Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada⁰

Washington, August 3, 1961, 6:01 p.m.

98. Eyes only for Ambassador. Please deliver following Presidential message to Prime Minister Diefenbaker of Canada. Advise date time delivery. Signed original being pouched.

“August 3, 1961

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I need not tell you how preoccupied I am with the Soviet challenge to our position in West Berlin.

I believe that the posture of our military forces is an essential element in preventing any miscalculation on Khrushchev’s part of our will. The members of NATO must convincingly demonstrate their seriousness by improving substantially the collective strength of the alliance.

The defense of this continent and the protection of our strategic forces are vital elements in the defensive power of the alliance. The intimacy of our mutual air defense arrangements in North America testifies to the understanding of this fact on both sides of our border.

There is, however, an aspect of our continental defense which, for reasons which we both understand, is imperfect. This is the lack of orderly arrangements for insuring that the RCAF as well as the USAF should be possessed of nuclear weapons to respond to any attack across the Pole.

I recall during our talk in Washington last February your statement to me that you were prepared to proceed with the negotiation of necessary agreements looking toward the presence bn Canadian soil of nuclear weapons at such time as the Canadian Government should reach a decision in this regard. Then in May in Ottawa when we were discussing the aircraft agreement you explained to me how matters then stood and of your thoughts and plans in this regard.

It seems to me that it would now only be prudent to renew with vigor our efforts to conclude negotiations on the language of the necessary agreements so that they may be complete and ready to hand if your Cabinet later makes the authorizing decision. Unless we do so we will have failed to take a necessary preliminary and possibly time-consuming step. By taking this step now we would in effect advance toward the strengthening of our common air defense.

I recognize that this is not an easy matter for you, but I do believe that we cannot achieve a successful negotiating position on Germany and Berlin until we have taken every reasonable step to strengthen our military security. We can talk when it is clear that we are attending to our arms.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts on this problem, and I hope we will be able to make progress on it together.¹

With best personal wishes,

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy”

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8–361. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. On July 30, Rusk had sent a memorandum to the President stating that Merchant recommended the reopening of negotiations with Canada on the language of an agreement to put nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. Attached to the memorandum was the draft of a slightly longer message to the Prime Minister. (Ibid., 700.5611/7–3061)
1. On August 11 Diefenbaker replied, stating that he would take the necessary steps within the Canadian Government to initiate the discussions. (Message transmitted in telegram 138 from Ottawa, August 15; ibid., 700.5611/8–1561)