Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

429. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State⁰

Ottawa, February 26, 1962, 11 a.m.

807. Eyes only Secretary from Merchant. As you know greatest single outstanding problem between US and Canada is Canadian failure face up to question nuclear warheads. Problem falls in three general categories: 1) Canadian acquisition warheads for Canadian NATO troops in Europe (Honest John rocket for ground troops; air to ground rockets for Canadian air division which converting to NATO strike role); 2) Warheads for Bomarc ground to air missile and tips for air to air missiles for RCAF 101B squadrons in Canada under NORAD command; 3) Storage on Canadian soil of warheads for USAF and USN use.

Diefenbaker Government continues procrastinate with strong elements in Cabinet, particularly Foreign Minister Green, opposed to dirtying Canadian hands and reputation with nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

President discussed matter privately with Diefenbaker during visit here May 1961. President’s letter to Diefenbaker August 3 (Deptel 98)¹ discussed matter in some detail and argued we should proceed with negotiation bilateral control agreements in order be ready move promptly when GOC takes basic decisions. Prime Minister agreed in his reply of August 11 (Embtel 138).²

As reported Embtel 386 October 7³ apparent progress this problem received setback from leak to press confirming existence of correspondence between President and Prime Minister. On November 27 however (Embtel 519)⁴ once again looked as though Prime Minister on point authorizing resumption negotiations.

Since then question has been stalled on dead center despite fact Canadian Armed Forces have now taken delivery substantial quantities expensive military hardware which next to useless without nuclear tips.

I do not share apparent Canadian Government assessment that acquisition nuclear weapons constitutes issue on which it would encounter overwhelming opposition. It is nevertheless a fact that Diefenbaker Government virtually paralyzed on this question and appears determined not face issue until after next general elections, which still unscheduled. (Whether it or some other government would then squarely and willingly face issue is also open to question.)

Under these circumstances I believe we should not let matter lie comfortably at rest and I therefore propose that you recommend to the President he send private personal communication to Diefenbaker along following lines.

Verbatim text.

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

You will recall that in our exchange of letters of last August regarding our joint commitment for the defense of the North American Continent we discussed the need for proceeding as rapidly as possible with certain pending negotiations. You indicated at that time that you would be sending me a further message about the matter.

I have been conscious that you have faced difficult problems and that a premature remark to the press here in Washington must have added a complicating factor for you at the time, which I regret. I would not, however, want you to think that my silence since then means I am any less interested in the problem nor any less persuaded of the urgency and importance of our going ahead as planned. I was encouraged by your conversation with Ambassador Merchant in late November, when you thought you might have further word before long.

I would hope that we might proceed promptly along the lines we discussed last May, and I should be grateful to have your views.

With best personal wishes,

Sincerely,”

End verbatim text.

Merchant

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/2–2662. Secret.
1. Document 426.
2. See footnote 1, Document 426.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–761)
4. Document 427.