296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom0
6083. Eyes Only Ambassador. Following message from Prime Minister Macmillan to the President is transmitted for information:
[Page 592]“May 15, 1963
Dear Friend, As I let you know, the Cabinet has now twice considered the issues raised in your message of May 13 about India.1
Of course, we quite agree that we shall probably both have to give some further military aid to India and we shall, of course, be ready to discuss with you its scale and character. But we have already committed 21 million to Indian defence since the Chinese attack and, as you know, we have a heavy commitment in Malaysia which so far we have to bear on our own. Therefore any further military aid to Indian will have to be pretty limited although we shall do our best having regard to all the aid we are giving on the civil side. I think we should be very chary about holding out expectations of a series of instalments. All this is just tinkering with the problem because no sensible defence of India is possible except as a planned part of the defence of the sub-continent as a whole.
The air umbrella plan, however, raises much more difficult and far-reaching questions. It is true that periodic exercises of a few squadrons of aircraft would be a cheaper way of bolstering the Indian defence and would perhaps be less offensive to Pakistan than any other form of military aid. Nevertheless, we do feel that such an arrangement might involve both of us in very far-reaching commitments. I cannot get out of my mind the situation which confronted this country in 1914 when as a result of what were intended to be only precautionary arrangements the bulk of the French fleet was moved to the Mediterranean and Britain thus became morally committed to the defence of the North Sea and so to war with Germany. The initial object of the squadrons training in India would be to permit a rather similar re-deployment of the Indian Air Force; to let them take up forward positions. So I believe that we must both reflect carefully before we undertake a military commitment, however limited it may be at the outset, which might either involve us in actual shooting with the Chinese or at least enable the Indians to claim that as any Chinese attack developed we were morally committed to increase our active participation in India’s defence with all that that might imply both for you and for us. Of course, if China really sets out to conquer India or SE Asia that would be quite another situation and one in which we would both have to react. But what I do not like is the idea of putting ourselves now in a position where we should ultimately no longer have a free choice. Meanwhile, we should have little control or even influence on India’s conduct of her foreign relations.
We also have a further difficulty in our minds. In the first moments of panic after the Chinese invasion the Indians seemed disposed to adopt a more realistic attitude both towards the Kashmir dispute and on the [Page 593] subject of ‘non-alignment.’ As the danger has receded, so their traditional attitudes have reasserted themselves. Indeed we doubt whether in fact Nehru would now be prepared to agree to the air umbrella. The only thing which would certainly change the Indian attitude would be renewed and acute fear of Chinese aggression. But if the Indians feel that we are already committed to their air defence without any effort on their part to contribute to a common defence policy for the whole sub-continent in alliance with the West, they may well be less and not more ready to take a realistic view.
We shall have to discuss all these issues further when you and I have had our talks with Mr. Krishnamachari. Meanwhile, I hope that we can both avoid any commitment about the air umbrella.
With warm regard,
Yours sincerely, Harold Macmillan”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Kennedy. Secret. Drafted in the White House by Bundy and approved in S/S by Executive Secretary Benjamin Read.↩
- See Document 295.↩