Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India⁰

Washington, July 27, 1962, 8:43 p.m.

318. Eyes Only Ambassador. Embtel 279.¹

President and Department believe that, if MIG deal all but settled, we should start disengaging from too vigorous opposition. As we see it, an alternative has been made available for their consideration, they have heard arguments and are in position to make their decision in knowledge of possible consequences. We have therefore accomplished at minimum immediate objective of giving Menon’s opponents a stick to beat him with if MIG deal results, as we would expect, in adverse consequences to Indian economic development. We wish to avoid getting any more deeply into this matter, thereby making it more difficult for us to extricate ourselves. If MIG deal goes through, as seems ever more likely, we want to be in position to observe its consequences in detached fashion, avoiding any implication that, as Ambassador Nehru implied, Indians were forced to decision by US pressure. Such a stance will be essential to quiet and restrained work which will be needed to rebuild US-Indian relations.

However if upon reflection you decide that you would like to have another go at Nehru along lines suggestion contained last paragraph reftel Department has no objection if approach is kept in low key. In talk with Nehru you authorized repeat to him as you have done to other Indian leaders (Embtel 4230)² assurances that we do not plan to provide any more F-104’s to Pakistan and that therefore present equilibrium is both most economical and best. FYI—As of this time such statement can be made. Our internal planning for Pakistan calls for replacement of one obsolescent F-86 squadron in FY 1966 but type of replacement aircraft has not been determined. We are thinking in terms of F-5A’s but Pakistanis have not been told of this. They undoubtedly assume they will receive modern aircraft within general program of modernizing Pakistan armed forces as F-86’s become obsolescent. End FYI.

If you think wise, you could further point out to Nehru that if Indians acquire or build several squadrons of MIG-21’s, it will create great pressure on us from Paks to provide similar aircraft. We want to avoid another arms race of type which Indians themselves have argued we created by our aid to Pakistan. Therefore, even if Indians determined to go ahead with MIG deal, we hope they will carefully consider how many they buy or build. FYI—Best solution at this point might be if Indians bought a few MIG’s but did not build. End FYI.

We also agree it would be useful for you to explain to Prime Minister facts of air power on Sino-Indian frontier. Such a discussion might give you an opportunity to emphasize again to him rapidity with which supersonic planes become obsolescent. By time MIG assembly line could be established in India MIG-21’s from line would already be out of date.

Department does not agree to bringing other major items of military equipment to Pakistan under stabilization umbrella. As far as tanks are concerned we have supplied Pakistan with 230 M-47 tanks up to 30 June 1962 under our military assistance program. We are committed to supply an additional 274 of these tanks and delivery has been scheduled as follows: 130 in FY 63, 72 in FY 64, 72 in FY 65. GOP has been informed of these planned deliveries and schedule. We do not believe it would improve our standing in Indian eyes to go back on commitment to an ally, not to mention broader implications of such action in entire area.

We agree with your judgment that there should be no formal withdrawal of Lightning offer but that it should be allowed to rest unless Indians revive it. If we push it at this time we might find ourselves confronted with an Indian attempt to straddle issue by taking squadron of Lightnings from West and a MIG manufacturing capacity from Soviets. You will recall [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports³ Morarji Desai as talking in these terms. This we want to avoid. You will agree that our efforts with British have been directed towards coming up with an alternative to MIG’s not as a prestige stopgap until Indian production of MIG’s could be gotten under way.⁴

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/7-2562. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cameron on July 26; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, INR, and DOD/ISA, and with the President; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and London.
1. Document 19.
2. Dated June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6-2962)
3. Not found.
4. On August 4, Macmillan sent a message to Kennedy in which he indicated that his government had also reached the conclusion that India had decided upon the MIG aircraft, and there was no point in pursuing the sale of the Lightnings. (Repeated in telegram 735 to London, August 6; Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/8-662)