115. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy and Rostow)0
McGB/WWR
Policy Toward New Syrian Regime
It is now clear the Syrian revolt has at least temporarily succeeded. Nasser, having started an abortive military effort to land in the north, recalled his forces when he found that north Syrian garrisons had joined the revolt. Nasser’s speech indicates that he accepts the inevitable.1
He is now in a real bind, having suffered a major setback. Three alternatives are open to him: (a) provoke a crisis with Israel so that he can rally all the Arabs (including Syrians) around him; (b) attempt to undermine new Syrian regime by combination of inducements, e.g. regional autonomy leading up to a counter-coup; (c) do nothing and suffer further erosion of his prestige. Some observers feel Nasser’s position in Egypt itself may now be in peril, although I doubt this.
The new Syrian regime is conservative, anti-Egyptian, and probably reasonably pro-Western outfit. Its natural ties will be to Jordan and Iraq. Not much prospect of communist infiltration (Syrian CP is very weak), although new Interior Minister2 had some pro-communist associations. If past experience is any guide, however, such Syrian regimes are notoriously unstable and subject to a succession of coups.
Are the developments in Syria a net plus or minus from US standpoint? NEA seems to think that any Syrian regime will be feeble and unstable; though the present crew seem moderately pro-Western, much less savory characters could ride in on their coattails. Moreover, the blow to Nasser’s prestige may drive him back into the arms of Moscow, or at any rate lead him into high risk policies to recoup the blow to his prestige. Thus a new and unpredictable element has been injected into the already volatile ME situation.
[Page 273]On the other hand, the effects of this blow to Nasser’s position may not be adverse to our interests. His role as a charismatic leader has been seriously circumscribed, which may make him more tractable in the future. The net result may be to turn his energies inward, toward the internal development of Egypt. The position of the conservative, and relatively pro-Western Arab leaders has been enhanced. The trend toward Arab unity at the expense of Israel may have been reversed, at least temporarily.
What should the US do? Officially nothing. Nasser may yet seek to blame US or UK for coup. We should avoid giving him any pretext for doing so. This means evading early recognition of new regime.
But if we wait too long we may lose initial advantage of being forthcoming with new regime. Perhaps we could have it both ways by conveying discreet assurances through third countries that we not hostile to new crew. Jordan and Turkey are obvious bets.
Now is also the time to be extra nice to Nasser. In his present cast-down mood he may be responsive to any friendly overtures on our part. It might not be too obvious to come out now with firm invite to US, or indicate approval in principle of DLF loan application for $32 million to construct grain storage facilities in Egypt. Nasser-Moscow relationship seemed to be cooling recently; we don’t want to let this trend be reversed by default.
In sum, my recipe would be public posture of hands off, discreet, indirect encouragement of new regime, and nice noises to Nasser.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Syria, 1/61–9/61. Secret.↩
- In telegram 600, September 29, the Embassy in Cairo reported that during a speech Nasser had said that he had started to send 2,000 paratroopers as well as additional forces to quell the rebellion in Syria but had ordered these forces to return when it became apparent that the rebellion could not be crushed without bloodshed. (Department of State, Central Files, 786B.00/9–2961)↩
- Dr. Adnan Quwatli.↩