Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

35. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions in Europe⁰

Washington, April 27, 1962, 6:35 p.m.

1844. In handling questions related to European political and defense treaty and particularly aftermath of Foreign Ministers’ Conference on April 17, following is position recommended to Secretary for NATO Ministerial in Athens:

1) Because of the sharp differences of view among the Six, and the crucial role of the British in this issue, we should refuse to be drawn into any discussion of the pros and cons of this issue. Any indication that the U.S. was taking sides in the matter would complicate still further an extremely complex issue. We should make explicitly clear that we are keeping out of this.

2) We can handle this issue by stating that we have three desiderata:

(a) a successful conclusion to the U.K.-EEC negotiations;

(b) a great interest in seeing progress toward political and defense cohesion among the Six which would strengthen NATO and the Atlantic Alliance;

(c) the desire to see the most tightly knit organization formed consistent with political realities and the temper of the times.

3) We should be careful then explicitly to point out that an appropriate balance among these factors is a matter for the Six countries and the U.K. to negotiate among themselves and any expression of views by the United States in the matter would probably be unhelpful.

Posts should follow this line for present. FYI. Dept’s analysis of recent developments this subject is as follows:

Spaak appears to have seized on Heath’s statement in WEU to serve both of his somewhat paradoxical aims. Spaak wants the U.K. in Common Market; “Europe” without Britain will be incomplete and low countries, without British counterpoise, will be forced to follow line of Paris-Bonn axis. He further convinced that de Gaulle may block British entry into EEC and consequently into political union.

Spaak also bothered by desire of French and de Gaulle to create confederal Europe based on sovereign states, which he considers the antithesis of the supranational Europe centered around the Brussels institutions. Although he is advocate of British entry, he is interested in a Treaty which makes revision necessary after given period of years in order examine question of majority voting. He wants British to have to accept this principle before they enter Common Market rather than have them join de Gaulle in solidifying conception of separate sovereign states operating on unanimity principle.

He thus wants to assure British entry into EEC without French interposing obstacles and achieve a commitment from both British and French that political institutions may become more supranational in time.

The Athens meeting will see furious negotiation in the corridors among the principals to put this back on the track. Heath will try to restore atmosphere of UK-EEC negotiations by pointing out that Spaak has gone further than British position and that Heath’s statement misunderstood.

Spaak, however, is kingpin. He will wait till others come to him. He may try to assure British that he will keep open final ratification of political treaty as a hostage to assure that French do not try block U.K. entry. In return for this commitment, Spaak would presumably ask U.K. to agree revision clause at some future date which involved possibility of majority voting.

With French, he will ask for agreement on acceptable revision clause as price for his agreement to treaty at this time, although he will make his final agreement on signature and/or ratification contingent upon no major French obstacles to U.K. entry.

Spaak’s objectives, both with the British and the French, are those we share but any overt intervention by the U.S. at this time would only lead to further recriminations. Spaak has apparently sufficient leverage to make progress on his own. End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–AT/4–2762. Confidential. Drafted by Vine, cleared with Schaetzel and WE, and approved by Cleveland and Kohler. Sent to Bonn, Brussels, London, Luxembourg, Paris, and The Hague.