Office of the Historian

162. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics1

Washington, March 14, 1963, 9:22 p.m.

1573. Presidents’ Meeting. We hope that, in discussion of Cuba and subversion problems at San Jose, there will be useful exchange of views on measures which Isthmian Governments themselves can take to restrict movement of people between their countries and Cuba which serve subversive purpose.

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We will be prepared to endorse and offer support to suitable program this end. Program should come up in discussions at San Jose as much as possible under Isthmian auspices, rather than come as U.S. proposal.

You should convey following outline of program to Government to which accredited, and without undertaking to “negotiate” program with Government, you should express strong hope that latter will take opportunities to propose and support points contained in it at Presidents’ Meeting. Specific proposals are drawn largely from SCCS report to COAS2 and we now urgently seeking have them embodied in action program to be recommended to all AmReps. However, will be impossible complete COAS action prior meeting.

You may express our gratification at quick negative response on rumor of Isthmian announcement on Cuba just before San Jose.

Collins3 will be prepared discuss further with Foreign Ministers in San Jose March 16-17.

Proposed program follows:

1.
Appropriate Ministers countries Central America, Panama, and U.S. meet periodically to review measures adopted and progress made to control Castro-communist subversive movements between Cuba and Central American Isthmus.
2.
Institute full and effective cooperation our countries with appropriate bodies of OAS, and bilaterally among our several states, in interchange of information concerning travel of person to Cuba and other Castro-communist subversive activities.
3.
Initiate bilateral talks with other countries to enlist their cooperation in adopting specific measures prevent movement through their countries of persons to and from Cuba.
4.
Agree to support action by COAS to recommend program of controls of travel along lines of proposals presented by COAS Committee, and meanwhile so far as possible, to implement such program, principal elements of which are:
a.
Adopt appropriate legal restrictions on travel to Cuba and provide severe penalties for evasion. Through bilateral talks we should urge other countries to do the same.
b.
Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to own nationals “not valid for travel to Cuba.”
c.
Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any national of third country who cannot produce valid permit issued by his own country for travel to Cuba.
d.
Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which is not integral, non-detachable part of travel document issued by country of which traveler is citizen.
e.
Require accurate manifests of all carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions of other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected.
f.
Intensify intelligence efforts in each country to identify persons who have traveled or intend to travel to Cuba and report selected information promptly to own government.
g.
Pursue campaign expose scope and purpose of Cuban training of nationals of our countries for subversive purposes, in order discourage prospective trainees and highlight urgent need halt subversive travel of our nationals to Cuba.
h.
Utilize our intelligence capabilities to determine nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in area.
i.
Institute unilateral surveillance and interception efforts by each country in its own territorial waters to stop this traffic. U.S. prepared upon request to assist in final interception in these territorial waters.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 36 CUBA. Confidential; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Fisher; cleared by Allen and Cottrell; and approved by Collins. Sent to Guatemala City, Managua, Panama, San Jose, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa.↩
  2. Reference is to a report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security to the Committee to Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of OAS Foreign Ministers, February 8, 1963. For text, see OAS doc. OEA/Ser.L/X/II.3; its conclusions are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 254-255.↩
  3. Lansing Collins.↩