249. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Kashmir
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
- Mr. Robert W. Komer, The White House
- Mr. James P. Grant, Acting Assistant Secretary, NEA
The meeting was at the request of the Pakistani Ambassador who was under instructions to request an appointment with President Kennedy to deliver a letter to the President from President Ayub. Following delivery of the letter, which set forth President Ayub’s assessments of the Kashmir talks to date and suggested that the introduction of a United States representative in the parleys might effectively bridge the gap between Pakistan and Indian viewpoints, the Pakistani Ambassador also gave the President a supplemental sheet containing an amplification of Ayub’s specific suggestions [3 lines of source text not declassified].
[Page 488]After reading the letter, President Kennedy asked what there was in President Ayub’s proposals for the Indians given their refusal to consider a plebiscite. The Ambassador briefly reviewed the Kashmir history. He began with UNCIP resolutions and went from there to the Dixon and McNaughton proposals. He stated that the Vale was needed more for the defense of Pakistan than for the defense of India and accordingly should be transferred to Pakistan. Also this would free GOI forces to meet the Chinese on other fronts and would meet the wishes of the inhabitants of the Vale.
The President commented that the Indians now have most of Kashmir, any settlement will call for the Indians to make the concrete concessions, and the real question is how they can be brought to make the difficult and painful concessions which are required. With respect to the second question of United States participation in the negotiations, the President said he would want to get the judgment of Ambassador Galbraith and others as to the extent this would be useful, and the reaction of the Government of India. He said we did not want to be left holding the bag if negotiations were to fail.
The Ambassador stated that there had been sufficient progress made in the last round of talks to justify another meeting, but this had been made possible only by the intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom Ambassadors in New Delhi. The Government of India negotiators have been most reluctant, according to the Ambassador, to show their hands and the Pakistani hope is that the introduction of a third party would speed up the negotiations.
The Ambassador said there was a strong desire among some Indian cabinet members, elements of the Indian public, and the Indian military for a Kashmir settlement. Nehru, however, has given no indication of giving in on Kashmir. The Pakistani assessment is that the Indians do not want the talks to break down at this time but will spin them out until they have received sufficient aid from the United States and at that time will settle with the Chinese Communists. It is because of this assessment that Pakistan wants the United States to push the Indians.
The President replied that he and the Ambassador had talked about this question before. There was disagreement between them on the capacity of the United States to influence other capitals. He said that the United States and Pakistan had been through this on the Afghan-Pak issue without any settlement (the Pak Ambassador interjected at this point that Pakistan had made concessions on this issue). The United States can help bring the parties to the table but has far less influence in bringing about a specific solution. [12 lines of source text not declassified].
The President closed the session by saying that he would be replying in the next couple of days to President Ayub’s letter after he had had a chance to ascertain the reaction of our Ambassadors.
[Page 489]- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 2/63. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Grant on February 8 and approved by the White House on February 18. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book.↩