Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan⁰

Washington, January 27, 1962, 2:57 p.m.

1505. Dept wishes take every feasible step exploit first break in impasse to achieve permanent solution. Believe your impending departure¹ provides favorable opportunity to explore this problem and lines of resolution with Ayub. If your agenda for January 29 meeting crowded, you should seek at least one more session devoted solely to transit dispute. You will be able judge by Ayub’s reaction whether you should press for some agreement in principle from GOP on possible solution or confine your efforts preparing ground for your successor. In light vigorous US effort get GOI to negotiating table on Kashmir and in wake successful consortium, seems at least possible Ayub may be in receptive mood on Afghan matter. In mentioning Kashmir and consortium, you might say you would like to leave Pakistan with at least a constructive start towards solution transit dispute. This is particularly true because of President Kennedy’s deep interest in issue. It would be gratifying to be able to make favorable report upon your return to Washington.

At your discretion, present US views to Ayub in following general framework:

1. US considers temporary reopening significant break in dispute and notes with satisfaction cooperative attitude adopted by GOP. In interest of both countries, we think strenuous efforts should be made keep border open permanently on mutually acceptable basis. RGA has made forward step and we are confident GOP can also make step in return without doing damage either to its interests or public position.

2. We are increasingly concerned over way Soviets are exploiting situation. In addition to Soviet gains previously cited, we now have reliable reports of significant increase in Soviet activity with Afghan armed forces. All this helps no one but the Soviets. US belief has been strongly reinforced that best way to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan is with vigorous US presence exemplified by US assistance programs.

3. Before going into specifics regarding possible solutions, at this point you should request Ayub give his present views on situation.

4. If Ayub still appears adamant on possible new moves toward Afghanistan, you should urge him at least make early appropriate public statement expressing his pleasure that border is open for aid goods and reaffirming GOP position on Afghan right of transit.

5. If Ayub appears receptive to discussing ways keeping border open, you should outline proposal in following paragraph and say you are prepared discuss details later at working level.

6. One major obstacle in resolving present impasse is RGA insistence on having Afghan officials performing freight forwarding duties in Pakistan and GOP refusal allow RGA reopen trade agencies and consulates on previous basis because of improper activities reportedly carried out by previous officials. US suggests some arrangement by which GOP would permit small offices officially designated as Freight Forwarding Offices be opened in Peshawar and Quetta manned by Afghan officials with consular status but not designated as consuls. In granting exequaturs, GOP would exercise sovereign right of determining whether any particular official acceptable. It would be understood from outset that if offices functioned mutually satisfactorily for reasonable length of time—e.g., six months—they would be expanded to perform full consular services and redesignated consulates with freight forwarding sections. Trade agencies as previously constituted, would never be reopened, and all functions would be integrated in one office. Again providing everything went smoothly, after reasonable period offices in Chaman and Parachinar might be reopened. US believes foregoing plan would protect GOP security interests and allow RGA retain enough of its public position to accept safeguarding restrictions implicit in exequatur process. At some point in proceedings resumption diplomatic relations would be presumed.²

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1-2762. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Gatch, cleared by Bromley Smith and with AID, and approved by Talbot.
1. Rountree left Pakistan on February 7. He was replaced as Ambassador by Walter P. McConaughy, who was appointed on March 1 and presented his credentials on March 20.
2. Rountree saw Ayub on January 30 and discussed the transit dispute along the lines of the instructions in this telegram. He found Ayub adamant against the idea of establishing freight forwarding stations in Peshawar and Quetta, but willing to consider issuing a statement expressing pleasure that the border had been reopened. (Telegram 1300 from Karachi, January 31; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1-3161)