229. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk0
SUBJECT
- Recognition of the Army Takeover in the Syrian Arab Republic
Discussion:
On March 27–28 the Army in Syria ousted the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, dissolved the Parliament, and is presently governing the country with the assistance of senior civil servants who are operating the various Ministries as Acting Ministers. Reports from our Embassy in Damascus indicate that the main motivation for the Army takeover was dissatisfaction with various policies and actions of the civilian authorities, that it may reflect increased pressure for a socialist policy within the Army, and may partially have been inspired by fear that the Government of President Qudsi had gone too far in seeking rapprochement with Iraq. Whereas some of the Army’s earlier communiqués suggest that an attempt would be made to conciliate the U.A.R., it seems clear that the ring leaders of the present Army movement are, with minor exceptions, the same officers who carried out the September 28 revolution. It has been emphasized by the regime and by the Acting Foreign Minister in a conversation with our Ambassador that this government is a “continuation of the 28th of September revolution and … a purely internal measure to correct certain internal conditions… .”
You may recall that at the time we recognized the Syrian Arab Republic on October 10, 1961, the situation was as follows: The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command, i.e. roughly the same group of officers conducting the present movement, had installed a civilian provisional government headed by Prime Minister and Acting Chief of State Mahmun Kuzbari, which governed pending the holding of elections for a Constituent Assembly.
The Assembly was later duly elected, under terms of an electoral law which had existed prior to Syrian union with Egypt, and the Assembly [Page 565] in turn elected Nazim al-Qudsi as President, and the Army declared it had “returned to its barracks” and was turning the reins of government over to civilian authorities. However, at the time of the Army takeover on March 27–28, the Assembly had not drafted or promulgated a permanent constitution.
It should be noted that the Army authorities issued an official statement on March 28 which, inter alia, asserted that “the Command will adopt the policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment, will safeguard international charters, will respect (its) agreements and will adhere to the principles of the United Nations.” Further, our Ambassador was summoned by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on March 28 and was assured that the Army takeover was an internal matter and that there would be no change in Syrian foreign policy.
While the reassumption by the Army of power on March 27–28 is claimed by the Army regime to be a continuation of the 28th of September revolution, there has in fact been a major change in the character of the government which presents a question as to the recognition of the new regime. However, on the assumption that we desire to recognize and to continue relations with the new regime, this can be done without expressly raising the question of recognition. Recognition of a new government need not be expressly stated but may be implied from continuance of normal contacts and relations with the new regime.
We believe it would be desirable that we have authority to authorize Ambassador Knight to inform the Acting Syrian Foreign Minister early in the week of April 1 that we intend to continue business as usual, and that we wish the Syrian Government and people every success. Prior to taking this action we would hope to coordinate with the United Kingdom with a view to its taking a parallel course.
We might also authorize Ambassador Knight at that time to assure the new government that we intend to carry on with present economic assistance programs and specifically with a loan agreement signed on March 27 designed to support the IMF-approved Syrian stabilization program.
We believe prompt action along these lines will provide a favorable basis for initiating our relations with the new government and accordingly request your approval.
Recommendation:
That you authorize us to inform Ambassador Knight early next week to inform the Syrian authorities (a) that we intend to continue doing business as usual, (b) that we intend to carry on with existing economic assistance commitments, including the stabilization loan, and (c) that we wish the Syrian Government and people every success.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/3–3062. Confidential. Drafted by Barrow (NEA/NE) and concurred in by Hewitt (L/NEA). The memorandum did not reach Secretary Rusk. It was directed through S/S and M to the Secretary and evidently was withdrawn after McGhee had seen the document, initialed its first page, and initialed the approved line at the end of the memorandum. The document is also initialed by Deputy Executive Secretary Edward S. Little. McGhee’s initials on the approved line have been crossed out, and a handwritten inscription reads: “not sent.” The actions recommended in this document were, however, eventually approved. See Document 236.↩