Office of the Historian

182. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1

Bonn, October 19, 1961, 7 p.m.

952. Eyes only for the Secretary. When I talked with Chancellor this afternoon re Gilpatric visit,2 I referred also to my stay in Washington, and in accordance with my understanding of the President’s parting instructions to me to “set the mood” for a possible exchange of views between you and Adenauer, mentioned the President’s view re [Page 514] seriousness of Berlin issue, need for Western unity, and desire for harmony of German and American positions. Having heard nothing further, however, re possibility of your visiting Bonn, I was purposely vague as to framework of exchange of views.

Chancellor said he entirely agreed that we must get together, adding that President’s letter of October 133 and Grewe’s reports (he is still here) had convinced him that we were not really very far apart. He went on to say that he was less interested in form of any negotiated settlement than in substance, and that latter had been admirably formulated by the President and you in definition of West’s vital interests.

Chancellor said he was much concerned with French attitude, and was considering writing de Gaulle in this sense. It was difficult exercise, however, he remarked, since not only was de Gaulle sensitive in this regard, but faced so many dangerous problems at moment. He concluded by reiterating previous advice that we continue gently to woo de Gaulle to return to NATO fold.

I took liberty of conveying the President’s and your greetings to Chancellor, for which he expressed warm appreciation, saying he was keenly aware of gravity of problems which faced the President, and indicating that he would not want in any way to add to this burden.

Dowling
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10-1961. Secret; Priority.↩
  2. In a letter to Adenauer dated October 16 the President suggested that he send Gilpatric to Bonn to discuss a wide range of defense measures and to make sure that the actions the United States and Germany were taking were both adequate and coordinated. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)↩
  3. See Document 176.↩