Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State⁰

Amman, October 1, 1961, 3 p.m.

181. Met with King at latter’s request afternoon 30th. King’s purpose was to urge prompt USG recognition new Syrian regime. Stressed that in his judgment regime now in definite control situation and, on basis his knowledge of individuals involved, believed new regime would be more pro-Western than predecessor. Believed prompt recognition by USG and other states was final step needed insure against irresponsible counter-move by Nasser. Then said wished me clearly understand that if Nasser did make such a move against new regime, Jordan would be with new regime and would go to their assistance.

While recognizing Department telegram 120¹ superseded Department telegram 116,² I did not think statement immediately preceding sentence could be left without comment. I therefore spoke to King along lines outlined paragraph 2 Embassy telegram 178.³

With regard to recognition I repeated point I had made previously to effect that precipitous embrace of new regime by USG might not be helpful. Said I furthermore suspected new regime itself not particularly anxious that USG be in first wave of recognition. Also said that when Nasser down, I did not think it either wise or useful to give him gratuitous extra kick. Seemed to me precipitous USG recognition could be construed as such.

King countered with argument that if USG really concerned re consequences of Nasser military move and Jordanian reaction, time to head this off was now, and means was by extending prompt recognition which would deter Nasser from making such a move. Once Nasser moved, it would too late to contain situation.

I asked whether King thought Nasser could in fact make countermove now unless there was some uprising within Syria itself to whose support he could go. King said he thought this was only basis, for present, on which Nasser could launch countereffort. In response my further question, King said he thought such an uprising was unlikely in view of firm control new regime appears have of situation within Syria.

Comment: King for moment sees Syrian developments as mixed blessing and naturally is anxious have new regime supported as promptly and fully as possible. While he understands reason why USG not rushing into recognition, he nevertheless feels somewhat let down by fact we not willing move as rapidly as he in situation which he regards to be favorable to our interests as well as his. (He also aware his immediate action re recognition being criticized in number of quarters and obviously would like to be vindicated by having others promptly follow his course.) Subtleties re handling Nasser during this difficult period do not interest him as he believes Nasser probably up against situation about which he can do nothing. He also recalls fairly prompt USG recognition of new Baghdad regime 1958 under circumstances far less advantageous. In addition believe he is concerned re trouble Syrian Communists may eventually cause for new regime and fearful this problem could be accentuated if Soviets grant recognition prior to Western powers.

My own view is Department is correct in not extending precipitous recognition but on other hand believe recognition should not be denied unduly long period. I concur in comments Damascus 129 to Department⁴ and would hope USG would be in fairly prominent place in second wave of recognitions. In meantime Department may wish consider desirability now extending privately to new regime indications USG support will be forthcoming at appropriate time.

With regard to Hussein’s intention come militarily to aid new regime if necessitated by Nasser countermove, I do not believe he thinks this will in fact be necessary. Furthermore, King aware what USG reaction would be to such move. Nevertheless, as long as there any possibility of Nasser countermove, danger of Hussein intervention remains. As Department aware, while Hussein more deferential to USG views than those of any other state, he is stubborn, full of self-confidence, and capable of taking action against USG wishes if convinced he is right, particularly in situations where he thinks own long-run survival at stake. This could be such a situation, as King has long been convinced his regime cannot survive indefinitely in Jordan unless there is break in link of hostility which surrounds him. He clearly views Syrian developments as such a break and will therefore feel under great compulsion come to aid of insurgents if this only way their position can be maintained. Nevertheless, USG intervention at highest level at crucial moment could have considerable effect on King and remains best chance of deterring him.

In meantime, as King continues be in relaxed mood, believing his assistance will not be necessary, recommend I continue handle situation within framework outlined paragraph 2 Embassy telegram 178 with Department ready to implement highest-level intervention on short notice if this (as now looks unlikely) should become necessary.

Macomber

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786B.00/10–161. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Tel Aviv, and USUN for the Mission and the Secretary.
1. Document 113.
2. Document 111.
3. The relevant portion of paragraph 2 of telegram 178 from Amman, September 29, reads: “Therefore suggest as alternative that I see King and point out USG’s serious concern that if Nasser makes military move regain Syria, every effort should be made confine hostilities to two principal combatants. Would also state that while understanding GOJ’s natural sympathy insurgent group, USG believes any intervention by any Syria’s neighbors could well trigger conflagration whole Middle East and quite possibly World War III. Therefore, as Jordan’s closest partner and as the nation carrying principal responsibility for maintaining peace in world, USG requests opportunity consult and fully exchange information on actual situation as it developing before GOJ plans intervene Syria in any way.” (Department of State, Central Files, 786B.00/9–2961)
4. In telegram 129 from Damascus, September 30, Knight recommended recognition of the new Syrian regime “reasonably soon.” (Ibid., 786B.00/9–3061)