Office of the Historian

256. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Ahmed) to Secretary of State Rusk0

Washington, February 18, 1963.

Dear Mr. Secretary, The President of Pakistan has desired that in connection with his proposal for a Kashmir settlement, the considerations stated below may be brought to the notice of President Kennedy.

2.

As the United States Government is aware, the President’s proposal is set out in his letter dated January 26, 1963, to President Kennedy, and the addendum1 I presented therewith. It was subsequently amplified when Ambassador McConaughy called on the Pakistan Minister for External Affairs on February 7. In the President’s view, no Government of Pakistan can accept any settlement of the Kashmir dispute which would leave the Valley with India without any form of reference to the wishes of the people.

However, he would not insist on an immediate transfer of the Valley, provided irrevocable arrangements are made at this stage for the final disposition of the Valley and the adjoining Muslim territory of Ladakh either in accordance with a plebiscite or some other method, in the latter case bearing in mind that the allotment of any significant part thereof to India would be manifestly contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants.

3.
During his meeting with Ambassador McConaughy on February 7, the Pakistan Minister for External Affairs stated that, since it appeared the the Valley was linked in the United States’ view with the defence of Ladakh, he wished to make it clear that if Ladakh (which has a 79% Muslim majority) came to Pakistan (as under any equitable settlement it would), the Pakistan Government would naturally assume full responsibility for its defence which attaches to sovereignty.
4.
A settlement on these lines would have several obvious advantages.
(i)
Such a settlement alone could bring about disengagement of the Indian and Pakistan armies;
(ii)
India would be relieved of responsibility for the defence of the Ladakh front;
(iii)
She could then withdraw some 5 to 6 Divisions of troops from Pakistan’s borders for deployment elsewhere.
5.
Any other settlement—even were it possible—would necessitate the continued presence of substantial Indian forces on Pakistan’s strategic flank in Kashmir; it would fail therefore to inspire in Pakistan the confidence necessary to bring about a genuine improvement in India-Pakistan relations and a disengagement of their armies either in Kashmir or elsewhere along Pakistan’s borders. In terms of the Sub-continent’s overall security, it would, in short, achieve nothing.
6.
Disengagement of Pakistan and Indian forces is crucial from every point of view.
(i)
Only thus could the two countries be freed from mutual fear and tension that plague their relations, and genuine Indo-Pakistan friendship and cooperation promoted.
(ii)
Disengagement could enable India to save as much as $300 million in defence expenditure—expenditure which would be bound to go on increasing if there was no disengagement.
(iii)
There would also be savings in Pakistan’s defence expenditure.
(iv)
In consequence of the resulting division of defence responsibilites, which a settlement such as is visualized by the President of Pakistan implies, the defence posture of the Sub-continent as a whole would be immensely strengthened, despite the anticipated reduction in defence expenditure of both countries.
(v)
These savings in defence expenditure would, furthermore, help speed urgently needed economic development in both countries.
(vi)
Disengagement should also result in a substantial reduction in United States’ commitments in the region, more especially, in the calls on her resources for the defence and development requirements of India and Pakistan.

Yours Sincerely,

Aziz Ahmed
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 2/63. Secret. A copy of the letter was sent from the Department of State to the White House under cover of a February 20 memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid.)↩
  2. See Document 249.↩