Office of the Historian

186. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, March 10, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • President Nasser’s Letter to President Kennedy of March 3, 19631

President Nasser’s letter in response to President Kennedy’s letter of January 19, 19632 indicates by its length and cordiality that Nasser values his relations with the United States and seeks to maintain the personal rapport developed through correspondence with President Kennedy. Key points in the letter are summarized in the first enclosure.

In essence, the letter conveys the following:

1)
The UAR intends to honor its commitments made in accordance with President Kennedy’s proposals of November 16, 1962.
2)
The UAR does not intend to invade Saudi Arabia or subvert its government, although revolution may come about because of internal factors.
3)
The UAR reserves the right to take whatever action it deems necessary to halt outside intervention in Yemen.
4)
President Nasser records his deep thanks for and appreciation of the President’s endeavors and wishes them the success they are worthy of, as a constructive and sincere effort for a peace based on justice.

We recommend that the attached telegram be sent to Ambassador Badeau authorizing him to express to Nasser or to Ali Sabri (a) thanks for Nasser’s frank letter in which are found some welcome constructive elements, (b) continued concern for Saudi Arabian integrity, and (c) hope for restraint in future UAR actions.3

The Department recommends that no publicity be given to this exchange of messages.

William H. Brubeck4
[Page 412]

Enclosure5

KEY POINTS

A.
Appreciation for the President’s letter of January 19, 1963 both for its content and for its timeliness in removing suspicions about US intentions.
B.
Acknowledgement of UAR understanding of US ties with Saudi Arabia.
C.
Reiteration of UAR desire to avoid outside intervention in the affairs of Yemen.
D.
Assertion that Saud and Faysal invaded Yemen from outside necessitating a UAR response.
E.
Claim that the UAR has documents proving the participation of American pilots transporting troops and equipment from Jordan and Saudi Arabia to the Yemeni border, but were operating under binding contracts and in circumstances which necessitated their actions.
F.
Assertion that the UAR seeks no war with Saudi Arabia and that the differences between the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and the UAR are not of the kind to be settled by armed clash.
G.
Presentation of the following as the cardinal bases of UAR policy:
(1)
The UAR does not consider her mission to be the random distribution of revolution among other peoples of the Arab world; revolutions arise from internal causes.
(2)
Sanguinary clashes are not a binding feature of revolutions and in cold war conditions might even be counterproductive; hence the UAR favors natural progress and has even gone so far at times as to accept a truce with elements considered hostile to revolutionary progress.
(3)
The UAR can spare neither time nor effort for futile adventures and disputes; if the sequence of events is studied, the UAR posture is defensive against assaults launched by those who “refuse to believe in the inevitability of the sun rising after the darkness of the long night”.
H.
Definition of UAR attitudes as follows:
(1)
The UAR is open minded to all endeavors in support of peace based on justice;
(2)
The UAR does not seek to dictate the means by which the United States convinces the Saudi royal family or the UK of the unwisdom of their present policies;
(3)
The UAR cannot remain inactive before premeditated and aggressive attempts against the rights of the peoples of the Arab nations.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 308, Memoranda to the White House. Secret. Drafted by Barrow and Davies on March 5 and cleared by Talbot.↩
  2. The Embassy in Cairo transmitted the text of the letter in telegram 1362, March 4. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN) On March 13, the Department of State sent the signed original of the letter and an unofficial translation to the White House. The March 13 covering memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy bears a notation: “White House agrees no reply necessary.” (Ibid., POL 26 YEMEN)↩
  3. See Document 135.↩
  4. The telegram was sent to Cairo on March 10 as telegram 1800. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 UAR–US)↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩
  6. Secret.↩