143. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Supersonic Aircraft for India
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan Embassy
- Mr. Salman Ali, Political Counselor, Pakistan Embassy
- M-Mr. McGhee
- NEA-Mr. Grant
- SOA-John N. Gatch
Mr. McGhee told the Ambassador that he wanted to describe in general terms the efforts on the part of the U.S. and the U.K. to forestall Soviet penetration of the Indian military establishment by the provision of MIG-21s. Mr. McGhee said that we saw the situation as follows: India has a threat to its borders from Communist China; to meet this threat and to balance its air strength with Pakistan’s F-104s, India had been seriously considering acquiring a supersonic capability; and we and the U.K. thought that, if India was determined to acquire these planes, it would be better for the planes to come from the West. We believed Soviet influence in the Indian Air Force undesirable, and further believed if there were no alternatives to the Soviets, Krishna Menon’s hand would be strengthened in the coming struggle for succession in India.
Mr. McGhee said that, for the foregoing reasons, the U.S. and the U.K. had been discussing the possibility of the U.S. selling India some unspecified transport aircraft and of the U.K. selling some Lightning aircraft. In addition the U.K. was considering the offer of an engine that India could manufacture. He pointed out that both we and the U.K. had supplied India with this type of equipment in the past. He made no specific mention of terms of payment. Mr. McGhee emphasized the U.S. conviction that we and the U.K. were acting in Pakistan’s interest as well as our own in this regard.
Ambassador Ahmed said his government disagreed on the seriousness of the Indian threat from the north. Furthermore, India had been informed in May 1960 that Pakistan was going to get F-104s and was only now raising a howl about it. The Ambassador said his government believed India’s real motive in getting jets was to increase its strength toward Pakistan. The Indian seizure of Goa, the several bellicose and belligerent [Page 286] statements made by Indian political leaders during the past six months, and now this attempt to get supersonic planes all convinced Pakistan that India meant to threaten it rather than Communist China.
The Ambassador said that there would be an adverse effect on public opinion in Pakistan if the West supplied supersonic aircraft to India. His government was not really convinced that the Soviets had made a genuine offer, and believed the Indians might be using the threat of an offer as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the West to make a counter offer.
Mr. Grant interrupted to say that, according to intelligence available to us, the Soviets were prepared to supply MIG-21s to India if asked, and would do so rather quickly if the Indians accepted the offer.
Ambassador Ahmed said that, in any case, a Western offer, if accepted, will amount to a grant of military assistance to India. The people of Pakistan would view this as an unfriendly act perpetrated by two countries—i.e., the U.S. and the U.K., who are supposed to be Pakistan’s allies. Pakistan believed that if India was determined to have supersonic jets, it would be better if they came from the USSR rather than the West. This would at least widen the split between the USSR and Communist China. If, on the other hand, the planes come from the West, tensions will mount between Pakistan and India because the latter will feel free to take a tougher line on Kashmir than in the past.
Mr. McGhee said that Pakistan should be less rather than more apprehensive if India got planes from the West since the West would be in a position to limit the supply. He added that the U.S. doubts that India has any intention of committing aggression against Pakistan.
Mr. Grant reminded Aziz Ahmed that on May 28 the Ambassador had expressed the concern of his government that an Indian supersonic acquisition would result in a serious military imbalance in South Asia. The U.S. and the U.K. are trying to prevent just such a situation since, once Soviets are in the field, they can, and probably will, aggravate any imbalance to suit their own purposes. Mr. Grant added that we see three advantages to the Western counter offer: (1) anti-Menon forces in India will be strengthened; (2) there is a possibility of a long delay before the Indians make up their minds to take either plane; and (3) even if the Western offer is accepted there will be less chance of a real imbalance being created.
Ambassador Ahmed replied that a long delay was unlikely, because both Nehru and Krishna Menon had made this a prestige issue. The serious thing, as far as Pakistan is concerned, is that the West is setting a new pattern by this offer to supply arms to India. The West has no assurances that, even if India accepts the Western offer this time, the Indians would not later turn to the Soviets for different types of military aid. India would thus have the means of putting almost unlimited pressure on the [Page 287] West. In Pakistan the difference between U.S. policy towards allies and neutrals would be further blurred.
Mr. Grant said that the central problem remained to prevent a major additional imbalance in the subcontinent. We have had and continue to have the closest sort of relationship with Pakistan as an ally. We believe we are acting in Pakistan’s best interests.
Mr. McGhee said there was a basic contradiction in Pakistan’s position. On the one hand it wanted to prevent or minimize an imbalance and on the other it believed it would be preferable to have the planes come from the Soviet Union. Such an arrangement would establish an open-ended channel for an Indian military buildup.
The Ambassador asked what specifically he could tell his government. Mr. McGhee said that the U.S. and the U.K. had been discussing means of forestalling the Soviet attempt to provide India with MIG-21s. Duncan Sandys and Ambassador Galbraith had had separate conversations with Nehru and had each elaborated on the possible adverse consequences for India of a MIG-21 transaction. They had encouraged Nehru to explore the possibility of Western alternatives before making a decision. No specific offer to India had been made and no financial terms had been discussed.
The Ambassador thanked Mr. McGhee and Mr. Grant for the information.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6-2162. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted on July 3 by Gatch and approved in M on July 11.↩