Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

323. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Goodwin) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, October 3, 1961.

John Martin’s return from the Dominican Republic,² and his excellent reportage, clarifies considerably the situation in that country and confirms the suspicions of those of us who have believed that our previous view was unreal. Based on Martin’s trip, the other information which has come to our attention, and our previous knowledge of the people involved, I would summarize the situation thusly:

The opposition is well-meaning but as yet has not displayed any capacity for effective government. No political figure, around which activity could be centered, has emerged from the opposition ranks. There is general reliance on the United States to solve all problems. This is all very understandable in light of 30 years of harsh and brutal repression; but nevertheless it is an inescapable fact in the formulation of our policy. I believe that in time figures will emerge and competence will develop. But it hasn’t happened yet.

As for the regime there is also an inescapable fact. The power to control the country resides in the hands of the military and especially the Air Force. The Air Force is modern and well-equipped and in the hands of General Sanchez, a Trujillista, a supporter of Ramfis and a brutal, right-wing figure. He is interested only in power. To a lesser extent the same sort of figures are in effective control of the Army. The Navy is not important. Ramfis Trujillo has no intention of giving up effective power. Talk along these lines is probably nothing but an effort to string us along; and if he did he would probably be replaced by Sanchez who has no intention of letting the UCN or any other opposition group run the country. Unless we are prepared to use military force—and we are not—then we cannot escape the fact that the Trujillo-Sanchez group has the guns and is prepared to use them to stay in power. Therefore I believe—sad as it makes me to say this—that any solution which involves an actual relinquishment of authority by Trujillo is not practical or possible or even desirable at this time. (Sanchez would be no improvement.)

Nevertheless we have considerable bargaining power since recognition, relinquishment of sanctions, trade with U.S., etc. are essential to the success of the government. We can, in my estimation, use this bargaining power much more effectively if we use it with a realization of the realities of the situation.

1. The primary and overriding objective of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic is the prevention of the establishment of a pro-Communist or neutralist state. We can see two primary dangers to this objective:

A. Overt U.S. support for Trujillo will dishearten the opposition, causing it to re-group around a radical-left, anti-U.S. resistance resulting in an eventual Castro-type revolution.

B. The regime itself, under Ramfis, moves in a leftward direction. Here the danger is not so much Communism as Nasserism or Titoism. There is a very real danger here. Nasser is Ramfis’ hero; and in the pre-assassination days he was noted for his anti-Americanism and leftward leanings. It is an over-simplification to attribute this all to pique at being thrown out of school here—and it is a dangerous assumption to assume that all has changed now that he is in power and needs us for a while.

There is no pleasant answer to this problem. But I believe we should do the following: Accept the fact of Ramfis remaining in power and bargain to create an acceptable democratic facade which will win the confidence—if reluctant confidence of the opposition—and create the conditions under which future democratic government may be possible. We should negotiate with Ramfis under the shadow of the U.S. Fleet. He does not realize just how non-interventionist we have become and the more doubt he has about our willingness to send in the Marines the easier it will be to bargain.

The actual negotiation should take the following lines:

1. A property settlement—most of the Trujillo property going into a public foundation with a good, healthy, liquid share for Ramfis. This is the most complex to work out but probably the easiest to achieve basic agreement on.

2. A political settlement—This would involve the departure of the uncles (Arismendi and Hector) which would please Ramfis; disbanding Arismendi’s private army; the formation of a coalition government under Balaguer; the end to other private armies and to the secret police; guarantees of basic civil liberties; an end to the terror generally; a postponement of the elections (no one can be ready for anything but a farcical election in May), etc. These steps will do much to satisfy the opposition and create a healthy climate for the growth of effective political groups for the future. At the same time it is important to note that this leaves Ramfis in control of the armed forces and the real power in the country.

3. When these things are announced and done—not before—we will lift sanction, resume diplomatic relations, etc.

4. We will send a series of missions to the Dominican Republic—economic development, agriculture, organization of public administration, even a constitutional government mission—to help re-establish a viable society. The presence of these missions and their work is the surest short-term guarantee of some sort of stability.

5. When these negotiations move ahead, Arturo Morales Carrion should be sent to talk to the opposition; tell them what a great job we are doing for them, and persuade them to accept the results of this negotiation. I think this can be done.

6. It should be left reasonably clear in Ramfis’ mind that if he begins to move to the left or towards neutralism we would find a pretext for coming in with the Fleet.

7. This leaves the question of who should negotiate. George Ball has suggested George McGhee. I share Arthur Schlesinger’s thought that Ellsworth Bunker would be best for this kind of mission. John Martin should be used as Bunker’s staff assistant on this mission.

Richard N. Goodwin³

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, Murphy Trip, August 1961-May 1963.
2. John Bartlow Martin, a free-lance writer with previous experience in the Dominican Republic, had written speeches for Kennedy during the 1960 election campaign. As a result of the August 28 White House meeting (see Document 320), President Kennedy sent Martin to the Dominican Republic on a fact-finding mission. Martin arrived in Ciudad Trujillo on September 10 and spent 3 weeks examining the political situation throughout the country. His 110-page report, October 3, was read in its entirety by the President. It recommended the United States send a high-level envoy to the Dominican Republic to negotiate an end to Trujillo family economic power in the country, help establish a broad-based provisional government until free OAS-sponsored elections could be held, convince the Trujillos to leave the country peacefully, and arrange for a gradual repeal of OAS sanctions against the island. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, Murphy Trip) Kennedy met with Martin at the White House on October 5 to discuss these findings. No formal record of the conversation exists. Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff McGhee was dispatched immediately to Ciudad Trujillo in accord with the recommendations of the report. (John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events, 1966, pp. 64-83, and Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 770)
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.