194. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting Between President Kennedy and General Pedro Aramburu, Former Provisional President of Argentina—The White House, 6:30 P.M., November 6, 19622

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • General Pedro E. Aramburu, Former Provisional President of Argentina
  • Assistant Secretary Edwin M. MartinARA
  • Mr. Ralph Dungan, Presidential Adviser
  • Ambassador Roberto T. Alemann, Argentine Ambassador
  • General Aramburu’s Aide de Camp (name not recorded)
  • Mr. Donald F. Barnes, Division of Language Services, Department of State

The President expressed warm appreciation for Argentina’s Cuban quarantine cooperation as the first nation to offer material assistance. Aramburu observed that not only was Argentina pleased to cooperate but would, if necessary, provide additional equipment and personnel. He wholeheartedly agreed with the President that it was vital to stop Communist penetration in the Hemisphere.

Political stability in Argentina was a matter of concern to the United States, the President stated, since Argentina was important not only in itself but because of its influence in neighboring countries, particularly Chile and Brazil, the futures of which were in some doubt. Aramburu indicated he was hopeful and optimistic about Argentina’s future stability and recognized his country’s spiritual leadership in South America. Although the Chilean picture was indeed clouded he did not believe the situation to be as somber as has been painted. The problems of Brazil date back many years. Gradual Communist penetration in this period had affected even the armed forces: the Brazilian Communist leader Luis Prestes was a former Army officer. Although Argentina is indeed concerned over events in Chile and Brazil, and does not wish to have foci of Communist infection on its borders, he was not personally concerned over prospects for the Communists in Argentina where party membership is small.

In response to a question by the President, Aramburu estimated that the Peronists represent about 25 to 30 per cent of the voters. The significance of these figures, he added, has to be interpreted against the circumstance that among the several currents in the Peronist movement, most could be drawn into legal and constitutional political life, although some might incline towards the Left. Peron himself is not the leader of the Peronist masses but is himself inclined to follow their lead before fixing his own position. Peronist strength in the March, 1962 elections has been exaggerated, said the General, since they had been joined by numerous Argentines who were unhappy with the Frondizi Government which had defrauded them. He was, all in all, optimistic about Argentina’s return to orderly constitutional life and emphasized that the United States could count on his country being a friend and a bulwark against Communist penetration.

The President observed that the next twelve months would be critical in Latin America with respect to renewed Communist attempts at penetration: all countries should be alert to this danger. He asked that the General transmit to the Argentine Government the appreciation of the United States for Argentine assistance in the Cuban quarantine. Aramburu acknowledged he would be glad to return to Buenos Aires with this message.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.35/11-862. Confidential. Drafted by Barnes and Charles A. Gendreau of EST/A and approved in the White House on November 28.
  2. In an October 18 memorandum to Bundy, Executive Secretary Brubeck requested an appointment for a meeting with President Kennedy for Pedro Eugenio Aramburu. Brubeck noted General Aramburu’s role in facilitating the elections of 1958, his attempt to mediate (unsuccessfully as it turned out) the dispute between Frondizi and the military in March 1962, and suggested that he might be “the sole Argentine who might command sufficiently widespread backing as a presidential candidate.” For these reasons, the Department recommended that the President see him. (Ibid., 735.11/10-1862)