Office of the Historian

247. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0

Washington, January 26, 1963.

Herewith a round-up on Sino-Indian-Pak matters, as we’re reaching stage where you may want to intervene directly again.

I.

Indian reply to Colombo proposals1 was notable on two counts. First, Indians shrewdly decided they’d agree to talks only if Chicoms accepted interpretations, which they already knew were anathema to Peking: (1) Indian troops would re-occupy NEFA; (2) Indian as well as Chicom police post must be allowed in Ladakh demilitarized zones. Desai tells us in confidence Indians will do both unilaterally over time. Indian ploy puts ball neatly back in Peiping’s court.

Second, when Nehru tried to get Congress party to vote approval of resuming talks even on this basis, he ran into so much opposition that he settled for Parliament merely “noting” the proposals rather than formally endorsing them. This confirms how aroused Indian nationalism has made Nehru far less of a free agent in foreign affairs.

II.
Kashmir talks are approaching a more critical stage. Both sides have agreed to talk about partition but neither has shown its hand. Paks [Page 486] fear that Indians are stalling, and have no intention of settling Kashmir now that pressures from Chinese are off. Ayub personally seems to be reverting to idea of internationalization of Vale and subsequent plebiscite (UK favors and regrettably sounded him out on this). See Karachi 1361 attached.2

We simply doubt Indians would ever give up the Vale, especially if after ten years or so it would revert to Pakistan. Therefore, we’ve worked out a partition scheme which we’re prepared to throw into the breach if talks seem about to break down. It is quite pro-Indian (map attached).3 Therefore Galbraith likes it, while McConaughy thinks Paks won’t buy.

As I see it, before Pak Assembly meets 8 March, we must persuade Indians to make some gesture which will be sufficiently forthcoming to convince Ayub that Nehru is not just stalling. One such would be an Indian proposal in third round talks (12 February) which is more than just a minor adjustment of cease-fire line. Ken is working on this. Another would be a Nehru speech arguing that Chicom threat makes Pak-Indian reconciliation essential, that he is going to accept a compromise Kashmir settlement to this end.

If we could only get Nehru to make the first move, it would go far towards creating the essential psychological climate without which neither side will be able to justify the necessary give and take. You may want to weigh in with Nehru along these lines. Then we could press Ayub to make reciprocal noises.

R.W. Komer
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 1/24/63-1/29/63. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Taken from Pres. week-end reading dtd 1/26-27/63.”↩
  2. See footnote 1, Document 243.↩
  3. Dated January 25; not printed.↩
  4. Not printed.↩