Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ¹

Washington, January 29, 1962, 7:39 p.m.

1767. Paris pass Finletter—eyes only. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Following are agreed instructions for your next meeting with Gromyko which you should request for early date. You will note minor amendments in text contained Deptel 1681,² to take account of points made by you and British and Germans.

Instructions contemplate that you will leave with Gromyko text of memorandum as well as text of all-Berlin proposal (proposal for reunification of Berlin) and summary of International Access Authority transmitted to you Deptel 1617.³ You will receive separate cable regarding amendments to be made in these texts.⁴

You will have noted that text of memorandum to be left with Gromyko while consistent with instructions in present cable, also contains certain arguments and language from basic instructions for first two conversations with Gromyko. While we assume you will wish to read entire memorandum, we leave it to your discretion to omit any portions in your oral remarks which might seem advisable in light of possible interruptions by Gromyko or any exchanges which might take place between you before you have finished. Hence use of expression “record and amplify the opening remarks” in first para of memorandum.

Begin text of instructions

1. We are, of course, disappointed that your last round with Gromyko led to nothing more than restatement both orally and in writing of standard Soviet position on Berlin. We also note that you are inclined to consider that Soviets wish to break off Moscow talks so that they may proceed with signature of peace treaty. Whether this view correct or whether hard Soviet position can be explained at least partly in terms of negotiating tactics, we can all agree that West has no over-riding interest in accelerating pace of talks or in pushing them towards breakdown. Although present indeterminate position creates difficulties in terms of required US decision on military build-up, those are not governing at present stage. On other hand time seems to have come in this round to present Western case strongly and to put certain questions which may cause movement in one direction or another.

2. You might begin by stating that Soviet Foreign Minister, in last discussion, put forward position known to be unacceptable to Western Powers. In presenting para 4 of previous instructions contained in Deptel 1615,⁵ you have already laid groundwork for elimination of further discussion of Western role in peace treaty. You should reiterate this point, adding that we are refraining from putting forward Western position in all-German field because we continue to assume that Soviets recognize that no meeting of minds is possible on peace treaty and that they are prepared to take this into account. As to free city proposal contained in Soviet memorandum,⁶ you should say that you will be giving Soviet Foreign Minister paper setting forth Western views on subject of appropriate arrangement for Berlin.

3. It is obvious, however, that between points of view set forth in US and Soviet documents no apparent basis exists for agreement. We assume that Soviets proceed from principle that great power cannot be expected simply to accept position of other side. If Soviets are not prepared, as seems to be the case, to discuss seriously an all-Berlin arrangement, they cannot believe that US should be expected to discuss Soviet proposal for free city which, despite verbal assurances, would represent substantial repudiation of position which Western powers have consistently maintained during numerous exchanges and discussions with Soviets since November 1958. Having attempted to dispose of East Berlin without Western concurrences, Soviets appear to be seeking basis on which they could interfere in affairs of West Berlin. Proposal would deprive West Berliners of essential protection they now enjoy and make their contacts with outer world subject to whims of East Germans. There can be no question but that people of West Berlin oppose concept of free city. If there is any doubt in anyone’s mind on this point, Western Powers would be glad, as previously stated, to have properly supervised plebiscite held in West Berlin. It would be difficult enough to establish entity comprising all Berlin as a viable, independent city, but this would be almost impossible for a portion of city.

4. It follows that unacceptable positions of both parties should be set on one side for the present and attention should be directed towards finding a common ground on practical matters. US is prepared to continue explore this possibility. Our belief is that appropriate place to begin, since this obviously critical point at issue, would be means of assuring free access to and from West Berlin. In this connection, Western Powers put forward suggestion for International Access Authority. Soviet Foreign Minister has said this unacceptable as inconsistent with “sovereignty of GDR”. Perhaps there is element of misunderstanding here. Soviets seem to be overlooking some basic facts:

a. West Berlin and our access thereto were not subject to any Soviet occupation rights.

b. There is no way by which Soviet Union can confer on GDR rights which it does not have.

c. Any attempt to confer “sovereignty” must therefore be limited by fact of Western position in Berlin.

d. We are prepared to discuss how Western rights can be exercised so as not to interfere with GDR authorities but not how these rights are to be handed over to those authorities. (In pursuing this line of argument you may as you see fit draw on paras 6 and 10 of Deptel 1615, as well as US note of July 17, 1961.)⁷

5. Moreover, International Access Authority would not run counter to procedure which Soviet Foreign Minister in first talk described as consistent with GDR “sovereignty”, namely, that agreement between four occupying powers should subsequently be respected by GDR in arrangement between it and Soviet Union. Access Authority would provide solution to problem which would be compatible with interests of all parties concerned and remove standing source of disputes between them. It need be no more inconsistent with “sovereignty” than any international transit arrangements such as those established under Montreux Convention or overflight provisions International Air Service Agreement are with “sovereignty” of areas concerned. You might at this point hand Gromyko paper summarizing concept of International Access Authority noting that if Soviets wish to pursue matter further we would be glad to provide draft of possible agreement.

6. In event that Gromyko shows no interest in International Access Authority or continues to argue that entire concept is unacceptable as inconsistent with GDR sovereignty, you might point out that, just as Soviets say they cannot discuss idea of International Access Authority, or apparently of all-Berlin solution, we find it impossible to discuss Soviet proposal for free city as contained in draft statute. Where does this leave us? Purpose of present talks is to establish whether basis for negotiations exists. Such basis clearly does not exist in terms of talks so far.

7. After pointing out that we would want to explore further whether there is, therefore, any intermediate point which might provide a basis for negotiations, you might try to ascertain from Gromyko whether Soviets insist on discussion of their free city proposal as prerequisite for further discussion of access question. You should stress point that one great power simply cannot expect another great power to capitulate in face of demands which are clearly unacceptable. We have left certain documents with Soviets presenting our views. If these are not acceptable to Soviets, we are willing to discuss possible modifications or general subject of West Berlin arrangement further.

8. If Soviets have problems with respect to West Berlin, they can raise them. They have said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation rights. We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights because they require no such confirmation, but acceptance, as one of the facts of situation, of presence of Western forces in Berlin, and we are prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with problems involved. If we can assume, as seems to be the case, that both sides have over-riding interest in avoiding collision course on Berlin, then it is only reasonable to expect that both sides will be willing to concentrate on those areas where at least some working arrangement might be possible.

9. You might then go on to point out that, lest there be any misunderstanding as to how we see present situation in West Berlin, status of Western sectors is as set forth in para 12 of Deptel 1615.

10. You might conclude by saying that you will report to your Government and after receiving further instructions, will ask for further meeting during which you hope Soviet position will reflect more appropriately importance of arguments which you have presented. If you consider it feasible, in rounding out response to Gromyko declaration at previous meeting to deal with his emphasis on “broader questions”, you may repeat language along lines para 14 of Deptel 1615.

11. To degree desirable in meeting specific points made by Gromyko or in spelling out US views, you may draw on previous instructions. Since Soviets show no hesitation in repeating stale arguments over and over again, you should feel no inhibitions in this regard. Purpose of exchange would not, however, be to lead to break in discussions but, hopefully, to encourage Soviets to accept that it is in common interest of both great powers to find a Berlin settlement, that they share responsibility for avoiding an impasse and that there is necessity for some give on their part if any progress to be made. End text.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1062. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand; cleared by Rusk, Ball, Bohlen, Guthrie, and Kaysen; and initialed and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Berlin.
2. See footnote 3, Document 273.
3. Dated January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1062) The memorandum was transmitted in telegram 1751 to Moscow, January 26. (Ibid., 762.00/1-2662) The all-Berlin proposal was Annex 4 to Part 4 of the Washington Working Group Report (BER-2), September 16, 1961. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1951)
4. Document 275.
5. Document 259.
6. See footnote 3, Document 264.
7. For text of this note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 753-760.