208. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State0
318. Called on President Kekkonen at his suburban residence and gave him copy of Kennedy–Adzhubei interview in Finnish translation.1 He showed real gratitude for it. He explained he had tried read it in New York Times but with his limited English had to give it up. Finnish press coverage had been incomplete and fragmentary.
We spent about one hour, mostly on what took place in his conversations with Khrushchev. Following paragraphs summarize his remarks.
On future Finn-Soviet relations he reiterated previous statements that nothing had changed except that deterioration of world situation is reflected in pressure on Finland. If Berlin crisis for example could be settled amicably, Finland could again perhaps live in peace.
At this point I remarked that the crisis had been created and was being maintained by the Soviets. The President replied that he understands my views and has heard those of the Soviets and that he in turn has his own separate impressions which may or may not be correct.
[Page 437]President Kekkonen intimated that he had been more optimistic about peaceful settlement when he spoke with President Kennedy and was less so now. When I asked him why he was less so now, and whether it was because of something said to him in Soviet Union, he dodged question and returned to praise of thoroughly good [omission in the source text] balanced and reasonable attitude in the interest of a peaceful settlement of international disputes.
In his conversation with Khrushchev, Berlin crisis and Finland were not directly linked, although Khrushchev did repeat practically the same words that Brezhnev used about West Germany and NATO. He added he had already reported these remarks to President Kennedy and to Secretary Rusk.
Next he answered my direct questions about what, if any, commitments had been made. First, he said no political commitments were made with regard to Finnish internal affairs nor did he agree sign separate treaty with Ulbricht regime or recognize it, nor were any these matters even brought up by Soviets.
Second, no military commitments. President Kekkonen’s tactical plan was to avoid any sentence with the word military in it. If Khrushchev had mentioned military topic he had planned to change subject.
I asked him about part of communique which charges Finland with standing on watch in Baltic. He replied that this topic was mentioned only in passing by Khrushchev. He was, therefore, surprised when Soviets wanted insert it in communique. Foreign Minister Karjalainen, Ambassador Wuori and Minister Hallama had got together with Soviets write up communique after talks. Minister Karjalainen came to President Kekkonen to ask what should be done. Kekkonen told him if Soviets insisted on proposal, accept it. His reason was that he felt this might imply Soviet acceptance of Finnish interpretation Article 2 of friendship treaty. Finns contend that both parties must agree that threat exists. Secondly, this item which calls for Finland follow events in Baltic now leaves initiative for military consultations up to Finns. President Kekkonen considered this victory, but added he knew there would be wrong interpretations in Scandinavia which, he said, would disappear with time.
No economic matters were discussed.
He speculated on what might have been Soviet motive for sending October 30 note and said that he believes it directed against NATO, Sweden and to lesser extent Finland. If Khrushchev just made a speech or had directed some complaint to NATO, it would have been quickly forgotten. On contrary by directing request for consultations to Finland they had aroused world attention. Article II of the friendship treaty was [Page 438] available for use and they used it with unfortunate results for Finland but Khrushchev does not care about those.
As to Finland’s future: Finland must continue to watch situation closely, keep steady nerves and make each move with an eye to next one Soviets may make and trust that its moves are the right ones.
I asked President Kekkonen if he though Communists would be taken into next government. He said he does not think so; but, whether they are or not, depends primarily on the SKDL’s relations with other parties; that is, whether other parties will cooperate with them.
I asked him whether the Communists lose votes next Diet elections. He answered no, they have about one-half million votes upon which they can count. These voters stuck with SKDL through Stalin’s time and Hungarian revolution, so does not think note from Soviet Union will affect number who turn out at the polls in February. He said Communists have profited from nine months in which Honka was Social Democratic candidate because they were able attack Social Democrats full force for nominating reactionary. Situation is better with Social Democrats now that they have a new candidate.
President was relaxed and friendly but not up to his top physical form as he has just recovered from an illness which struck him immediately after his television and radio speech. He attributed his illness particularly to relaxation of nervous tension thereafter.
Frank Friberg who acted as interpreter and I believe that President endeavored give much better picture situation than he feels is really warranted. We believe his efforts explain and justify inclusion in communique of Finnish watch dog responsibilities are unreal and may be effort shut his eyes to what may well be a major concession to Soviets.
- Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Subgroup Meeting July 20, 1961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.↩
- President Kennedy talked with Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Izvestia editor Aleksei Adzhubei on November 25. For a transcript of the interview, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 741–752.↩