237. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- PCC Refugee Initiative
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, Special Representative, Palestine Conciliation Commission
- Mr. Sherrington Moe, Senior Advisor to the Special Representative
- IO/UNP—Stephen Palmer, Jr.
- NEA/NE—William R. Crawford, Jr.
1. Dr. Johnson’s Plans for the “Second Round”; Working Paper V:
It was agreed that consultations with Dr. Johnson and Mr. Moe over the past two months have served a useful purpose in refining possible approaches to the problem of winning Arab host government and Israel agreement on the movement, in both directions, of a limited number of refugees in a limited period. This appears the only practical way to break down the psychological and political obstacles that have precluded basic progress for thirteen years. Working Paper V (attached for selected posts)1 represents in most respects a consensus of Dr. Johnson and his staff, of the Department working group, and of valuable suggestions received from the field. (One or two Department exceptions to Working Paper V were reserved for discussion later in the meeting.)
Dr. Johnson indicated his intention not to present a “present proposal” during his coming visit to the Near East. His ideas are crystallized to date only in regard to initial discussion with the Israelis. Dr. Johnson said his approach would include the following elements: (a) a statement that, as a UN official, he cannot force compliance with General Assembly resolutions which are in the nature of recommendations, and that he must try to define possibilities for agreement within the framework of the sovereign concerns of Israel and the Arab states; (b) the statement that what is under discussion is initial movement of a small number of refugees rather than an over-all solution; (c) questioning the Israelis as to the circumstances under which they would be willing to accept some repatriation and as to Israel’s own views of what repatriation and compensation would mean in practice; (d) forewarning [Page 578] that he is quite prepared to leave Israel and return directly to the United States if discussions in Israel prove wholly fruitless but that, alternatively, he would plan to return to Israel on this same round, after talking to the Arabs, if there is prospect of progress; (e) the statement that no plan would be set down in detail until his return to the U.S. had provided an opportunity to consult with his principals in the PCC.
Mr. Crawford commented on the reasonableness of this approach. If negotiations break down, Dr. Johnson will clearly wish at least to avoid a situation in which the Arabs unite in opposition to his proposals. Provided that is avoided and the UAR were willing to stand on the sidelines, Dr. Johnson might consider whether there is hope of doing anything on a one or two country basis.
Dr. Johnson agreed this is one “fall back” position to be considered.
2. Joint Meeting with Arab Host Government Representatives:
Dr. Johnson said he had been advised on the previous day by Lebanon’s permanent representative in the UN, Ambassador Hakim, that the current Arab League meeting in Riyadh has decided not to insist on joint Arab meetings with him.
3. Meeting with Chiefs of State:
Dr. Johnson said he will wish to meet chiefs and/or heads of state on this round. Little difficulty is anticipated except with Nasser. A letter has been sent to Foreign Minister Fawzi seeking an appointment, back-stopped by a personal message from IBRD President Black to Minister of Economy Kaissouni.
Dr. Johnson said he will inform Ambassador Badeau from Jerusalem, through American Consulate General channels, of the UAR response, if any. If no reply has been received, Ambassador Badeau’s support will be appreciated.
4. U.S. Diplomatic Support:
Dr. Johnson said that, as during his first round, he will be under UN auspices and does not want close identification with American officials. He does not wish to be met on arrival and will take the initiative in getting in touch with Chiefs of Mission, with whom he is most anxious to consult.
Department officers assured Dr. Johnson that Missions would be instructed to provide full facilities consistent with this Government’s continuing support of the PCC initiative. Thought has been given to the desirability of high level approaches to the Arabs and Israelis prior to Dr. Johnsons’s departure. It is concluded that this is perhaps necessary only with the Israelis. In recent weeks they have tended to deprecate the Johnson mission as an exercise “for-the-record”, presumably with the [Page 579] objective of watering down Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s May 1961 commitment to President Kennedy.
Dr. Johnson said he thinks a high level USG approach to the Israelis should be made.
5. Special Representative’s Relations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia and non-government groups:
It was agreed PCC Chairman Eldem (Turkey) should inform Iraqi and Saudi UN representatives that, consistent with his terms of reference, Dr. Johnson has not scheduled visits to Baghdad and Saudi Arabia, but would be happy to meet with representatives of these countries at their initiative at any time. It was noted that the PCC’s March 27 letter to Dr. Johnson (attached)2 authorizes contacts with non-government groups and individuals, such as refugee leaders, “in the nature of information-gathering as distinct from official consultations”. It was recognized that a relationship with refugee leaders may be useful, but that the Department does not wish the actions of the Special Representative to encourage the “Palestine entity” concept.
6. Detailed Comment on Working Paper V:
Dr. Johnson was informed of certain detailed Department comments on Working Paper V, inter alia the Department’s conclusion that it would not be wise to use the open mails in Near East countries for distribution of refugee questionnaires.
7. Financial Considerations and Compensation:
Department officers noted that Dr. Johnson has not requested a commitment in specific terms regarding U.S. willingness to contribute financially to progress on the refugee problem. The Department’s position, therefore, remains as stated to Dr. Johnson in New York on March 14.3 (“As a matter of history, the United States has expressed willingness to give generous support to programs that offer prospect of real progress on aspects of the Arab-Israel problem. The willingness to seek legislative authority for such support continues today.”) Department officers reiterated the hope that detailed financial discussions can be avoided during the “second round”.
Department officers agreed with Dr. Johnson’s general observation that the cost of a 10–15 year program for a definitive solution of the refugee problem could be estimated as between $1–$2 billion.
Department officers reserved position on the application of compensation as set forth in Working Paper V. As Dr. Johnson is aware, the [Page 580] Department’s traditional position has been that UN responsibility for ensuring compensation applies only “on one side of the line”, i.e. to those who do not opt for repatriation. This does not mean, of course, that there may not be the possibility of redress through the Israel courts. Further, and while the Department recognizes room for differences of interpretation on this point, we have always tended to regard compensation as including only payment for immovable property adjusted to reflect the depreciation in money values since 1948. At the same time, the Department is not opposed in principle to some form of per capita payment, outside the context of compensation, to enable needy refugees moving in either direction to get a new start in life.
Dr. Johnson acknowledged that there is a difference between the Department’s thinking and his own regarding the nature of the compensation obligation. Shorn of its “legislative history”, paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 would not seem to exclude an obligation to compensate those who choose repatriation. Nor does the wording of the resolution necessarily bear out the Department’s view of a very narrow definition of what is included under compensation.
It was agreed that Dr. Johnson’s coming conversations in the area would develop a greater insight into the position of all parties on the financial and compensation aspects of the problem.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/4–662. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Crawford on April 11.↩
- Not attached to the source text. A copy, dated April 2, is ibid., NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Refugees—PCC Basic Documents. For text, see Supplement, the Arab-Israeli dispute.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- See Document 213.↩