Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic⁰

Washington, January 19, 1963, 11:44 a.m.

931. Re Deptels 924¹ and 930.² Corrected version of Presidential message to Nasser follows:

Verbatim text.

“January 18, 1963

Dear Mr. President:

When you and I embarked upon what I think we both regarded as a mutually promising relationship, we agreed that it must be on a basis of utmost candor on both sides. Having followed closely the tortuous course of events in Yemen and the exchanges between our two governments, I fear that this affair has given rise to misunderstandings which, unless we personally speak frankly to each other, may prejudice our growing rapport.

When the United Arab Republic and the Yemen Arab Republic agreed publicly to undertake certain commitments, I was hopeful that a great advance had been made. Now, however, I sense some UAR suspicion that, because Saudi Arabia has not withdrawn its support from the royalists, the US may be pursuing a double policy in Yemen. I assure you categorically that this is not so. We have done and will do what is necessary to protect our important interests in the Arabian Peninsula, but this has been most carefully calculated not to support Saudi policies in Yemen.

Perhaps more serious is a possible UAR feeling that we ought to be able to force the Saudis to disengage in Yemen. Once again let me say that we have been urging Faysal in his own interest to do just this. You are well aware, however, that it is not the US method to bring forcible pressure on any Arab leader who is our friend. Nor would Faysal respond. At this moment he considers his policy toward Yemen as essential to maintaining the very integrity of Saudi Arabia. I am afraid that it is UAR and YAR words and actions that have helped persuade him to this effect. Indeed each time we have felt we were making some progress toward disengagement, such actions as the Najran bombings have set us back. I must tell you in all candor that, as seen from here, they serve not to cow Faysal but to anger him. In my view, this situation needs patience and the exercise of that statesmanship for which we and others have applauded you on earlier occasions.

Similarly, the UK hesitations about recognizing the YAR spring clearly from their concern over Aden. Recurrent threats uttered by President Sallal do nothing but heighten these fears, whereas I am convinced that words of reassurance would help bring about UK recognition. I earnestly desire UK recognition but I am not in a position to press the UK to recognize in face of unwise statements from Sanaa.

I believe that we have already given ample evidence of the sincerity of our interest in good relations with the UAR. Let no one doubt US good faith. Similarly we have made every effort to be sure our own interests in Aden and the Arabian Peninsula are understood by you. With full understanding on both sides, I see no reason why these interests need impede mutually satisfactory relations between us.

Let me assure you that we will continue our efforts to bring about disengagement in Yemen on a basis which will permit the new Yemen Arab Republic to live in peace with its neighbors. I hope the UAR and US can pursue this objective with mutual confidence and understanding. We need to find a formula which will provide Faysal with a public basis for disengagement. A suitable formula may best be found by an impartial mediator and I urge you to agree to such an effort. Ambassador Badeau can explain what I have in mind.

I hope that this letter will help clear the air between us. Many people in both of our countries question whether good relations between us are really possible. I think they are wrong, but it is up to us to prove them wrong. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy”³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.02/1–1963. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Barrow; cleared by Strong, Rowe, and Komer; and approved by Rusk and Talbot.
1. Telegram 924 to Cairo, January 18, transmitted the original version of the message from Kennedy to Nasser contained in the telegram printed here. (Ibid., 786H.02/1–863) On January 18, in a memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, the Department of State transmitted to the White House the draft text of a message from Kennedy to Nasser and requested the earliest possible approval. Brubeck’s memorandum noted that the “anticipated” UAR rejection of the Secretary-General’s proposal to send a neutral intermediary to discuss disengagement and withdrawal with the governments engaged in the Yemen conflict had produced a “difficult impasse.” The memorandum advised that a message along the lines indicated would help dispel suspicion within the UAR while pressing it toward courses of action that the United States deemed desirable. (Ibid., 786H.02/1–1862)
2. In telegram 930 to Cairo, January 19, the Department of State requested Badeau to hold up the delivery of the message pending the receipt of textual changes. (Ibid., 786H.02/1–1963)
3. In telegram 1038 from Cairo, January 20, Badeau reported that the corrected text of the message had been delivered to the President’s office at noon that day. (Ibid., 786H.02/1–2063)