Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

1.

After the assassination of Generalissimo Trujillo, his son Ramfis moved swiftly and effectively to establish control over the armed forces and to pledge his backing of President Balaguer in the latter’s program for gradual reform and liberalization of the Trujillo system. Law and order have been maintained in the country. Ramfis’ control of the military has thus far gone unchallenged, although it cannot be taken for granted that this will be the case over a protracted period. Likewise Ramfis has emerged as the dominant figure over the Trujillo family and over the Trujillo economic interests which encompass an estimated two-thirds of the nation’s productive economic activity.

2.

President Balaguer, within the scope allowed him by Trujillo and the military, has undertaken a series of reforms, the principal of which are:

(a): The secret police SIM has been renamed and drawn into the background. Tortures have apparently stopped. The notorious Abbes, who directed SIM activities, has been sent abroad but little progress has yet been made in purging subordinate secret police personnel.
(b): Legitimate political activities, including opposition activities, have been guaranteed. Public meetings have been held, a few self-proclaimed anti-Castro exile leaders have returned, and a Constitutional opposition is forming.
(c): The President, and presumably Ramfis, are aware of the Castro danger. An anti-Communist law has been sent to the Congress, the entry of exiles from Cuba and other Communist countries barred, and steps initiated to disband the Castro-line party which was set up by the late Generalissimo. The Government has announced a pro-Western policy and anti-American material has virtually vanished from press and radio.
(d): A new Cabinet, better than the old, has been appointed.
(e): Measures have been taken to liberalize the economy. Businessmen have been taken into economic policy-making positions. Export controls, administered through Trujillo-controlled monopolies, have been relaxed and some of the monopolies broken up. Some prices, particularly of consumer items used by the lower classes, have been lowered by decree. The Trujillo family has given away, as a token, its holdings in two enterprises.

3.

These reforms have not yet affected the core of the Trujillo family’s power. Ramfis is still in control of the armed forces and the family remains in a dominant economic position. The Government Party, Partido Dominicano, supports the Trujillos and their circle rather than Balaguer: it operates a large portion of the government’s social welfare program and its membership includes virtually every adult Dominican, since government jobs and services could only be obtained by exhibition of a party card.

4.

Opposition to the Trujillos—which is extensive in the upper and middle classes—remains deeply skeptical that human rights can be assured and fair elections held as long as the family retains this core of military, economic and political power. For the moment, however, they have decided to try to oust the Trujillo family by political means in an orderly manner, and anticipate the support of the United States in this enterprise. Most, but not all, middle and upper class opposition elements are aware that revolutionary and subversive activity at this time could bring disorder and other openings for a Castroist take-over. However, to the extent that efforts to effect a withdrawal of the Trujillos before the May 1962 elections by political means fails to achieve results, the temptation to resume revolutionary and subversive activities will grow.

5.

There is emerging a weak, poorly organized, somewhat divided, but widespread movement in opposition to either the restoration of a full-fledged Trujillo dictatorship or a Castro-Communist take-over. The spectrum of this movement includes:

(a): President Balaguer and the more moderate elements he has brought into the government. The President and these elements, however, do not yet have the full confidence of the opposition.
(b): The Union Civica Nacional (UCN), an opposition political movement (not party) whose formation was made public on July 16. Comprised initially of several hundred of the outstanding Dominican business and professional leaders, it has pledged itself to peaceful action and taken an anti-Communist position. However, hidden within it, are apparently elements who were the intellectual authors of the Trujillo assassination, and its present determination not to participate in the elections and resume revolutionary activities unless the Trujillos are out should not be taken lightly.
(c): The “14 of June” Movement, a younger somewhat more radical group composed of persons who participated in or morally supported an abortive plot in 1959/60 to overthrow Trujillo. Although it has agreed with the UCN (some members belong to both organizations) not to make common cause with the Castro-lining MPD, it appears somewhat more fuzzy on the Castro danger.
(d): The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), which is being established in the Dominican Republic by three returned exile leaders. Its public position is one of peaceful rather than revolutionary action and it has taken an open stand against Communism and Castroism and in favor of change on the pattern advocated by Betancourt and Figueres. As the first new opposition party to come into the open, it has created a good deal of excitement in the Dominican Republic but does not as yet have strong or organized support. Its leader, Juan Bosch, who remains outside the Dominican Republic is a close friend of Betancourt and Figueres who support him. (However, an FBI report has cited him as a Communist and the Department is urgently attempting to secure an evaluation from the intelligence community to clarify this point.)

The above, broadly speaking, comprise the middle-of-the-road, pro-American political forces in the Dominican Republic. The twenty-odd Dominican movements still abroad have little following and many of them are infiltrated by pro-Communist and pro-Castro elements.

6.

Within the Dominican Republic, pro-Castro sentiment is centered in the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD). Until recently the MPD had no real significance or organization; it was established by Trujillo when he was piqued by the OAS sanctions against him and sought to prove to Dominican and world opinion that opposition to him was Communist. Although its leadership was authentically Castroist imported from Cuba, its membership was heavily infiltrated by secret police agents and the secret police earlier this year suppressed it altogether for some months. However, the Castro-line MPD leaders were quick to use the liberties granted by Balaguer to agitate and to incite to mob action with considerable success. The President has indicated his intention to shut the MPD down but this has not yet been done.

7.

The situation in the Dominican Republic is, then, precarious. From the U.S. point of view, it would be desirable to strengthen President Balaguer and moderates within the government and to encourage and support an anti-Castro, middle-of-the-road opposition. These elements are weak and untested. They are faced by unreconstructed Trujillista elements (probably not including Ramfis himself) who want to continue the Trujillo era with as few changes as possible. However, since Ramfis himself is not even attempting to play his father’s role and since opposition to the Trujillos is widespread, it is doubtful that an attempt to maintain the status quo could long be successful and the chances are high that if [Page 650] the Trujillos try to hang on, a revolutionary movement will develop. On the other hand, pro-Castro elements are ready to move into the vacuum created by any abrupt relinquishment of power by the Trujillos and will do so unless non-Communist civilian and military elements are prepared to step in.

1.

The basic political problem facing the U.S. is how to encourage and foster a stable government, resistant to Castroism, constructed from Balaguer’s moderate wing of the existing government, the middle-of-the-road opposition elements and the armed forces. An effort to prolong the control of unreconstructed Trujillista elements beyond an adequate transition period would be to invite revolution and disorder at a time when there is no one to exercise the controlling role formerly played by the Generalissimo. To act precipitately to remove the Trujillos before firm foundations are established for a more representative government would be to invite a collapse of authority if not civil war. On the other hand, U.S. identification with the Balaguer Government while the Trujillos retain essential control could have the disadvantages of (a) giving other countries the impression that we are condoning dictatorships which they consider too slow, (b) reassuring the Balaguer Government so it might move more slowly, and (c) leading the embryonic middle of the road oppositionists to believe that the U.S. has accepted continued Trujillo dominance and thus encouraging the more active among the opposition to turn to revolution and assassination.

2.

Thus the immediate problems in the Dominican Republic are:

(a): How to encourage the Balaguer Government, with Ramfis’ support, to make further modifications without excessively identifying the U.S. with it.
(b): How to increase the strength and cohesiveness of the middle-of-the-road elements and to prevent the opposition moving towards Castroism and
(c): Whether arrangements can be made for the orderly step-by-step withdrawal of the Trujillos at a stage not so early as to create a collapse and not so late that the opposition—in despair—turns to revolutionary activities.

3.

On the economic front, discontent is likely to rise in the next few months and find political expression, since it is improbable that the current depression will not end until confidence is restored and the economic system is made more rational.

4.

A problem also arises in the OAS, where 14 votes are required to restore diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and lift other sanctions. It is unlikely that such action will be forthcoming soon. The OAS Subcommittee that visited the Dominican Republic to determine [Page 651] whether the government there still constitutes a “threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere” returned to Washington and has now issued a report2 which notes certain constructive moves but concludes that it is too early to determine the extent of change and that observation by the OAS should continue. While the presence of the Subcommittee might inspire somewhat more rapid evolution toward democracy, the Subcommittee would be confronted with the serious problem of either awaiting some significant new development, which might require a long stay, or returning and issuing another inconclusive report which could be harmful to the Balaguer Government. Therefore, if OAS technical advisors are requested, and an OAS “presence” can thus be assured, it would be wisest to await a significant new development that might warrant a more favorable conclusion by the Subcommittee before encouraging its return to the Dominican Republic.

5.

A problem also arises in determining how far the U.S. is willing to intervene to prevent a Castro take-over. President Balaguer has been assured of U.S. military action if there should be a Castro invasion from abroad. But the precarious situation contains potentialities of a take-over from within; for example, through the assassination or sudden flight of Ramfis coupled with a breakdown of law and order. Should such a situation arise, our representatives will have to know immediately how far the U.S. would be willing to commit itself to Balaguer and other anti-Castro elements and what the U.S. position with respect to the Trujillos would be in such an event.

1.

We have assigned as Consul General a very experienced officer who did superb work in Guatemala during the fall of Arbenz and who has been Latin American Bureau liaison with CIA for several years during which time he worked on the Dominican problem.

2.

Measures to prevent a Castroist take-over:

(a): We have assured President Balaguer privately that we would upon request give prompt military support within Dominican jurisdiction if there should be a Castroist invasion from abroad.
(b): We mobilized a considerable military force immediately after the assassination of the Generalissimo and still retain forces nearby.
(c): We have firmly encouraged President Balaguer to adopt an anti-Communist law, to ban the entry of exiles from Cuba and Communist countries, and encouraged his proposal to shut down the MPD.
(d): We have consistently advised opposition elements against Castroism and encourage them to take anti-Communist positions.

3.

Measures to reform and humanize the Trujillo system.

(a): We have assured Balaguer privately and publicly that his reforms have our support.
(b): We have specifically urged him to clean up the security police, to make electoral reforms, and to allow legitimate, non-Communist opposition groups to operate openly and within the Constitution.
(c): We have urged Balaguer and the Partido Dominicano’s new leader to stress the future and gradually reduce the divisive emphasis on the late Generalissimo.
(d): We were instrumental in persuading the OAS to send a Subcommittee to the Dominican Republic and in keeping a corps of U.S. newsmen there to exercise a moderating influence immediately following the assassination.
(e): We have encouraged Balaguer to ask for OAS technical advisors for the elections.

4.

Measures to bring forth an anti-Castro political force.

(a): We took a key role in encouraging the business and professional leaders to establish the UCN.
(b): We urged the Betancourt-oriented PRD to take a moderate position and to come forth openly with their anti-Castro and anti-Communist position.
(c): We have urged all non-Communist opposition groups to work in harmony, to avoid efforts of the Castroists to form a “united front” opposition, and to give President Balaguer’s reforms a chance however much they distrust them.

1.

To continue to press on all of the above points wherever progress lags and whenever we think action is likely to be productive.

2.

To continue to encourage the sending of an OAS technical advisory group to assist the government in preparing for elections. Action by the OAS special committee should await significant new developments before again sending the present or “new subcommittee to the Dominican Republic even though the Dominican Government has sent the Subcommittee an invitation to return. In these and other ways, continue to give emphasis to the OAS role in the Dominican Republic.

3.

To give encouragement and assistance to acceptable opposition movements on the condition that they make every effort to act in concert with other acceptable groups.

4.

To exert special efforts by discreet means to become acquainted with and influence student and labor groups. The visa officer in our Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo has special aptitude for relations with students and we are assigning him to this work, sending in another visa officer. We are seeking an outstanding labor officer.

5.

To identify lines of authority and influence in the Armed Forces in order to be able to understand and influence individual leaders, and to gain intelligence on the intentions of individuals and factions within the military.

6.

To explore the possibilities of inducing Ramfis and the Trujillo family to effect a step-by-step, orderly transfer of their control of military and economic power at a stage not so early as to run a high risk of collapse and not so late as to encourage the opposition to abandon Constitutional activities in favor of renewed subversive and revolutionary actions.

7.

To refine contingency planning in order to be prepared to act promptly and appropriately in any sudden adverse change in the situation.

8.

To develop contingency plans to take promptly effective economic and political action to stabilize and strengthen an anti-Castro Government when and if the Trujillos withdraw.

9.

We have examined the political experience of some countries, who are in a transitional stage following dictatorships, but have not found any aspects of their experience which would be applicable to the Dominican situation. We will continue this examination.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

315. Paper Prepared in the Department of State1