Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, October 13, 1962, 3:23 p.m.

982. Department agrees with analysis Buenos Aires telegram 1079² that Peron, who is almost unique among twentieth century dictators in that he retains a large following because he was deposed at a time when many of his followers were still unaware of extent to which he had debauched their country, remains most difficult and pressing political problem confronting GOA. It seems likely that he will remain a major problem as long as he lives unless in the meantime bulk of his followers decide they have nothing to gain by continuing heed his orders. Blatant manner in which these orders issued and important role he assumes personally even in documents such as action program (Buenos Aires telegram 1074)³ given out to non-Peronists indicate continuing boldness of his plans. Argentine political situation is of course further complicated by immaturity, selfishness and lack of desire cooperation other parties and politicians. In this situation we believe that if USG attempts any action at all vis-à-vis Peron it should be designed reduce his authority by encouraging his present followers to look elsewhere for leadership.

It is our view that an approach by US to Peron along lines which Interior Minister Martinez appears to suggest in first reftel would probably accomplish following:

1. Enhance personal position of Peron.

2. Convince both political and military leaders in Argentina that US approves of deals with Peron.

3. Leave major role in choice of person who would be elected next President of Argentina to Peron, thus confronting Argentine military with situation which they might well believe required their renewed intervention to annul elections.

4. Indicate US thought Peron could now be trusted. (Do addressees have any reason believe Peron would honor any agreement made with US unless it in his opinion would in long run assist groups under his personal control regain power in Argentina?)

In our view some or all of above would take effect as immediate result any indication US interest in acting as intermediary between GOA and Peron. We therefore do not desire become in any way involved in such dealings with Peron.

Unless you perceive strong objections you are requested convey these views to Interior Minister at early date and use this US position at your discretion in discussions of Peron problem with other Argentine leaders. At same time you should point out that US policy makes clear distinction between exiled dictator and great bulk of his current following, stressing our support reasonable objectives of Argentine labor.

We also believe it would be well to speak directly to GOA at this time regarding increasing number of hints from senior Peronists (as well as certain of their would-be collaborators such as Frigerio) that Peron will actively seek Communist support unless US begins negotiations with him. It is our firm view that greatest opportunity international Communism could currently hope for in Argentina would be restoration of Peronism or some similar authoritarian government. Role Communism could hope to play when such a regime were finally brought down would in all likelihood be much more dangerous than anything Communist Party could hope to accomplish otherwise. In addition we are confident Peron realizes any significant enlargement of his current flirtation with Communists would result in serious differences within Peronist Party.

We would appreciate your report of Interior Minister’s reaction to our rejection of first of two alternatives he has put forward⁴ keeping in mind possibilities for other action discussed in Deptel 901 and difficulties set forth Madrid’s 443.⁵

We are sending separate instructions⁶ regarding dealings with Peronists who wish to establish contact with US officials.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 735.00/10-1062. Secret; Limited Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department and CIA. Drafted by Lancaster, cleared by Well-man, cleared in substance with H. Freeman Matthews of EUR/WE and Albert E. Carter of INR/DDC, and approved by Martin. Repeated to Madrid.
2. Dated October 10. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1074, October 9, contained a statement delimiting actions necessary by the Guido government to comply with the spirit of Peronist demands. (Ibid., 735.00/10-962)
4. In telegram 1079 from Buenos Aires, McClintock reported that Interior Minister Rodolfo Martinez had suggested that Argentina would ask the Spanish Government “to put Peron under wraps.” A second alternative, according to Martinez, was to get an agreement from Peron to instruct his following in Argentina to cooperate in elections designed to return a representative form of government.
5. In telegram 901 to Buenos Aires, October 4, the Department suggested that although the approach to the Spanish Government should come from the Government of Argentina, the United States would give immediate assent and support. This support would not be kept secret since it would reassure the hard-line military and might help to detach some of the less doctrinaire Peronists from their “erstwhile leader.” (Department of State, Central Files, 735.00/10-462) In telegram 443 from Madrid, October 9, Ambassador Robert F. Woodward stated, that Spain was unlikely to agree to quarantine Peron during the Argentine pre-election period. (Ibid., 735.00/10-962)
6. Not further identified.