225. Special National Intelligence Estimate0
SNIE 36.1–62
Washington, March 28,
1962.
PROSPECTS FOR NASSER
The Problem
To estimate the prospects for Nasser over the next year or two.
Conclusions
- 1.
- We do not foresee any significant challenge to Nasser’s control of Egypt during the period of this estimate. His moves are often based on reactions rather than on advance planning. Hence, the years immediately ahead are likely to be uneasy ones, as he continues his vigorous ad hoc efforts to remake Egypt’s social and political structure and to develop broader support for his regime. (Paras. 15–16)
- 2.
- Nasser’s defeat in Syria has clearly cost him stature, but he remains the most formidable single leader in the Arab world. He will keep up propaganda and subversion against the secessionist Syrian regime and against rival Arab rulers elsewhere. He will remain strongly opposed to Arab communism. He is unlikely to cooperate in efforts to reduce tension with Israel. We do not believe, however, that he feels any immediate compulsion for direct overt use of force against either Israel or his Arab opponents. (Paras. 19–23, 29)
- 3.
- Nasser’s basic suspicions of France and the UK probably will not change. For the next few years at least he is likely to be reasonably restrained in his dealings with both the US and the USSR because of his heavy dependence on the US for food and on the USSR for military and development aid. The nature of his interests and his objectives makes it likely that on many issues his views will be closer to those of the Bloc than the West. However, he will be alert to detect and will react vigorously against any attempt by either to use aid as a lever to influence his basic international position or his policies in Egypt and the Arab world. (Paras. 14, 28–31)
[Here follows the 6-page Discussion section; see Supplement, the compilation on the United Arab Republic.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.↩