285. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State0
712. Embtels 693, 696.1 Discreet soundings with Greek Embassy and UK HICOM have produced no indication they have copies President Makarios’ memorandum on amendment of Constitution and new arrangements to replace Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. Thus, while memo appears drafted also for ultimate UK and Greek consumption, GOC may be seeking initial reading from us before passing memo to others.
Basic purpose of memo appears to be inspire US and perhaps UK apply pressure on Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots to accept less radical proposal of House President Clerides (A–560)2 for joint committee on constitutional amendment. Basis of information here, however, there is little likelihood Turkish-Cypriots or GOT will agree to either Clerides or Makarios proposal for constitutional revision.
Although memo has appearance of trial balloon, we believe it reflects genuine Makarios determination bring about modification pres-ent situation partly to resolve practical problems and partly to build useful record which will unite Greek-Cypriots behind Makarios in 1965 elections. In talk with Ambassador (Embtel 680),3 Makarios appeared discouraged over impasse and casting about for way out. If Turkish-Cypriots refuse discuss constitutional amendment, as we expect, next step, a Cyprus request for “opinion of highly qualified constitutional experts”, might form basis for appeal to UN or World Court. Makarios might consider such new forum could suggest fresh approach to solution, possibly relating to rules of procedure and terms of reference for constitutional assembly.
Critical remarks in memo about Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance may appear give undeserved importance to this aspect of Cyprus situation [Page 569] but may reflect Makarios’ concern over possible physical Turkish intervention to counter specific measures he may have in mind. “More effective arrangements” may involve concentration of guarantor responsibilities in UK, as FonMin Kyprianou suggested earlier (London’s tel 4719).4
Makarios action in presenting memo to us alone faces us with dilemma: if we withhold comment GOC might be given some encouragement move forward with drastic course of action; if we seek discourage such action, we will become involved more deeply in Cyprus communal question, tending to confirm in Cypriot minds oft-stated allegation that we take the part of Turkish-Cypriots in these matters.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara.↩
- Telegram 693 is printed as Document 284. In telegram 696, June 24, the Embassy reported that Greek Cypriot officials had stated that only Wilkins had received a copy of Makarios’ memorandum outlining the President’s “current thinking.” The Embassy commented: “We find it difficult to accept at face value this explanation of Makarios restatement of extreme Greek Cypriot revisionist demands and threat of unilateral action.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp)↩
- Airgram A–560, June 14, forwarded Clerides’ proposals together with an Embassy analysis. (Ibid., POL 15 Cyp)↩
- Telegram 680, June 19, summarized the main points of discussion at the Wilkins–Makarios meeting that day. (Ibid., POL 1 Cyp)↩
- Telegram 4719, May 23, reported on British approaches to Makarios and the British Government’s judgments of his objectives. (Ibid., POL 18 Cyp)↩
- In telegram 5 to Nicosia, July 2, the Department of State commented that it regarded the Makarios memorandum as a “briefing paper” and would avoid making any comment on its contents. (Ibid.)↩