Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

148. Telegram From the Consulate General at Calcutta to the Department of State⁰

Calcutta, July 1, 1962, 10 a.m.

1. From Ambassador Galbraith. Unless Washington has an energetically adverse view based on factors not evident here I consider it desirable that on an early occasion, perhaps in answer to press conference question, I say that as a practical matter, and without reference to merits of the case, we consider plebiscite question dead and that any Kashmir settlement will obviously now have to be found in other directions. The advantages of such a statement are:

(1) It reflects the realities of the situation as even intelligent Pakistanis agree. Myths, such as possibility of plebiscite, no more desirable here than elsewhere.

(2) It will put me back into political operation from which the debate and Menon victory has largely excluded me. This is important for influence on other pending and more vital issues. It is also the reason for saying it here.

(3) It will vitally help pro-American groups here who are now sadly on defensive.

(4) Emphasis on purely practical aspects of position will protect Stevenson.

(5) Statement wherever made will clear our position and insure against another damaging round on this subject a few months hence.

(6) Presumably there will be a Pakistan reaction. That, it will be agreed, is partly because they would prefer to have issue continued ad infinitum, ad nauseum even with no affirmative gain if it provides the negative return of worsened US-Indian relations. This we cannot countenance. Statement here will center at least part of reaction on me rather than President or Secretary State. It will also give measure of freedom from the language—it was Galbraith’s. However statement assumes that we have played this game for last time.

You will see need for timeliness for full effect as well as to clear position for work on other issues.¹

Mattison

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7-162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.
1. Galbraith sent an undated message, via a special channel, to McGeorge Bundy to ask him to discuss telegram 1 from Calcutta with President Kennedy. Galbraith stated that, in his view, the statement he proposed to make was “the kind of sensible air cleaning political action which situation requires but which contains just enough momentary static so that working level Department would never initiate or willingly to clear.” He felt that all that was involved was a simple statement of the realities of a situation already accepted by intelligent Pakistanis. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 7/1/62-7/10/62)