Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State⁰

Brussels, April 18, 1962, 5 p.m.

1959. As agreed with Myer Feldman and Trezise in White House meeting April 11,¹ I met alone with Foreign Commerce Minister Brasseur April 17 to cool him off on carpets and glass and try to deter him from unhelpful statements and retaliatory action against US during vitally important period of congressional consideration of President’s trade expansion legislation. I took helpful line suggested by Feldman, emphasizing that while decision on increased duties on carpets and glass is final, President is personally interested in arriving at mutually satisfactory solution and we prepared make meaningful concessions during Geneva Article 19 negotiations to compensate for trade lost as result of tariff increases. In confidence discussed reasons why Belgians should be patient in Article 19 negotiations which, because of their complexity, probably could not successfully be concluded for three months or so. Also indicated that while negots will be carried on in Geneva Belgians may always bring their views to President’s attention through Mr. Feldman if they feel situation so warrants.

I then pointed out that existing executive order requires review of escape clause action within 2 years and permits earlier review in certain circumstances. In strictest confidence I indicated personal view that we would be willing consider review of escape clause action after it had been given reasonable trial for period of year. However, there could be no commitment as to outcome of such a review and this possibility was for private and confidential information of Spaak and Brasseur only.

Concluded by stressing to Brasseur great importance of our working closely and intimately together on this difficult problem in spirit of mutual understanding and give and take. Emphasized that if our tariff increase action on carpets and glass resulted in threats and retaliations by Belgium and CM countries it would harden views within US and in long run do great damage to European cause of Atlantic solidarity. Therefore, while knowing what disappointment increase in tariffs on glass and carpets were to our Belgian friends I trusted we could work to avoid situation developing unfavorably for all concerned.

Brasseur replied with some feeling that while he had always been and continued to be friend of US and strongly believed in cause of Atlantic unity, our action had not in judgment of GOB been justified, our timing had given impression of bad faith and Belgium had no recourse but to defend itself. Furthermore, members of Common Market and other countries such as Japan “were incensed” by our action and were urging Belgium, which had been most injured, to lead retaliatory struggle against US. Insofar as compensation under Article 19 was concerned, GOB did not see how we would be able to give meaningful compensation in light of position we had taken in Dillon round discussions and in any event whatever compensation was forthcoming would not help those Belgian industries destroyed by our action.

I went over situation again at great length with Brasseur explaining cogent reasons which required US in long term interest of both Europe and US to increase tariffs. If Belgium wished to begin an all out trade war we could not prevent them, but frankly believed in long term Belgium and Europe would pay unacceptable price. Any such dispute would be tragedy for all and I urged him to think positively rather than negatively, assuring him again of our sincere desire to cooperate in finding concessions with which Belgium could live. In conclusion pointed out that in light of our increases in glass prices, I understood Belgian glass industry might not be as badly damaged as Belgians had first anticipated, and that it was most important that GOB not react hastily and that it give time to assess real effect of our action on both carpets and glass and compensation we proposed to offer before thinking of any retaliatory action.

Brasseur simmered down and said he believed in our sincerity and appreciated very much my frankness. He would of course be willing not push Geneva Article 19 negotiations too fast and appreciated reasons why they might take about 3 months. While he understood difficult problem President had faced, we must recognize that GOB also faced with explosive political problem. He wished to describe situation with complete frankness as follows:

Despite views of Belgian glass industry, in Brasseur’s own judgment this industry, while hurt, would not suffer mortal damage as result of our action, particularly if tariff increases could be reviewed after reasonable period such as a year with possibility of some amelioration. On other hand, carpet industry was “mortally wounded” and unless something is done numerous factories which for years had produced largely for American market would go under. There was no possibility of converting these plants to other production and end result would be widespread unemployment in certain key carpet producing areas with ensuing economic distress and great political hue and cry. Even if we reviewed carpet situation after a year and reduced tariffs damage would be done since affected industries could not convert and operate during one whole year and would lose their markets to other suppliers such as Japan which because of lower labor costs could still enter our market. It was essential from Belgian viewpoint to find some way to ameliorate carpet problem and if we could do so he promised not to press us on glass and also to use his influence with other members of Common Market to handle entire problem of glass and carpets with temperance and in way designed to avoid retaliation and recriminatory statements. He therefore hoped President would find some means to defer tariff increase on carpets or reduce amount of tariff increase so that affected carpet industry would not go under.

I reiterated to Brasseur that President’s action on tariffs was final and it would only be possible to consider modifying tariffs after reasonable time had elapsed and if facts and circumstances then so warranted. Brasseur replied that with imagination there must be something we could do to ameliorate carpet problem in such way as to permit him to “unfuse political bomb” that our action had created in Belgium. If we could do nothing on carpets except give him secret personal assurance we would look at matter again after lapse of a year, it would be totally impossible politically for Belgian Government to keep situation in manageable bounds and to sign textile agreements since Belgian textile industry was also affected by action against carpets and would not tolerate GOB signing. If GOB did not sign other EEC countries would also refrain. He was not saying this as a threat, but simply stating political fact. He fully agreed that Belgium should not take retaliation against us and should try to work out some solution within framework of Article 19 of GATT. For his part he was willing to do so and also to do everything possible to avoid stirring up trouble. For example, an American news agency and Belgian radio and television had yesterday asked him to appear at press conference to lay out Belgium’s position with respect to carpets and glass. As result our talk he would put them off, as he feared that what he would be obliged to say because of Belgian internal political considerations would inflame situation further.

At same time, he wished specifically request me to let White House know in confidence of our talk and that Belgium could live with glass situation, but some amelioration of carpet problem seemed essential. He did not know what could be done, but with imagination and good will he hoped White House and our experts could find some proposition which would give partial satisfaction to Belgians and at same time meet President Kennedy’s own difficult domestic political problems relating to trade expansion legislation which he fully appreciated. At all costs he wished to avoid Washington having any impression that he was trying to engage in blackmail or threats. He was only asking for tool that could enable him and Spaak to meet a most critical domestic political problem caused by carpets and glass which had serious implications in terms of future US-Belgian and US-European relations. He concluded by reiterating it was essential to do something about carpet problem and that only Spaak would know of our talk. [3 lines of source text not declassified] I said I would of course report what he had told me, and would be in touch with him in due course when I heard from Washington.

Comment: I was encouraged by Brasseur’s general attitude, his obviously sincere desire to avoid recriminations and retaliatory steps against us, and his confidential statement that GOB could live with glass problem on basis of appropriate compensation under GATT Article 19. On other hand, I was disappointed that I could not shake him on the carpet problem which obviously has difficult and emotionally charged political implications. I personally am inclined to doubt somewhat his statement that if Belgium does not sign textile agreement other EEC countries will necessarily refuse to sign unless Belgium makes a major issue of it in terms of Common Market solidarity. I gave him no encouragement whatsoever that President could modify tariff action on carpets. I do not know enough about technical, political and other elements involved to know whether there is anything we can do. If something can be done we will, as Brasseur puts it, be able to “unfuse bomb” and should be out of woods on carpets and glass insofar as both Belgium and Common Market are concerned. If there is nothing further we can do or say, then we will have to try to ride out storm and run the risks of recriminations and retaliatory steps against us, which I will do my best to reduce to minimum. Would appreciate reaction to foregoing as soon as feasible.²

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/4–1862. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.
1. No other record of this meeting has been found.
2. On April 27 MacArthur was informed that after further discussion with Feldman it was not practicable for the United States to go beyond the position which he had taken with Brasseur. MacArthur should inform Brasseur that the White House and the State Department understood the seriousness of his domestic problem, but that failure to ratify the cotton agreement or other retaliation would help no one. (Telegram 2965 to Brussels; ibid.) On April 30 MacArthur met again with Brasseur who was “crestfallen” that the United States could do nothing on the carpet problem. Brasseur stated that the tariff issue would now become a Common Market question, and unless some satisfaction were given, retaliation would follow. MacArthur was convinced that Brasseur was the key to the issue and suggested that the problem of compensation be discussed under GATT to gain time to come to an agreeable solution. (Telegram 2053 from Brussels, April 30; ibid., 411.004/4–3062)