Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

147. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, June 25, 1962, 10 p.m.

4183. Pass White House Eyes Only for President. Eyes Only for Acting Secretary. Reference: Deptel 4351.¹

I had begun drafting response for what I considered a predictable Presidential inquiry prior to receipt. Nehru was in extremely self-righteous mood reflecting a larger attitude here and since he gives the tone to the press and politicians we will no doubt have more of it.

Obviously it was a nasty accident that our representations on the MIGs coincided with the Kashmir ballot in New York. Both are highly emotional issues here. Nehru had been hit very hard on the MIGs by Macmillan, Gore-Booth, Sandys, myself and by the confirming message from the President.² Then came this debate.

His flare-up is related to at least three matters where I judge our position to be sound and one matter where we might wisely reflect on the wisdom of our course. I begin with the matters which the Indians find distasteful but where the medicine is good.

1. The GOI in general and Nehru in particular clearly dislike suggestions that they should tailor their behavior more carefully to American political and public reactions. This is new idea. Until past year we have been so wary of seeming to attach strings that there has been literally almost no mention to Prime Minister of the effect of Indian actions on aid prospect. Avoidance has become the standard of good manners. Mention of the effect of their actions on aid is by our own standard improper and indecent. This has always seemed to me an intolerable situation. I have made it clear that American public opinion is a highly relevant consideration. Nehru’s reference to indirect pressures is his protest against these reminders which he says are an impairment of “India’s independence.” Obviously no country is that independent.

2. He is annoyed over my labeling of Soviet rupee sales as aid. On this too they have had it ever so good. For if Soviet rupee sales are not aid then dollars and hard currencies can be reserved for economic assistance and the Soviets can be used for military hardware. The uneasiness when I have attacked on this point has been visible.

3. There is the conviction in India as elsewhere that we are so pathologically afraid of Communism that to take our aid and remain non-Communist is a great favor. We have affirmed this by a tendency to a supplicant role in which we take ever so seriously India’s problems and never mention our own. This relationship is unhealthy as well as undignified. Yet it conditions Indian attitudes and causes surprising reactions when we depart from our erstwhile meekness.

On the other hand, the Indians have legitimate grounds for objection to the two symbolic battles we have waged on behalf of our allies and against them in the UN this past year. Both of these allies, so far as one can tell, have considered their relationship with us largely important for advancing their private quarrels in the non-Communist world. (Here helping with our anti-Communism is also considered a real nice favor.) And we have allowed ourselves to become involved unusefully in these far from exemplary quarrels. The rewards, while perhaps greater than from our alliance with General Phoumi, give grounds for reflection, to wit as follows:

1. We supported Portugal in the UN on Goa. We succeeded in antagonizing India. We did not “save” Goa. We seem to have partially alienated the Portuguese. We got the Russians a very good press. This would seem a low score.

2. We supported Pakistan in the UN on Kashmir (I am aware of super-innocuity and Irish screen). We recognize, as do even intelligent Pakistanis, the UNCIP resolutions and the plebiscite are out of date and bear in no practical way on a settlement. We got nothing practical for Pakistan. We got a bad press in India. Again the Soviets got a magnificent one. We left the Pakistanis still complaining about Americans, still wondering if Mohammed Ali is too pro-American, still negotiating with the Chinese. This also no high score.

In light of our specific commitments, we had no alternative in this latter case. But clearly we must soon have some concern for the parochial and messy issues in which our lesser allies involve us and the consequences. As soon as military needs can be made to allow we must obviously try to get in a position where we can stand in dignity and some majesty above these disputes. We must recognize that outside of Europe alignment and non-alignment are mostly differing techniques for extracting concessions from the US. We must not be supplicants of the non-aligned or subordinates of allies. Both positions are weak and unworthy. In these precincts when one hears talk of being faithful to our allies we should ask if it means being unfaithful to ourselves.

As to the immediate future, I doubt that there is anything very dramatic we should do. I will downplay aid announcements. I would hope that having warned of what Congress might do as the result of the MIG deal it won’t do it anyway. In a calmer time I will go over all these things again with Nehru but I would not think it wise to hit him again right away.

3. I am seeing both Desais in next two days and will weigh in on that part of the Prime Minister’s speech having to do with indirect pressure. I will ask them both if they would prefer not to be warned about possible US reaction to Indian moves.

4. I will do missionary work with other members of GOI on the Pakistani 104s. I confess I thought I had made some progress with Nehru on responsibility for the 104s and the accidents and misadventures of history that caused the previous administration to offer them. Incidentally, I did evidently persuade Nehru that these supersonic planes are an expensive novelty which unmanned interception apparatus is making obsolete. He quoted my advance technical briefing more or less verbatim in his speech. Nehru texts being sent Embassy telegrams 4179³ and 4180.⁴

Galbraith

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6-2562. Secret; Priority.
1. Document 146.
2. See Document 142.
3. Telegram 4179, June 25, transmitted the text of Nehru’s remarks on Pakistan and Kashmir in the Indian Parliament on June 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6-2562)
4. Telegram 4180, June 25, transmitted the text of Nehru’s remarks concerning the purchase of supersonic aircraft during the debate cited in footnote 3 above. (Ibid., 791.5622/6-2562)