Office of the Historian

179. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy1

Washington, March 30, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Attitude Toward the Argentine Situation2

Problem. Should the State Department or the White House issue a statement disapproving of the action of the Argentine military in interrupting constitutional processes in Argentina (without, of course, closing the door to eventual relations with the new government)?

Arguments Pro. The failure to do this will lead the military in other countries to suppose that they have a green light to stage coups of their own. Loeb in Peru, Stewart in Venezuela, Bernbaum in Ecuador and now John Martin in the Dominican Republic have all reported ominous stirrings in their local military establishments. Betancourt, who is obviously greatly alarmed, has pulled most of his people out of Buenos Aires and, according to radio reports, has sent a telegram to you and other Latin American Presidents concerning the Argentine situation. (We are checking, but the Betancourt message apparently has not yet arrived, the radio report did not describe its contents.)3

Great concern is reported throughout Latin America from the particular friends of the Alliance for Progress.

It is further contended that making such a statement, far from prejudicing future relations with the new Argentine government, may have a [Page 369] sobering and salutary effect (as similar statements may have had in the case of South Korea).

Arguments Con. We do not yet know enough about the situation to take a public attitude of disapproval; and, if we do so, it may make it more difficult for us to influence the direction of the new government. We should deal with the situations in Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic by specific means adapted to each country rather than by comment on the Argentine situation. In some cases (El Salvador in the past, perhaps Cuba in the future), we have welcomed military coups. Given the uncertainty of the situation, it would be safer to move with caution, let our disapproval be made evident by delaying formal relations with the new government and refrain at this point from going out on the limb.4

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.5
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Argentina, General, 3/16/62-3/31/62. No classification marking.↩
  2. On March 29 Argentine military forces removed President Frondizi from power claiming that he had reduced Argentina to a critical state by his errors and justifying their actions by the need to protect the constitution and the aims of the revolution which overthrew Peron in 1955. For the immediate U.S. reaction, see Document 182.↩
  3. See footnote 2, Document 185.↩
  4. At the daily White House Staff meeting, the coup in Argentina was discussed. According to Ewell’s memorandum for the record, March 30, the discussion was as follows: “Arthur Schlesinger brought up the fact that we had not reacted yet to the Argentine situation. The President evidently decided that we would say nothing yesterday (Thursday), but had issued no guidance as to today or subsequently. Schlesinger’s primary interest is for us to tell the other Latin American countries that we are opposed to military take-over. Bundy is in the middle as he sees no need for unnecessarily antagonizing the new Government. It was accepted by all that we would sooner or later recognize the new Government.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, January-April 1962)↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩