Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

207. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State⁰

Helsinki, November 29, 1961, 7 p.m.

303. Paris for USRO. Embassy has endeavored basis communique, speeches and subsequent reactions Finland assess nature and effect Novosibirsk conversations. Soviets appear temporarily have contented themselves demand listed paragraph 1a Embtel 280.¹

Soviets may think pause useful because:

1. If they drive Kekkonen and his supporters too far too fast they might balk or by being too obviously obedient lose their effectiveness for Soviet purposes.

2. Lull interested countries and circles in free world.

3. Preserve Finland as usable hostage which still in danger being strangled slowly or left alive more in appearance than fact.

Even if Soviets give Finland breather until after Diet elections on February 4–5 they have made great gains and have started political developments here that may serve their purposes best without further overt action by them.

Following is Embassy’s estimate of give and take and possible consequences conversations:

A. Finland was given some fair words and postponement of military consultations which Soviets completely again demand tomorrow.

B. Soviets received:

1) Kekkonen’s firm commitment to concept that Finnish foreign policy and political leadership must always be acceptable to Soviets. He may have to be all more careful now conform this line because he did not come at once to heel after October 30 but first tried gain time.

2) Reduction Finnish presidential election to empty formality amounting Kekkonen’s “reappointment”.

3) Public acknowledgement by President Finland that:

a) Soviet note to Finland justified by international tensions;

b) Soviet fear Germany genuine and understandable;

c) Khrushchev great friend Finland but must naturally look after his own country’s interests;

d) It great achievement for Finland that Finnish policy recognized by Soviets as integral part of Soviet security system;

e) If Finland’s neutrality and independence are lost, it will be Finland’s own fault;

f) Finland has duty of standing on watch in Baltic;

g) There must be no criticism of Khrushchev in Finland;

h) Nation’s interests require that all those in disagreement with foregoing remain quiet.

C. Possible consequences:

1) Increase apprehensions about disagreements with Soviet Union in any field;

2) Freer field for Finland’s communists and increase inhibition against attacking them as agents of Soviets;

3) Decrease general knowledge of what happening because of tendency silence objective public discussion in press and otherwise foreign policy and matters involving Soviet interest;

4) Greater disorganization than ever among anti-communist groups and parties;

5) Anti-communist voter apathy indicated by sense futility and fear that heavy anti-communist vote could produce immediate Soviet reprisals;

6) Communist Diet election gains that could furnish basis demand for inclusion in government.

Despite gloomy situation above outlined there are in Finland active pro-democratic, anti-communist elements that even this soon after Novosibirsk have recovered enough hope and courage continue struggle preserve and reinforce country’s will to survive as genuinely neutral independent nation. Their courage gives justification for efforts help on part Finland’s friends. These efforts might take form well considered public statements, quiet diplomatic actions designed encourage Finnish will to resist and discreet offers political or economic help at appropriate times.

Gufler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11–2961. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, London, Bonn, and Paris.
1. Telegram 280, November 24, provided the Embassy’s estimate of Soviet objectives at the Novosibirsk meeting. In paragraph 1a, the Embassy suggested that in the political field, the Soviet Union would “initially” request only reassurances about Finnish foreign policy and a personal commitment from Kekkonen to close ties with the Soviet Union. (Ibid., 600E.61/11–2361)