Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

159. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, July 25, 1962, 8 p.m.

279. Eyes Only Acting Secretary State, pass White House. I have just had several hours luncheon with T. Krishnamachari and I think I have the plane business taped at last. This is information of the highest importance which should be closely protected. We will give general outlines to British here but leave further communication to your judgment. Facts are as follows:

(1) Menon, in effect, shot down the Lightning even before the team departed for London. Team has returned to confirm that the plane won’t do. This is the honest opinion of at least one member. Menon presumably instructed the others on the required decision. As indicated in other telegrams Prime Minister and other civilian ministers have access only to Menon’s political technique. This holds that Lightnings are heavy, too costly (this of course being in advance of any knowledge of terms) and (he says) unavailable before 1964. The Indian team was declined access to the Mark III: Menon thoughtlessly omitted to mention its non-existence.

(2) Some weeks ago the Prime Minister reached a decision to send a team to Moscow to look into the MIG’s and get an offer, unless Menon’s then adverse view of Lightning was modified by London visit. (Reflection on odds against such reversal probably unproductive.)

(3) Team according to T.T. Krishnamachari has now gone to Moscow to test fly MIG, negotiate terms for purchase and manufacture. The team does not have power to conclude deal. At this point we are not certain that TTK’s information is accurate. Our military people believe that some obvious candidates for any team are still in India.

(4) The pressure leading to the dispatch of this team, again according to TTK, apart from Menon, was the strong sentiment in Parliament for self defense and more recently skillful linking in Cabinet of the China border defense with Pakistan defense. He stresses growing Parliamentary power of Menon. Civilian politicians do not understand these planes are unuseable in mountains against Chinese. (In fact, TTK, who prides himself on Renaissance breadth, thought they had some use and retreated when I showed with Mach 2 data and problem of fields and control.)

(5) Prime Minister was undecided for a long while and Cabinet extensively discussed the American reaction to decision and sending of team. Decision so far has not been between Lightnings and MIGs but as between MIGs and no purchase at all.

(6) There are “always slips between cup and lip” but purchase is now on rails. However, Soviet offer must be obtained and decision taken on acceptance. This will require time—some weeks I would sense.

(7) Making appropriate use of T.T. Krishnamachari’s vanity and with appropriate caution considering his ambiguous position while he reaches conclusions on Menon’s projects and other questions of principle, I made case for the adverse effect on American public opinion and unleashed other arguments now familiar. I also took soundings on whether another effort with the Prime Minister would be useful.

Without recounting details there is one more gambit which has been on our minds here, which I have tried soundings and which might conceivably work. Pakistan is still the political nub of this problem. Were I to propose that Indians forego the MIG’s if we assure of standstill on similar weapons to Pakistanis, they might buy. I am not optimistic but it would strike me as a very good bargain (and much cheaper than Lightnings) if we could bring it off and even the discussion might have a long delaying effect. I gather we are not scheduled to give Pakistanis any further fighter aircraft for another 4 or 5 years so even supporters of Pakistan armed power are giving up nothing of importance. It would give me a handle to explain facts of air power on China frontier to Prime Minister. Perhaps this discussion might lead on to stabilization on tanks which our military people here think will cause more trouble here when known than 104’s, God forbid. Also time is running out on past argument that arms aid to Pakistanis was inherited policy. Nehru is leaving town today and will not be back until Monday. I think I had better have another try at him then. While noting doubtless well-grounded Washington aversion to initiatives in this quarter do bear in mind I must have something to talk about. There should, I am sure, be no formal withdrawal of Lightning offer since this would strengthen his position. But unless Indians revive, my judgment would be to let it rest.

Galbraith

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/7-2562. Secret; Niact. A handwritten notation indicates that the telegram was repeated to Karachi and London.