Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

178. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Acting Secretary of State Ball¹

Washington, March 26, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Argentine Situation

For Frondizi (not in order of priority)

1. Essentially accepts our domestic economic objectives.

2. Is legally President.

3. No good alternative visible.

4. Replacement by military apt to loose Peronista violence.

5. Military coup bad example for Latin America.

6. He has courage, at least as far as staying in office is concerned.

Against Frondizi

1. In foreign and domestic political matters it seems sometimes difficult to know what he really believes.

2. Has made deals with Peron.

3. Has no important supporting group in country which will help him govern and solve future urgent problems; if he stays it will be because of principle of constitutionality only.

On balance, and especially looking beyond the next few weeks, it is a close thing and our instructions have been accordingly restrained. The FYI on Friday’s cable² was FYI. Its positive clause was a negative instruction against any encouragement to military to take over. It did not revoke our earlier instructions³ or my telephone conversation of Tuesday night with Ambassador⁴ when we agreed he should personally stay out of crisis and only pass views through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It only changed previous endorsement of constitutional processes to an FYI expression of our support for Frondizi because by Friday two seemed to have merged and success of Frondizi seemed only way to prevent military coup. But this was a statement of our views and not an authorization to move to open and active support.

His initial reported response was not wholly inappropriate relay of US views through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Action on Frigerio was first open intervention and while good advice to Frondizi, could put us in bad spot in future with Frigerio group; and ploy along this line through McCloud to military was bad tactics also in relations with Frondizi. On Sunday he openly stepped in with authority to Frondizi to quote FYI US view to Navy and in his own meeting with Navy. Subsequently he met with Air Force and General Aramburo and revealed to Frondizi the General’s personal plans to replace Frondizi.

I do not now feel able to pass judgment on actions of man on spot in crisis of this urgency.

This report in No. 1779⁵ on Sunday’s activities also underlines that even with the title of President, Frondizi will not have the support necessary to govern. The large Peronista vote makes it even more important than would normally be the case that there be a firm government in Argentina with a clear policy which it is able to carry out.

Recommendations:⁶

1. That we concur in Ambassador McClintock’s recommendation in the second section of No. 1779 that he take no further action but let events take their course for the immediate future.

2. That we should turn our attention to the need for a government in Argentina which can govern effectively and vigorously and with some degree of popular support, particularly to deal with the issues raised by the Peronista vote. What the US can do to promote this objective will require very careful examination.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 735.00/3-2662. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Martin.
2. Reference is to telegram 1738 to Buenos Aires, March 23. An FYI message in the cable reads: “It is our strong desire and policy that Frondizi not be forced to resign by military and nothing should be done that might in any way encourage the military to take such action.” (Ibid., 735.00/3-2362)
3. Apparent reference to telegram 1668 to Buenos Aires, March 19, in which the Department stated that the United States must “avoid any intervention in Arg internal affairs, and this is particularly advisable in view uncertainty regard game Frondizi is playing vis-à-vis Peronists and others. (Ibid., 735.00/3-1862)
4. No other record of this telephone conversation, March 20, has been found.
5. In telegram 1779, March 25, McClintock reported that Frondizi told him that he was under heavy pressure from the Argentine Navy to resign. Frondizi asked McClintock to talk with the admirals. McClintock reported that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Penas and Navy Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Palma informed him that unless Frondizi resigned, there would be a coup in 48 hours. McClintock encouraged the admirals to work with Frondizi in reorganizing the government. McClintock saw Frondizi again that afternoon and agreed to speak to key members of the Argentine Army and Air Force. After these meetings, McClintock met General Aramburu who was firmly in favor of Frondizi’s voluntary departure to avoid a coup. McClintock reported to Washington that he had discharged his “moral obligation” to aid Frondizi, had discouraged an outright coup d’etat, and that Frondizi was a spent force. McClintock recommended that the United States sit tight and “let the Argentines work out their own salvation.” (Ibid., 635.00/3-2562)
6. There is no indication on the source text whether Ball approved or disapproved these recommendations but in telegram 1767 to Buenos Aires, March 26 at 8:49 p.m., the Department told McClintock that it concurred that the “best course of action is to let events take their course,” and that the prohibition against the United States “not intervening in open fashion still stands.” The Department reminded McClintock that other initiatives should not be taken without instructions from Washington. The cable also suggested that once the situation stabilized, the United States should try to help secure a government with sufficient support to govern effectively and to meet the challenge of the Peronists vote. (Ibid.) According to an attached note, Ball did not see this memorandum until after telegram 1767 was sent.