Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

228. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

Washington, March 29, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Visit of the Shah of Iran 10–17 April 1962 (U)

JCSM-233–62

1. Reference is made to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 21 March 1962,¹ subject as above.

2. The papers prepared in response to the reference memorandum are attached.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Curtis E. LeMay
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment 1²

TALKING PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—VISIT OF THE Shah OF IRAN 10–17 APRIL 1962 (U)

An Assessment of the Military Threat to Iran

Discussion

A precarious political situation as well as an unstable economic situation, both operating under the prevailing uneasy calm which presently pervades the Iranian scene, are far more of a threat to Iran than any present military threat.

A military threat to Iran stems only from Soviet capabilities in the form of formidable ground, sea and air forces deployed behind the contiguous border with Iran. While a limited conflict could be instigated by the Soviets through the medium of Iraq and Afghanistan, this threat is not considered an immediate one and would only develop if direct and extensive Soviet support would be provided to them. This is considered to have little likeliHood of materializing within the next few years.

The Iranian army could not contain or seriously delay a major Soviet attack. While the USSR may view Iran as an especially promising and vulnerable target, it believes that events are moving toward an internal revolutionary explosion which will result in the overthrow of the Shah’s regime by nationalist, anti-Western forces who would sever Iranian ties with the West. Soviet propaganda has endeavored to hasten these developments by seeking to discredit the Shah and his government. While Iran is the most vulnerable target for a Soviet attempt to undermine CENTO, we believe that Soviet policy toward Iran and CENTO will continue along the same non-military lines described above. Barring a domestic upheaval which offered the Soviets new opportunities for subversion and expansion of their political influence or a global war, we do not foresee any dramatic Soviet military moves against Iran over the next four or five years.

Iraq and Afghanistan have received extensive military and economic support from the Soviets and are almost solely dependent on the USSR for a wide range of equipment and supply for their armed forces as well as instruction in the use of the new equipment. Over a period of time the USSR military aid and training is certain to have an important influence on their internal as well as foreign policy. For the present, however, it appears that Soviet aid has been delivered to these countries for political effect and has not substantially increased the military capability of their Armed Forces which are concerned primarily with internal security and will be for the foreseeable future. They do not have the trained manpower, facilities, maintenance, and supply ability to properly employ the equipment over a sustained period. Thus while their military capabilities are certain to increase gradually during the next few years provided Soviet assistance continues, neither Iraq nor Afghanistan have a present capability for offensive operations against Iran.

The military assistance effort already planned by the U.S. will enable Iran to stay ahead of Iraq and Afghanistan in its military capabilities. In spite of the steady efforts which the U.S. has made to modernize the Iranian Army and increase its effectiveness, its capabilities continue to be limited. Its main deficiencies are its excessive size, the low level of general education and technical aptitude, inept leadership, a cumbersome system of command, supply and administration, inadequate transportation and communication facilities, and a lack of combat experience. Despite the attention that has been lavished on the military by the Shah whose rule rests primarily on their loyalty, the army has not acquired great prestige in the eyes of the Iranian people both in and out of government, and a growing number of the younger officers have the discontent of the civilian middle class from which they come. In order to reduce the possibility that the army could become a threat to his position, the Shah has encouraged factionalism, competing intelligence services and conflicting chains of command. To a considerable degree, the military hierarchy is corrupt, wasteful and inefficient. The capabilities of the Armed Forces are generally low, although a slow, steady improvement has been made.

We believe that in spite of the foregoing U.S. assessment of the poor capability of the Iranian Armed Forces, that Iran does have the capability to defend against any purely Iraqi or Afghan aggression but in the foreseeable future will not have any significant capability against Soviet military action.

Attachment 2³

March 26, 1962.

TALKING PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—VISIT OF THE SHAH OF IRAN 10–17 APRIL 1962

SUBJECT

• US Strategic Concept, Defense of the Middle East

Background—See Enclosure.

Discussion—Two major considerations influence the US strategic concept for the defense of the Middle East: First, the unusually formidable terrain obstacles to Soviet over-land incursion to the area and, second, the unquestionable Soviet recognition of the United States and Free World vital interests in the area.

Consideration of the above factors, together with Soviet military inaction in the area over the past several years impels the United States to the view that Soviet military attack of the Middle East area is, first, unlikely in the near future, and, secondly, would under any circumstances occur in conjunction with aggression in other world areas.

The United States places reliance upon the Armed Forces of Iran and its other CENTO Allies to execute effective ground delaying action in areas adjacent to the Soviet borders.

Certain measures of limited nonnuclear response to Soviet attack on Iran can be taken by US forces to counter limited Soviet intervention and probing aggression. Inadequacies of road and rail facilities in Iran limit commitment of US conventional forces to two Army Divisions and Marine and US Air Force Combat elements to Northern Iran. By extensive use of US Air Transport capabilities, about two additional battle groups could be supported.

Commitment of US forces in sufficient time to counter a Soviet advance into Iran requires use of the only two airborne divisions presently in the US Strategic Reserve and all of the airlift capability including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, resulting in a serious dilution of the capability to respond to other contingencies.

The ability to commit conventional forces as indicated above is based upon the assumption that authorization by the President for the use of nuclear weapons will be given as required to achieve US objectives in the area, should the Soviets persist in spite of US actions.

Should this conventional response on the part of the United States, Iran, and their Allies prove to be insufficient to turn back a Soviet invasion, the United States and her CENTO Allies are capable of a limited nuclear action consisting primarily of interdiction of Soviet routes of advance through the difficult terrain in the border areas and nuclear attack of Soviet airfields which are directly supporting their operations. CENTO plans for such action exist.

Finally, the United States has the option of fully escalating the defense to general nuclear war.

Enclosure

BACKGROUND

1. US policy toward Iran defers any decisions on whether or how the United States would react militarily to a Soviet attack on Iran; therefore, major policy decisions are required should it be determined desirable for the United States to apply measured force against the Soviets in Iran.

2. The current general war plan for the Middle East area does not envisage the deployment of US combat forces to the area at least initially. Primary reliance for defense of the area against Soviet attack is placed on indigenous forces. The area would accrue benefits through the Allied strategic offensive.

3. Current US plans do not provide forces for a limited war with the Soviets in Iran.

4. Current contingency plans for operations short of general war in support of Iran are designed to assist in restoration of law and order resulting from internal disorder which may include communist volunteers. If US and Soviet forces were to become engaged, these plans assume that general war plans would be invoked. The forces earmarked for contingency operations short of general war consist of two battle groups, five fighter squadrons, 1/3 Marine Division/wing team, plus naval and air transports.

5. The planned movement of units by air requires the use of staging bases in Turkey. Routes to Teheran and Hamadan are within range of Russian air elements in the Azerbaijan area. Therefore, if the US deployment into Iran takes place after overt Soviet involvement in Iran, the movement by air over these planned routes is no longer feasible, and new air routes requiring overflight of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq would be required.

6. Any commitment of US forces in Iran against overt Soviet involvement must be preceded by a decision to employ whatever degree of force is required to achieve US objectives in the area and to preserve the integrity of US forces, to include the use of nuclear weapons or initiation of general war if the Soviets persist in spite of US actions.

Attachment 3⁴

March 27, 1962.

TALKING PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—VISIT OF THE SHAH OF IRAN 10–17 APRIL 1962

SUBJECT

• US Global Defense Posture in Support of Iran

Discussion—The following considerations pertain to the support which Iran obtains from the over-all US defense posture:

US policy with regard to the Middle East is to hold as far forward as possible of the Northernmost boundary of the CENTO countries. This includes Iran, which has a common frontier with the USSR.

The only US forces in the vicinity of Iran are 2 Destroyers and 1 AVP, under the control of CINCNELM and operating in the Persian Gulf, the Red and Arabian Seas.

Two US Tactical Fighter Sqs in Turkey are earmarked for NATO use; however, it is conceivable that they could be employed in Iran as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, although committed to NATO, could be considered as a potential force for use in reinforcing Iran, particularly the air-transportable elements of the Marine BLT normally embarked.

The US 7th Fleet in the Pacific, although committed to the PACOM area, could also be considered a potential for use in support of contingencies in Iran.

The nearest Army forces which could be sent to reinforce Iranian forces are 2 Airborne Battle Groups in Europe. These appear in CINCNELM plans for the Middle East.

The over-all US defense posture has increased to a considerable degree during the past year as a result of Presidential determination to increase the US conventional capability. With activation of USSTRICOM, a US unified command has been established which will contribute a great deal to US world-wide strength in increasing capability to react rapidly to cope with communist-inspired emergencies. Recent exercises in which US troops were lifted to Europe from Ft. Lewis, Washington, in 10 hours have pointed up the tremendous strides which have been made in speeding up troop airlift through the use of jet transport.

Attachment 4⁵

March 27, 1962.

TALKING PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—VISIT OF THE SHAH OF IRAN 10–17 APRIL 1962

SUBJECT

• The Military Assistance Program for Iran

Discussion—Objectives for and Role of Iranian Armed Forces—The objectives of MAP for Iran are a defense posture capable of maintaining internal security, contributing to deterrence of limited war, protection of Middle East LOC within or contiguous to Iran, participating in CENTO, and effecting maximum delay in event of Soviet attack. The role of the Iranian Armed Forces is to meet these objectives. To this end, military assistance in the amount of $577,888,000 was provided Iran by the US during FY 1951–62 and $63,450,000 in military assistance is proposed for Iran in FY 1963.

MAP Accomplishments—Since MAP for Iran commenced in 1950, the Iranian Army has advanced from a poorly trained, ill equipped force of 84,000 to an Army of almost 200,000 men with more modern equipment and an improved combat capability. The Iranian Navy, which became a separate service in 1955, has shown slow but continuous improvement in training and quality of personnel. The Iranian Air Force has measurably improved its organization, training and operational capability. The Gendarmerie has improved from a poorly trained, organized and equipped unit to a force capable of performing its mission acceptably.

Deficiencies—The Army lacks mobility and requisite communications and logistic capabilities. The Navy’s capability, due to lack of modern ships, is limited to a minimum contribution to protection of LOC in the Persian Gulf. The Air Force lacks modern high performance transport and fighter aircraft. The Armed Forces lack an air defense capability.

Estimate of Iranian Military Capabilities—With MAP assistance, recommended by SecDef to the NSC on 18 January 1962, the Iranian Armed Forces will become increasingly able to maintain internal security; can defend successfully against a limited war attack by either Iraq or Afghanistan; can probably withstand a coordinated attack by those two countries; but without help, cannot defend successfully against a Soviet attack or an Iraqi-Afghan attack covertly supported by the USSR. Iran’s capability to meet a Soviet attack as part of a general war offensive would be limited to minimum defense by successive delaying actions. Iranian capability to maintain and operate complex equipment is limited. However, the Iranian Armed Forces at a level of 150,000 men, with US assistance and advice, can operate and maintain effectively the equipment necessary to meet current JCS force objectives.

FY 1962–67 Military Assistance Plan for Iran—The Administrator, AID, has recommended to the President a FY 1962–1967 Military Assistance Plan for Iran at a cost not to exceed $330 million which includes about $170 million for modernization of Iranian Armed Forces at a strength reduced from 200,000 men to 150,000 men. A table extracted from the final Steering Group Report, which summarizes FY 1962–67 MA Plans for Iran recommended by USCINCEUR, the US Ambassador to Iran and the Steering Group, is attached.⁶

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Iran 091.112(TS) 21 Mar 62. Top Secret.
1. Not printed.
2. Secret. Prepared by Captain J.P. Fox, USN, Defense Intelligence Agency.
3. Top Secret. Prepared by Colonel E.R. White, USA, International Policy Branch, J–5.
4. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
5. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
6. Not printed.