284. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State0
693. Verbatim text. Embtels 642 and 681.1 Following memorandum from Makarios labelled confidential was handed to Ambassador Wilkins just before his departure this morning. Comment will follow.
Begin text (unnecessary words omitted):
At time when agreements establishing Cyprus State were signed in London in February, 1959, it was more than obvious that number of provisions of those agreements would create difficulties in functioning of state, constituting at same time sources of friction between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, with grave consequences affecting relations between Greece and Turkey.
In course of conference in London—at which UK, Greece and Turkey participated—Archbishop Makarios had then expressed serious reservations with regard to certain provisions contained in agreements and, in fact, proposed some amendments, which were not, however, accepted. In his desire to see end to bloodshed, on one hand, and on other hand to see Cyprus attaining independence, he had finally decided to sign agreements, upon which Constitution of Cyprus was subsequently based.
Since independence, it has become abundantly clear that certain constitutional provisions are unworkable in actual practice, as for example provision with regard to separate municipalities in five main towns of island. Other provisions, one, for example, requiring separate majorities for enactment of taxation legislation, create many obstacles in smooth running of state and seriously hinder government’s efforts to apply sound policy of economic development.
It might, perhaps, be argued that constitutional provisions in question have been devised in such manner as to provide certain safeguards to Turkish minority. It should not, however, be difficult to find other ways and means of safeguarding interests of minority, without necessarily hindering efforts for progress of people of Cyprus as whole, and without creating permanent sources of friction between Greeks and Turks.
Anomalous state of affairs, created as result of various internal difficulties arising from Constitution, is made even worse by so-called [Page 567] Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance. Mere existence on paper of those treaties is in itself source of danger, although no one could successfully argue that those two treaties might serve any useful purpose at all. Furthermore, these treaty arrangements are in direct conflict with very essence of true independence. Any attempt by any one or other three countries to intervene would unavoidably lead to very serious situation in Cyprus, with great possibility of wider conflict between Greece and Turkey.
Any interference by other countries in internal affairs of Cyprus must be considered as completely unacceptable. Argument might be advanced that Turkey is interested in fate of Cyprus for military reasons of its own, due to geographic proximity between two countries. In view of Greek Cypriot leadership, Turkey’s concern, whether genuine and legitimate or not, might be met by other and perhaps more effective arrangements.
There is no doubt that certain provisions of Constitution of Cyprus should be revised. Question which arises is what procedure should be followed in order to meet situation.
Greek Cypriot leadership have come to conclusion to raise officially question of revising Constitution, and for this purpose they will approach others concerned. It would have been very good thing indeed if all interested parties would acquiesce such revision. But if, on other hand, it were to prove impossible to have consent of others, then Greek Cypriot leadership will proceed with revision of Constitution, employing internationally accepted democratic methods and procedures. In such case, it is contemplated that people would be called upon to elect special representatives to Constitutional Assembly, which would be entrusted with task of effecting necessary amendments to Constitution of the state.
Before, however, final decision is taken on procedure to be followed, opinion of highly qualified constitutional experts will be sought.
Whatever line that may have to be pursued, one of main objectives should be not to allow Cyprus to continue to be bone of contention between Greece and Turkey with unavoidable repercussions within and outside island.
End text.