238. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hansen) to President Kennedy0
Emphasis in the briefing papers1 on the emotional state of the Shah and his obsessive preoccupation with military assistance matters has overshadowed two basic premises for U.S. strategy toward Iran.
- First: Iran is going through a critical period of socio-political upheaval. Rapid and conspicuous progress in the economic development [Page 581] program and various reforms is essential to maintain reasonable political cohesion.
- Second: While recognizing the symbolic and stabilizing role of the monarchy—we are looking to the present regime of Prime Minister Amini rather more than to the Shah—to provide the impetus toward faster economic progress, reform, and the beginnings of a political synthesis which will speed the process of modernization.
The briefing papers imply that you should be completely silent on the role of the Prime Minister. I fear that this could be misconstrued and result in failure to convey to the Shah the view that the U.S. looks on Amini’s efforts as contributing to both U.S. interests and the Shah’s. After all, it was only several months ago that Ambassador Holmes successfully headed off an attempt by the Shah to dump Amini.
While the briefing papers are right in pointing out the Shah’s jealousy of Amini, in my opinion, careful but pointed reference to your recognition of Amini’s efforts and the importance of continued support by the Shah would be useful and less risky than a studied avoidance of any discussion. There will continue to be a difficult relationship between the two men under the pressure of recurrent crises in Iran. But we should not overlook the importance of Amini as perhaps the only Iranian politician with the intelligence, prominence, and courage to pursue a reformist policy with some prospects of success.
Possibly more important is the need to convey firmly to the Shah that we consider economic and social progress, particularly at this stage in Iran’s development, to be of overriding importance—and that the U.S. stands ready to assist substantially in this effort.
The briefing papers concentrate on the necessity for “unselling” the Shah from a bigger and more glamorous military package. I believe there should be far greater stress on “selling” the Shah on the need for moving faster on the economic and reform front.
This need not involve any more aid commitments than are already proposed. It can readily take the form of simply revealing to the Shah your own assessment of the relative priority of this effort in the nation-building process—that you view the 3rd Plan and the reform programs as the “right” things to do—and that failure or inadequate progress constitute the major risk to Iran, his regime, and U.S. interests.
On both of these points the briefing papers appear to convey a fear that either the Shah might be driven by jealousy to jettison Amini or that he might be spurred to renewed interference with Amini’s economic and social reform and development activities.
These fears, given the irrational nature of the Shah, are not entirely groundless. But I believe it is extremely important that the Shah depart with an understanding that, while we do not underrate his importance, [Page 582] or the legitimacy of some of his concerns regarding the military posture and prospects of Iran, our economic and military support is predicated upon the firm view that we look to the development of a responsible ministerial government capable of achieving economic progress and political stability as a cornerstone of our efforts and his own future.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran Subjects: Shah Visit, 4/7/62–4/10/62. Secret.↩
- Reference is presumably to the Scope Paper and Talking Paper for the President, prepared by the Department of State, to brief President Kennedy prior to the Shah’s visit. (Ibid., Iran Subjects: Shah Briefing Book, 4/11/62–4/14/62; and Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2081–2082)↩