Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

209. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kekkonen and the Ambassador to Finland (Gufler)⁰

Helsinki, January 2, 1962.

President Kekkonen received me on January 2 and we talked for about fifty minutes. Nothing of much significance emerged, but there were a few points which give useful indications of his thinking.

2. I began by stressing that I was not speaking on instructions but wanted to review the situation with him. For the first ten or fifteen minutes he said little more than his usual line in public, and in describing his conversations with Khrushchev emphasized the hostility the Russians had expressed to certain political circles in Finland. This was a fact of life which he must take into account.

3. Ipressed him to say whether he expected the Russians to renew their request for military talks. While admitting that they could do so at any time (next time if they liked without a note), he persistently expressed confidence that the request would not be renewed in the near future at all events. He emphasized the value of the last sentence of the Novosibirsk communique as leaving the initiative with Finland, and he confirmed, when I asked him about the point, that Finland could still contest whether a situation justifying the formal invocation of the 1948 Pact existed. But he admitted that next time, should the Russians really press hard for military consultations, it might prove impossible to avoid them.

4. I asked him whether he was satisfied that the general line of silence and official unconcern taken during November by friendly Western governments had been the best from Finland’s point of view. He said he was, instancing something he had said to Mr. Rusk in America to the effect that Finland must be left to deal with her problems alone. He referred also to the Swedish Prime Minister’s statement about the maintenance of Swedish neutrality. He knew that Mr. Erlander had been criticized for this statement, and it had been argued that on the contrary Sweden should have said that Soviet action against Finland would lead her to abandon neutrality. But he thought this would have made things worse not better for Finland. I said that while I understood his point of view, if the world at large maintained an indifferent silence the Russians might feel no one would object if they absorbed Finland completely. The President said he was well aware of this consideration.

5. I told the President that all Finland’s friends realised the difficulty of her situation and no-one could easily suggest a satisfactory alternative policy. But I assumed that Finnish policy, while concerned not to provoke the Russians, to conciliate them as far as possible and to deserve their confidence, must nevertheless contemplate that there was a certain point beyond which Finland would not be driven without resist-ance. It seemed to me that Finland must be prepared to contemplate the possibility of having a period of bad relations with the Soviet Union. Other countries had had such periods of bad relations and had survived them. The President replied that there was indeed a point beyond which Finland could not go. But he hoped and believed that the Russians would not press them as far as this point.

6. I reminded the President that I had been instructed in November to inform him of my Government’s support for Finnish neutrality. For my part, I felt it was essential that the nature of its neutrality should be defined by a neutral government itself and by no-one else. The President said that was indeed so, but the government then had to satisfy itself that those concerned agreed with its definition. I said this seemed to me dangerous. If under pressure from one side neutrality were extended in one direction it might cease to look like neutrality from the other.

7. Turning to internal affairs, I reminded the President that in his New Year speech he had said the country’s greatest need was for an effective majority government after the elections. What kind of Government did he think might then be formed? He said he believed the elections would produce a bourgeois majority (i.e. a majority of parties other than Communists, Social-Democrats and Skogists). From his point of view the ideal government after the elections would be one composed of the Agrarians and both the elements into which the Social Democrats were now split. He agreed with me that Social Democratic unity could not be established before the elections. (What he has in mind, presumably, is the possibility that it may be established after the elections by the withdrawal or ousting of the group now in control of the Social-Democratic Party (i.e. Tanner and his associates) and the emergence of a new dominant faction—perhaps led by Paasio, now the Socialist candidate for the presidency—which will be able to heal the breach with the Skogists.) The President added that if such a Government could be formed, then he hoped it would be possible to form a bourgeois coalition (i.e. Agrarians, Conservatives and minor centre parties).

8. I told the President I was glad to hear what he said about a possible future government, as naturally I shared the widespread concern lest the next Finnish Government should include Communists. If it did, then Finland’s relations with her Western friends were bound to suffer. And once Communists got into a Government it might not be easy to get them out. Finland had got Communists out of her Government in 1948, but she might not be able to do so again. The President replied with apparent confidence that he did not think it likely there would be Communists in the next Government. He did not expect a Communist success in the elections. And even if they did win a few seats this would not be of real political significance. Anyhow, no other party was ready to collaborate with the Communists, and that alone probably settled the matter.

9. In thanking the President for receiving me I said I hoped that, if difficult times for Finland should return, the Finnish Government would be prepared to take friendly Western governments into its confidence as to its hopes and fears. I felt sure he realised that my Government at all events would treat whatever the Finnish Government told us with discretion. The President replied rather half-heartedly that he would always be glad to let us know about his problems.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.60E/1–562. Confidential. Transmitted as an attachment to a January 5 letter from Gufler to Tyler.