246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan0
196. Purpose of this message is to set forth conclusions of full scale review at highest level of USG of our policy objectives in Afghanistan and to outline approved course of action designed to achieve these objectives in light of continuing impasse between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This message constitutes your instructions and is basis for your approach to RGA on your return to Kabul.
Our aim, which is to maintain Afghanistan as an independent buffer state, stems not from any emotional involvement in Afghanistan’s area controversies, but rather from our objective assessment of strategic importance of territory it occupies. Security of those to whom we have security treaty obligations, Pakistan and Iran, would be gravely jeopardized should drastic curtailment of US position in Afghanistan result in full Soviet domination of that country. Moreover, there are implications to security of subcontinent as a whole should this situation develop.
Secondly, but of equal importance, we want to thwart major Soviet effort by maintaining an effective competitive position in Afghanistan. We will be demonstrating to Soviets that any plans for monopolistic position in Afghanistan will not escape unchallenged. To curtail seriously our position in Afghanistan would be signal to Soviets that we were abandoning field to them. Our retreat would leave vacuum for them to exploit.
Our efforts to counter communist encroachment into subcontinent through economic aid and security arrangements would be incomplete should we neglect vital northwestern flank.
Most effective instrument available to maintain an effective US position in Afghanistan is our aid program.
We intend therefore to continue our aid program in Afghanistan using Iran route for such time and extent required even though at some additional cost and absorbing such additional transportation costs within currently planned aid levels. We believe this course will at least slow down if not eventually thwart fulfillment of Soviet purposes in Afghanistan. This posture gives us an interval during which more favorable conditions may develop; it could make possible emergence of more moderate government in Afghanistan more allergic to Soviet threat than one now in power. Certainly by retaining an effective position in country [Page 484] we will strengthen those elements in Afghanistan who wish to continue close ties with West. Additionally, we will have more time to work for a constructive approach from Pakistan which we are prevented from effectively doing at present because of its preoccupation with tension elsewhere in area. This policy decision provides us with best discernible course through which we achieve our objectives, placing us in a positive position from which to operate.
Major US project, Kabul-Kandahar road, has come to symbolize US interest and position in Afghanistan. To complete this project will clearly demonstrate US determination to maintain its position in Afghanistan. We intend to complete this project, though to specifications less elaborate than originally planned to minimize additional costs, using route through Iran. To alleviate some of effect of added costs to AID and to demonstrate to Afghans that their political stance imposes responsibilities on them too, absorption of extra transportation costs out of planned aid levels is considered fair and right.
In your presentation manner and method of which we leave to your discretion you should stress our considered judgment that this approach places our relations within framework of understanding where real progress can be made if cooperation characterizes our mutual endeavors. However, you should also point out our continuing belief that Afghan ability to maintain independent position would be greatly enhanced by improvement of relations with Pakistan.
In addition this approach, while taking into account regrettable area conditions which inhibit our fuller freedom of action, does not allow those conditions to distract us from pursuing objectives which are basic to US interests. RGA should find no difficulty in accepting and appreciating this rationale.
Fundamental to foregoing course of action is our conviction that RGA is dedicated to the maintenance of its independence and nonaligned status. Should this prove to be incorrect as evidenced, for example, by RGA complete unresponsiveness to your approach we would be inclined to regard this as an indication that RGA had little intention of, or interest in, maintaining balanced position by continuing effective ties with free world. In these circumstances achievement of our objectives would become remote to point it would be difficult to justify further US investment in Afghanistan and we would be forced to re-examine basis of our relations with Afghanistan.
There follows immediately in a separate message prepared in AID an elaboration of specific AID program activities for your guidance in discussions with RGA.
As part of your presentation you are authorized to extend invitation to King and Queen to visit US at convenient time. If it becomes necessary to discuss availability dates you may say that President’s schedule tentatively [Page 485] filled up to September and it would be more convenient plan visit for some time after September 1.1
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.89/1-2563. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Carle and Steeves; cleared with SOV, GTI, U/PR, Cameron, U. Alexis Johnson, Gaud, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi, Tehran, London, and Bonn.↩
- Steeves reported on his consultations in Washington and conveyed the substance of the policy decisions outlined in telegram 196 in a meeting with Naim on January 29. He also extended an invitation for a State visit to the United States by the Afghan Royal Family. Naim was pleased by the assurance of continuing U.S. aid and delighted by the invitation, which he felt would contribute tremendously to furthering friendly ties between the two countries. (Telegram 324 from Kabul, January 29; ibid., 611.89/1-2963)↩