119. Memorandum From the Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States (Morrison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward)1
Following extensive personal conversations with a large number of OAS Ambassadors in Kansas City during Friday and Saturday of last week, I have come to the conclusion that we have an excellent chance of getting a vote ranging from 13 to 16—first in favor of calling the meeting of Foreign Ministers and next getting some type of effective action regarding the Cuban issue. In my opinion, this is the most important success that the Kennedy Administration can achieve in foreign policy. By the same token, if we fail, it could be a definite loss for the Administration and, of course, for the U.S. people.
I know that Brazil has gone to work energetically doing missionary work to achieve a negative vote. Although the Mexican Ambassador has stated to me that they will not make a campaign and will be “fatalistic” about having this meeting that they do not want, still we have to realize that these two nations are going to press hard to defeat the Colombian proposal,2 delay it or “pigeon-hole” it.
My point is we have to act quickly with all resources at our command. I say “quickly” because I am sure that already the Brazilian Foreign Minister is working energetically on Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. These are three countries that with extensive, timely action on our part will support the Colombian proposal. But all concerned must be impressed with the necessity for needed and timely effort to be put forth now in reaching not only the Foreign Ministers but also the Chiefs of State. OAS Ambassador Rivarola (Argentina) stated that he had personally recommended to his government support of the Colombian proposal. OAS Ambassador Clulow (Uruguay) feels the same way. My fear is that before we get our missionary work underway, we may find that as a result of Brazilian urging these three countries may be induced to “play the delaying game” or take a neutral position. In my opinion, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile (the difference between 13 assured and 16 votes) are the key to our diplomatic success and likewise if the situation is ultimately unfavorable, the reason for diplomatic defeat.
I would recommend that you show this memo to Mr. Ball and also to Mr. Goodwin.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1561. Confidential. Drafted by Morrison. A note attached to the source text indicates that the memorandum was sent to Ball. Copies were also sent to Coerr, Jamison, Hartwick, and Crimmins.↩
- At the OAS Council meeting on November 14, the Colombian representative presented a request to convoke a meeting of Foreign Ministers under the Rio Treaty. The Council was scheduled to meet on December 4 to consider and act upon the Colombian request.↩