahead with help to India but do so in a way which would not drive the Pakistanis off the reservation. On the other hand we couldn’t give the Paks a veto. We also wanted to bring the Commonwealth along with us. It was not in our interests to “compromise” Indian non-alignment, lest we promote a Soviet-Chinese rapprochement which would greatly up our bill.

Rusk thought we could do a number of things for the Indians to keep nursing them along. He mentioned C-119s, radar and air training. As to defense production, he suggested that we and others might increase our contributions to the Indian consortium so that the Indians themselves could buy more defense production items. Bundy interjected that we would get little political credit for the C-119s since we had told the Indians in April these would be coming. He had explained to TTK¹ that we were intensively looking at some way to help India on its air defense problem and had had no negative reaction from TTK on an air defense package.

The President said “if the C-119s were already discounted what are we going to give the Indians to take back?” He further asked “Is it really right that we get more advantages out of non-alignment?” The Soviets might work harder to subvert India under these circumstances but this wouldn’t hurt us too much. He agreed with Rusk that perhaps we ought to try and give credits which could be used by the Indians for arms. He asked why we shouldn’t have more credit sales of defense items in general. Bundy explained the $100 million revolving fund limitation imposed by the Congress and that any credit sales were a charge against the MAP appropriation. The President thought that next year we should ask to put this limitation up $100 million more.

Bundy returned to his description of DOD thinking on aid to India. As to supersonic aircraft we would have a hard time finding them. We should go ahead, however, on air defense radar because the Indians needed it in any case. Rusk interjected that the real problem was getting the Indians into a position to use MAP aid. They were not really logistically prepared to do so. The President commented that if they ask for $1.3 billion and we give them $50 million, there will be “real disillusionment.” He then asked about the project for rotating US/UK squadrons to India. It wouldn’t cost much, it wouldn’t give the Paks much pain, so why not go ahead without the UK if necessary. We should do a paper on two squadrons for training exercises plus radar and whatever else was necessary, so that we could get ahead on this matter.

Rusk thought it most important that we have some “Commonwealth flags” in the Indian aid effort. He urged that we give TTK the idea that we were thinking positively and get him to work on the UK to be more forthcoming. Bundy thought that $ 10-20 million a year in subsequent aid was the most we could get from the British. Rusk said this was all the more reason for going ahead with the air defense package. We should try to get other Commonwealth countries in, if we couldn’t get the UK. In fact, we should tell the UK this.

Bowles entered a plea that we make the Indians de facto allies instead of de facto associates. It was so important to get India firmly on the side of the West against China that we should not let TTK go away thinking that we were unwilling to really help. The President said we should obviously do the least we could get away with politically, but at the minimum some sort of a substantial response to India was required. Rusk thought that we should tell TTK that we were prepared to “go big” in principle.

Rusk urged that we have one more crack at Prime Minister Macmillan on air defense. The President agreed that we should tell TTK we were thinking about this and were consulting the UK. Talbot urged that we hold off for a month until Kashmir was better sorted out before going ahead on air defense. Rusk, however, mentioned that Ayub did not get mad at the air defense proposition when Rusk talked with him in Pakistan. The President said we should feel out TTK and should tell the Prime Minister that we ought to go ahead together but if they didn’t come along we would have to go ahead unilaterally. Rusk said we should keep telling the Indians about the potential consequences for us of shooting down Chinese Communist planes in India. This was a real commitment on our part because it could involve us in a major war.

Harriman commented that TTK must go back with a clearer understanding that the subcontinent was indefensible without the Paks and that our aid would have to be interim in nature until then. The President asked why Harriman thought India indefensible without Pakistan. Harriman’s reply was that Assam, the most vulnerable target area, could not be defended effectively without East Pakistan. This was true also of an attack from Burma. He further emphasized the costly diversion of India and Pakistan effort entailed in the Kashmir dispute. The Indians, for example, still kept substantial forces deployed against the Paks. Let’s not give the Indians an idea that mediation was just an exercise. So let’s press TTK on Kashmir. Let’s not forget our Pakistan interests.

The President started to sum up what we were going to tell TTK, and asked Bill Bundy to describe what DOD had in mind. Bundy indicated that we would (1) couple the air defense discussion with an offer on radar and training; (2) underwrite the Ladakh air transport requirement; (3) push ahead with roadbuilding and communication equipment; (4) suggest a joint survey of the ammunition and weapons requirements to support a 16-division force base; and (5) would offer the Indians any training help we could. The President asked how much our support would cost per division. Bundy said a horseback figure would be $5 million in equipment plus several times that in ammunition, depending on the stockage level agreed upon.

Secretary Rusk suggested that it would be good to expose TTK to a movement of our Congressmen; we should talk to TTK about how to handle them. The President asked who was setting up TTK’s meetings on the Hill. Ambassador Bowles indicated that he was taking care of this.

RWK

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meeting with the President, 5/63-7/63. Secret. Drafted by Komer on May 23. The time of the meeting, which was held at the White House, is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
1. T. T. Krishnamachari, Indian Minister of Economic and Defense Coordination, arrived in Washington on May 15 for discussions with President Kennedy, as well as officials of the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, AID, the NSC, and members of Congress. Krishnamachari was accompanied on the visit by Secretary of the Foreign Ministry M. J. Desai. The visit in Washington concluded on May 23. A memorandum of William Bundy’s May 16 conversation with Krishnamachari is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 3131, India, 1963. Additional documentation relating to the Krishnamachari visit is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Krishnamachari Visit, and in Department of State, Central Files POL 7 INDIA, POL 27 CHICOM-INDIA, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK, DEF 1-4 INDIA, and DEF 19-3 INDIA.