118. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball)1
Problem
To determine U.S. action on the Colombian Proposal regarding Cuba in the OAS.
Discussion
The Peruvian initiative calling for Rio Treaty action on the Cuban situation has, in combination with its resultant publicity and Colombian activities on behalf of its own initiative, put the OAS under strong pressure to decide whether or not it will face up to the Cuban issue. There is an increasing belief that the OAS cannot sidestep the problem much longer without grave loss of confidence and prestige.
The Colombians are actively consulting other governments to determine potential support for their plan to convene a Meeting of Foreign Ministers (see Tab A for brief summary).2 They believe they have at least fourteen votes—the two-thirds majority required for substantive action—and are hoping to add one or two of the larger countries. The Colombians probably will not move from the stage of consultations to [Page 264] action in the OAS in the face of the united opposition of the large Latin American countries. We have encouraged them at a high level and consistently in the last few months to pursue their plan, and have informed the other Latin Americans of our basic agreement with its objectives. They consider they have our backing and may be expected to ask for our active support at any time.
We have two courses of action:
- 1.
- Limit ourselves to action now being taken on the Peruvian proposal, pressing for investigation by the Inter-American Peace Committee and similar action by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and withhold at this time the strong U.S. support for the Colombian proposal.
- 2.
- Combine with the above action on the Peruvian proposal close cooperation with the Colombians and, should they request it, strongly support the Colombian proposal in talks with all Latin American governments and especially Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
The first course would avoid a formal showdown on Cuba and would offer some faint appearance of anti-Cuban activity in the OAS. In ARA’s opinion, however, this course of action would be so weak as to constitute a clear victory for Cuba.
The second course would run the risk of committing the U.S. to a line of action that might be thwarted by the opposition of several of the larger Latin American countries. This could resolve in a psychological victory for Castro but we believe such a victory would be, although more dramatic, no greater than the one he would gain through continued OAS failure to act affirmatively on the Cuban issue in the face of Peruvian and Colombian initiatives. ARA believes that the issue has been joined in the OAS and that we should take advantage of the momentum started by the impulse of the Peruvian and Colombian proposals by giving our full support to the Colombian effort to gain maximum Latin American backing for the Colombian Plan. We believe that the vigor, tact and timing of our effort will have a substantial effect on the vote, especially if nations now doubtful or opposed are given to understand that the United States is determined to bring the issue to a vote.
The various considerations discussed above are described in greater detail in Tab B.
Recommendation
That you approve the second course of action.3