Office of the Historian

224. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0

Washington, March 28, 1962.

Strategy for Shah’s Visit (10–16 April)

Since the Shah’s visit will be a particularly delicate exercise in reassurance, we suggest at least two prior strategy sessions with you. The first would be this Friday to get your preliminary reactions and another next week when Holmes will be back. For background, you should read the attached.1

While the Shah is much bucked up by earlier visit, he’ll probably still insist on ventilating his military concerns. Our proposed strategy is to soften him up first by taking the initiative with a forthright confidence-building portrayal of continued US strategic superiority and our growing general purpose strength (we’d like your reactions to draft State talking points at Tab A).2

We believe, subject to your views, that the visit should not be used to negotiate a new MAP program. However, we will probably have to tell the Shah something in order to avoid risk of disillusionment later; we also want US agencies speaking with one voice.

Hence it is important to decide at least tentatively beforehand on what size MAP package to use as the backdrop for our approach. The MAP Steering Group recommended offering a $300 million five-year package as means of getting Iran to cut its forces from 200,000 to a more efficient 150,000. State/DOD/AID have all agreed to up this to $330 million, [Page 549] which they believe will be impressive, and is maximum in light of our world-wide commitments (see AID’s powerful case at Tab B).3 However, Holmes argues that some $424 million is essential (Tab C);4 you will want to hear his case.

Also relevant is that we may have to commit $400–$600 million over a like period to Iran’s Third Development Plan. Indeed, we want to use the occasion to educate the Shah on how undermining from within may be a greater threat than external attack (cf. Khrushchev’s remarks to you at Vienna) and to convince him that such economic aid is just as important as MAP in meeting Iran’s security needs.

R. W. Komer
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran Subjects: Shah Visit, 3/25/62–3/28/62. Secret.↩
  2. The attachments described in this memorandum were not attached to the source text, but are ibid.↩
  3. Tab A is a 14-page talking paper, prepared by the Department of State and transmitted to the White House under cover of a copy of a March 28 memorandum from Battle to Bundy.↩
  4. Document 208.↩
  5. Document 172.↩