Office of the Historian

293. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State0

Nicosia, November 4, 1963, 3 p.m.

260. Deptel 193 (paragraphs 6 and 7).1 We continue doubt Makarios would be willing join with Kutchuk in public statement as proposed in paragraph 4 of US Plan of Action.2 For Makarios it would mean reversal of all he has been saying in recent years and, to him, would be politically impossible (Embtel 251).3 Establishment of time period for municipalities under Article 173 is now but one of several goals Makarios seeks in revising Constitution.

Placing this article, as well as others, under Article 132 would not attract Makarios, as two-thirds of Turkish Cypriots in House would still have to approve changes, which means six Turkish Cypriots could block revision. Makarios will accordingly be unwilling to make proposed political statement for advances which are of no real advantage to him.

Principal changes desired by Makarios are 1) unification of municipalities within definite time period, 2) no separate majorities for tax measures, 3) small army or none at all, 4) civil service employment on more rational basis, 5) elimination of Vice President’s veto powers, 6) consolidation of judicial system, and possibly 7) elimination of communal chambers. Cancellation of Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance is also desired.

At same time, Makarios is realistic and knows formal changes in Constitution and treaties to this broad extent will be unacceptable to Turks. Makarios will accordingly, in my opinion, pick up Clark’s suggestion of “interpretations” of Constitution4 and will in end be content with unification of municipalities and limitation on tax measures. Makarios would, I think, be willing to make public statement with Kutchuk with respect to these interpretations of Constitution. If Makarios does not pick up Clark’s suggestion of interpretations, I believe he will continue to move toward consultation with guarantor powers and, if no progress is made, calling of Constitutional Assembly as [Page 582] indicated in his memorandum to us of last June (Embtel 693),5 in which event Makarios’ minimum demands would be greater.

Greek Cypriots will continue opposed to present treaties, but will realize difficulty of “interpreting” them and will be willing to let them stand for time being if changes in Constitution could be made.

Wilkins
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–5 Cyp. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London.↩
  2. Telegram 193, November 1, authorized a more active U.S. role in the crisis and commented on the British plan for resolving the Cyprus issue. (Ibid.)↩
  3. See Document 292.↩
  4. Telegram 251, October 30, reported that Makarios was unlikely to respond favorably to the British approach. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–5 Cyprus)↩
  5. The British plan called for both sides to reach a mutual agreement on the interpretation of the Constitution that could “after some years” be accepted by both as constitutional amendments. (Telegram 2913 to London, November 6; ibid.)↩
  6. Document 284.↩