Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

144. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Acting Secretary of State Ball⁰

Washington, June 22, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Developments in the Kashmir Dispute Before the Security Council

We thought it would be useful to recapitulate briefly some of the principal developments regarding the Kashmir case in the Security Council.

You will recall that the genesis of our intimate involvement with the Kashmir dispute before the Security Council arose during Pakistani President Ayub’s visit to the United States last year. Among other things Ayub felt that he had received a commitment from the President to support Pakistan if the issue of Kashmir were raised by Pakistan in the Security Council. After India had rejected the Black mission, Pakistan, against the advice of the United States, in fact brought the Kashmir issue to the Security Council. It soon became clear that Pakistan expected the United States to assume a major active responsibility for advancing Pakistan’s position and that an excessively broad interpretation was being placed by Pakistan on the President’s commitment. Accordingly, the Department sought to limit Pakistan’s interpretation that the United States should actively manage the Kashmir issue in the Security Council to a successful conclusion (Pakistan is not a member of the Security Council). A working definition of the President’s commitment was, therefore, agreed in the Department and transmitted by memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the White House, on May 17, 1962 (Tab A).¹ The working definition reads as follows:

“With respect to the Security Council, we believe the United States is committed to sympathetic consideration of and support for any Pakistan initiatives in the Security Council which advance a settlement of the problem. This would include sponsorship of a Pakistan draft resolution even if it were to draw a Soviet veto. We would vote in favor of resolutions which are consonant with the earlier United Nations resolutions (UNCIP) and attempt to enlist support among other members of the Security Council for such resolutions. The United States is not committed, in our view, to vote in favor of any resolution which radically departs from the intent of the earlier resolutions, although we would, of course, examine any such resolution on its merits.”

Meanwhile, our Mission in New York had been instructed to encourage the Pakistani Delegation to put forward its own proposals and resolutions which we would then hope to be able to support. The reason behind this instruction was that, in view of the excessive interpretation by Pakistan of the President’s commitment, it was important to make clear to the Pakistanis that we were in fact discharging the commitment, once and for all. This tactic proved effective and on May 15, 1962, Zafrulla Khan, the Pakistani Representative at the United Nations, presented the United States Delegation with two texts of resolutions. Zafrulla at the same time also informed our Delegation that he would see the Irish representative, Ambassador Boland, on the next day and seek his sponsorship of a resolution (New York’s 3745).² On May 17 the Department instructed the Mission to welcome the submission by Pakistan of both draft texts and offer to sponsor and work for the adoption of either (Deptel 2983 to New York).³ On May 19 in a conversation with President Ayub and the Pakistani Foreign Minister, our Ambassador underscored our offer to sponsor and work for the adoption of either draft resolution as a significant affirmative decision on our part in implementation of the President’s assurances to President Ayub of last summer (Karachi’s 2044).⁴

Pursuant to Zafrulla’s initiative, Ambassador Boland of Ireland together with the United Nations representatives of Ghana, Chile, Venezuela, and the United Arab Republic attempted to draft a resolution acceptable both to Pakistan and India. Behind the scenes we strongly encouraged this initiative to have others sponsor the resolution and worked to assure a feasible text. On June 5 the Boland drafting group (the so-called Little Five) made its final drafting concession to the Indian position by changing a specific reference to third-party assistance to a broader reference to Article 33 of the Charter. This was done in an attempt to keep the Little Five together in the face of the wavering UAR Delegate (New York’s 3913).⁵ However, unrelenting Indian counterpressure against this resolution was being exerted in the Little Five capitals, in New York and in New Delhi where Krishna Menon charged that the Little Five were fronting for the United States and the United Kingdom (New Delhi’s 3944).⁶

By the time Menon had arrived in New York on June 17 the UAR and Ghana had already decided not to co-sponsor the compromise resolution. The Chilean representative had also backed out of sponsorship on his own initiative, thus reducing the Little Five to Ireland and Venezuela. Although the UAR and Ghana defections had been expected to occur despite our persistent efforts, the Chilean action was an unpleasant surprise. Further efforts were being taken to hold the group together when the Venezuelan Delegate, expecting to be a candidate for a high General Assembly office in 1963, showed signs of losing his nerve before Menon’s onslaught. Accordingly, on June 19, the Department telephoned the Embassies in Caracas and Santiago to request that the Venezuelan and Chilean representatives co-sponsor, or in the case of the Chilean representative, at least vote for the compromise resolution (Deptel to Caracas 1295, Santiago 1004).⁷ The representations in Santiago appear to have been successful in assuring an affirmative Chilean vote (Santiago’s

1060)⁸ and Embassy Caracas reported that the Venezuelan Delegate had an absolutely free hand (Caracas 1475).⁹ Presumably in the interests of his personal aspirations this Delegate then exercised his free hand to withdraw from co-sponsorship, at which stage the Irish Delegate expressed unwillingness to be the sole sponsor. Our Mission immediately made a further effort, assisted by the Irish and French Delegates, to persuade the Venezuelan Delegate to co-sponsor but he flatly refused. In order to keep the resolution alive, our Delegation later that afternoon (June 20) discussed the entire situation with the Pakistani Delegation and acceded to its request that the United States sponsor alone, if necessary, the Little Five text (New York’s 4071).¹⁰ Two steps were then taken. In order to maintain pressure for the Chilean affirmative vote, essential to a Security Council majority, our Embassy in Santiago again was instructed to approach the Foreign Office and by telephone on June 21 the Embassy reported the Chilean Delegate had a free hand. Meanwhile, the Irish and British Delegations had, at our Mission’s behest, recommended to their governments that they be permitted to co-sponsor with the United States. A rapid response was received the morning of June 21—the Irish could not co-sponsor with the United States; the British would if we requested them to do so. Simultaneously our Embassy in New Delhi warned against US-UK co-sponsorship (New Delhi’s 4131).¹¹

At this point, the White House was consulted directly and the President decided personally to persuade the Irish to sponsor the compromise resolution alone.¹² He was successful and a favorable Irish reply has now been received. Meanwhile, the Department instructed our Mission in New York to seek a 24-hour postponement of Security Council consideration of the Kashmir debate. Accordingly, at the afternoon meeting of the Council on June 21, against Soviet and Indian objections, the United States proposed and the Council approved by a 7-2-2 vote that the meeting be postponed until 3 p.m. on June 22. We expect the Irish to put forward the compromise Kashmir resolution at that time.

As you can see from the above, we have operated on two basic assumptions: (a) that it would be strongly preferable to have other Security Council members sponsor the resolution; and (b) that if this did not prove feasible, the commitment to Pakistan required us to sponsor a reasonable resolution.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6-2262. Confidential.
1. Not printed.
2. Dated May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/5-1562)
3. Dated May 15. (Ibid.)
4. Dated May 20. (Ibid., 690D.91/5-2062)
5. Dated June 5. (Ibid., 690D.91/6-562)
6. Dated June 8. (Ibid., 690D.91/6-862)
7. Both dated June 19. (Ibid., 690D.91/6-1862)
8. Dated June 20. (Ibid., 690D.91/6-2062)
9. Dated June 19. (Ibid., 690D.91/6-1962)
10. Dated June 20. (Ibid., 690D.91/6-2062)
11. Dated June 21. (Ibid., 690D.91/6-2162)
12. According to a telephone conversation on June 21 between Cleveland and Ball, President Kennedy phoned the Irish Ambassador in order to get Ireland “back on board.” (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Subjects, India, 1961-1963)