Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

171. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 27, 1962, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the President and Prince Naim

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• H.R.H. Prince Naim, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister for Afghanistan
• H.E. Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Ambassador of Afghanistan
• Mr. James P. Grant, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

The President opened the conversation with an expression of his concern and interest in strengthening relations with Afghanistan, and of his concern with the problems which were arising out of the relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors, and possible means for their solution.

Prince Naim responded, in English and in a very low voice dropping on occasion to a whisper, with a little speech in which he expressed his appreciation of the interest of the President in Afghanistan, in aid for development and in the resolution of the border problem. He regretted the lack of results in the latter area, noting that it appeared Pakistan was not desirous of reestablishing normal relations between the two countries. Prince Naim noted the delicate situation in Afghanistan, and that it was a part of the frontier of the Free World, but in contrast to the United States, a part of the old frontier. Its society was not of the type of its neighbor to the north and, left alone, would not evolve in that direction.

Prince Naim noted that Afghanistan was in a very exposed location, continually confronted with economic and political isolation. He said that the Pakistan policy of denying the true facts and of pressing for the increased isolation of Afghanistan from the Free World was making Afghanistan more and more dependent, and dangerously so, on its northern neighbor. This constituted a dangerous threat not only to Afghanistan but to the Free World as well.

He said there were two principal issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first was the complicated Pushtunistan issue which will take much time and patience to solve. The second was the issue of Afghanistan’s access to the sea.

The President interjected at this point that he could not understand why the issue of trade through Pakistan to Afghanistan could not be separated from the other issues between the two countries, and why a solution could not be found for this problem standing alone.

Prince Naim stated that it was more than a problem of just physical movement of goods, that there was a real question as to what kind of trade was possible in the absence of consular and trade offices to take care of the papers and consular activities associated with the movement of goods and people. Without consular facilities it was extremely difficult for traders and other personnel, such as truck drivers, to function. On the other hand, he said, it is possible to separate the border/trade problem from the general Pushtunistan issue and this was what the Afghans proposed. He said that the Pushtunistan political problems raised by the Pakistanis in connection with the consulates were imaginary ones in that the Afghans, given the open border, can pass freely back and forth.

The President returned to the theme that it should be possible for Afghanistan, if it really wants to, to reach an agreement with Pakistan allowing trade and aid to flow smoothly through Pakistan, and that it should be possible to solve that problem without having to solve other problems.

Prince Naim stated that it is a matter of life and death for Afghanistan to maintain its trade and aid ties with the West. Unfortunately Pakistan had mixed the subject of consulates and trade agencies, necessary for trade and aid goods to pass, with the broader political issues. Prince Naim said that Afghanistan was most willing to guarantee that its consular offices would not engage in improper political practices and would abide by conservative international practices. If the Pakistanis had some suspicion of a problem they could declare the person involved persona non grata. Also, the building of one or two rail spurs would help since when finished there would no longer be a need for trade agencies in the frontier area. However, consular facilities will be required for the thousands of Afghans who travel along the two routes from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

The President then said that he wished to affirm most strongly our friendship for Afghanistan and our desire to be of help. However, he believed that Afghanistan could not long exist in a position of growing dependency on the U.S.S.R., that under the best of circumstances independence of a country cannot be maintained readily by complete dependence on one country. The Iran route was useable to a point but too expensive. In his opinion Afghanistan needed to make adjustments to reach some solution of its problem with Pakistan.

Prince Naim replied that the undesirable and growing dependence on the north is a result of moves by the Pakistanis. He noted parenthetically that when Afghanistan came to the United States for military aid in 1952-53 the United States turned down the request even though Afghanistan said it was threatened on both borders. He noted that in education they were still placing their dependency in this field in the West, and on the United States particularly. Progress did need to be made on solving the transit problem and he expressed the strong hope that both the United States and the Shah of Iran would continue their good efforts. However, he doubted whether it was possible for there to be a successful negotiation if the United States gives Pakistan the feeling of United States support for its position.

The President interjected to note that the United States had only a limited capacity to influence Pakistan, that each country seemed to feel that the United States had the capacity to influence its neighbor although not itself.

This brought a laugh from Prince Naim, who then continued that if discussions can continue it should be possible to meet the basic needs of both countries with the possible exception of the question of prestige for each. Prince Naim stated that he had an appointment with the Iranian Foreign Minister and the Pakistan Foreign Minister as soon as he returns to New York, with the Iranian Foreign Minister serving as host. He hoped that at that time he could convince Mohammed Ali that a consulate with a senior and a junior officer is a small matter to be holding up the progress of much larger interests.

He also requested that the United States continue to show its willingness to continue shipping goods through Iran and to provide support for the Five-Year Plan. He noted that a large amount of information had been given to the United States on the plan and many discussions had been held with the AID officials but nothing definitive had yet evolved. He noted that it was extremely important that aid continue to flow over the Iran route if the hands of the Pakistanis were not to be greatly strengthened.

The President replied that the United States was willing to continue shipping through Iran as we have been in the recent past but that we are not in a position to give a long-term commitment in detailed support of the Five-Year Plan. He noted, however, that we are discussing projects with the Afghans and are prepared to continue aid at least previous annual levels subject to the availability of well prepared projects, Congressional appropriation of funds, and satisfactory means of shipment.

Prince Naim stated quite vigorously that shipment through Iran to Afghanistan is possible at the same price as through Pakistan. He said he understood our problem on long-term commitments but he felt that the project approach was not yet working very smoothly, there having been many discussions and examinations already without much action.

The President promised to look personally at the status of the projects in Afghanistan after Congress had appropriated funds. He noted, however, that there seemed to be a real difference between the Afghans and United States officials on the cost and amount of goods which could be shipped through Iran. He again reiterated the need to restore transit through Pakistan. He said that he had talked to Ayub and hoped the countries were not too far apart and could carry out careful discussions in New York and Iran.

Prince Naim stated once again that he would talk to the Pakistanis and was confident of agreement if the Pakistanis would be more flexible and stop their pressure. He noted that the additional cost of shipping goods through Iran was a small cost in comparison with the vastly greater costs if Afghanistan were lost to the Free World. He did not feel safe now as to the future of Afghanistan; it would need the moral and financial help of outsiders if it were to survive.

The President replied that the United States is a long way off and even though it is very anxious to be of help it can at best play a limited role. He stated that he was not convinced, after talking to Ayub and Naim, that it would be possible to reach a general accord but at least it ought to be possible to reach an agreement on how goods from the United States can flow across Pakistan to Afghanistan. The President closed on the question of the source of greatest danger: that arising from complete dependence on the Soviet Union or that from some adjustment with Pakistan to enable goods to flow again.

Prince Naim said, in reply, that dangers are present in any course of action but that his government, as all governments, must maintain its national life. Afghanistan, like West Berlin, is landlocked and dependent on routes through other countries. As with West Berlin, if a landlocked country does not stand up for its rights where does the process of attrition stop?

The President closed the meeting by noting that there was a real problem in balancing the factors involved. He assured Prince Naim of the very strong United States interest in Afghanistan and of our willingness to be of assistance.

The tenor of the meeting throughout was cordial.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, Memoranda of Conversation, 7/61-9/62. Secret. Drafted by Grant. Naim was in the United States as head of the Afghan Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.