Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

294. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State⁰

Ankara, November 6, 1963, noon.

577. Deptel 384.¹ London for Jernegan.

1. Embassy has reviewed proposed U.S. action plan for Cyprus and endorses orientation toward checking Makarios’ plans for unilateral moves while attempting give him something of what he wants.

2. Six months ago GOT would obviously have been pleased and relieved if ways could have been found induce Makarios legalize de facto separate municipalities. However, as FonMin Erkin has just told Ambassador (Embtel 570),² they no longer issue for GOT since statements by Makarios and other Greek Cypriot leaders in interim have confirmed long-standing Turk fears that Makarios would now begin pressing openly for ultimate objective of abolition Treaty of Guarantee and revision Cyprus Constitution. Therefore, we do not believe that belated willingness by Makarios legalize separate municipalities would at this stage suffice restore GOT’s faith in his good intentions. Moreover, severe restrictions on GOT’s maneuverability arising from new situation are compounded by domestic considerations.

Relative weakness of coalition government and of any visible successor makes strong Cyprus policy political “must”. Believe it most unlikely, therefore, that GOT would agree kind of public statement contemplated by U.S. plan which might be exploited by principal opposition party and press as offering unpardonable concession to Greek Cypriot ambitions.

3. Appears to us that GOT trying be reasonable on Cyprus question, where it realizes it has nothing gain but much to lose if situation turns sour. It will, however, continue insist on putting horse before cart and expect see some concrete evidence good faith on part Makarios before it prepared make concessions. We believe FonMin Erkin accurately summed up GOT position when he told Bristish Ambassador Allen GOT not opposed to discussion between Greek and Turk Cypriots and if Makarios acted like President of state with two communities instead of leader of only one community, two communities could settle differences and even agree some modification of Constitution (Embtel 554).³

4. Surest way open to Makarios demonstrate good faith toward Turks would be give all constitutional provisions fair and uninterrupted test over reasonable period time. In meanwhile, believe would be difficult persuade GOT at this stage agree to anything more than quiet undertaking consider possible constitutional modifications after period of full implementation Constitution. Latter would permit development mutual confidence and good will between two communities which GOT holds essential to any real progress on Cyprus problems. Within this framework GOT has indicated would be willing for Greek and Turk Cypriots discuss and agree on how disputed constitutional provisions might best be implemented (Embtel 498).⁴ Such discussions might in fact lead to minor operational adjustments and prepare way for formal constitutional changes at later date.

5. Meanwhile we encouraged by interest expressed Cypriot Turk Deputy Halit Ali Riza in Clerides’ idea for quiet, informal Greek-Turk meeting to review whole Constitution (Nicosia’s A–173).⁵ If something tangible should come out of such consultation we believe we would be in good position urge GOT accept results as step forward.

Hare

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–5 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, and London.
1. Telegram 384 to Ankara, October 24, reported that the British had provided the United States with a copy of its action plan and instructed U.S. Embassies to coordinate their activities with British officials, providing all requested support to the British effort. (Ibid.)
2. Dated November 5. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 554, November 11, reported that Erkin had told Hare that the Cyprus problem had escalated from a question of municipal government to a “broad attack on the Constitution” not simply by Makarios but also by Clerides. Erkin added that Inonu agreed with this analysis. (Ibid., POL 15 Cyp)
4. Telegram 498, October 20, reported on Talbot’s talks with senior Turkish leaders. (Ibid., POL 15–5 Cyp)
5. Dated November 1. (Ibid., POL 15–5 Cyp)